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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A CONTEMPORARY CONSIDERATION 
  
OF METAPHYSICS IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY:  
 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF POPE JOHN PAUL II  
 
AND CLAUDE TRESMONTANT 
 
 
 
By 
 
Daniel Michael Strudwick 
 
May 2008 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by William M, Thompson-Uberuaga, Ph.D. 
 It has been traditionally held that Catholic theology has notable metaphysical 
threads deeply connected with the fabric of its faith and its systematic presentation. This 
dissertation focuses upon those “metaphysical threads” in order to explore their past, 
present and possible future status within theology. In each section the goal is to 
investigate the contributions of John Paul II and Claude Tresmontant and the role they 
believe metaphysics has within Catholic Systematic theology. 
 This work attempts to present and assess whether, which, and why components of 
metaphysics, according to John Paul II and Tresmontant, should be retained even in light 
of modern philosophical challenges. Chapter Two highlights the thought of Claude 
Tresmontant. Tresmontant was convinced that there was a distinct “Christian 
Metaphysics.” He maintains that metaphysics is a necessary outgrowth of a thoughtful 
commitment to a Judeo-Christian biblical perspective. His metaphysical focus draws our 
 iv
attention towards cosmological and anthropological considerations. Chapter Three 
explores the thought of Pope John Paul II who advocated metaphysics as a way to ground 
both the contributions of phenomenology and Christian ethics, as well as being a 
precondition for achieving rationally grounded thought. Since Pope John Paul II’s Fides 
et Ratio calls for metaphysics to be reinstated to its proper place within the Catholic 
intellectual tradition, this chapter investigates how John Paul II envisions integrating 
metaphysics within systematic Catholic thought. A thoughtful reflection upon these two 
thinkers seeks to provide a better understanding of at least some of what may be at stake 
by either maintaining, significantly revising, or abandoning the metaphysical tradition.  
 Chapter Four presents the postmodern challenge to a continued metaphysics 
within Christian philosophical theology. The arguments of both Jean-Luc Marion and 
Gianni Vattimo seek to explicate the perspectives of thinkers of the postmodern 
philosophical tradition, arguing for the elimination of foundationalism in all its forms. 
Chapter Five places all four thinkers in dialogue and concludes with some propositions 
for future collaboration. 
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 1 
 “A small mistake in the beginning is a large mistake in the end.” 
    -Aristotle Work I a ii.1 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 1: Overview 
 Throughout the history of Christianity believers have engaged in philosophical 
undertakings in as much as they were pertinent to Christian self-understanding or apolo-
getics. Some of this thought took place within the sphere of metaphysics. Although not 
all of Christianity’s early thinkers were in favor of becoming engaged in philosophy,2 the 
bulk of these early theologians found it necessary to at least borrow the then current phi-
losophical terminology to explain their unique position on a variety of topics.3 As Chris-
tians were drawn toward deeper understanding of their faith, and as they were also 
pressed to define their beliefs against various forms of heresies and misrepresentations, 
the precision found within Hellenistic thought afforded the early theologians an ability to 
express their faith in new and compelling ways.  
It has been traditionally held that Catholic theology has notable metaphysical 
threads deeply connected with the fabric of its faith and its systematic presentation. A 
cursory reading of philosophy and theology from the patristic period until our own day, 
                                                 
1
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978). 
This quote, used by St. Thomas at the beginning of his notable metaphysical work On Being and Essence, 
still stands as a reminder of the importance of foundational thought and its bearing upon all that we conse-
quently achieve as we engage in theology. Regardless of whether one follows in the Aristotelian/Thomistic 
school or proposes a radical reworking of foundational or metaphysical thought, it would seem agreed upon 
by all that where and how we begin is of the utmost importance. 
2
 Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity, 1961) 33, 122. Here one finds reference to Tertullian’s famous question as to theology’s need of phi-
losophy. “”What has Athens to do with Rome?” Cf. De Praescriptionibus Haereticorum. 
3
 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, 34-38. Justin, Origen and Clement of Alexandria are here 
posited as representatives of a  marriage of Christian and Greek thought. 
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official church documents, as well as the writings of our most notable theologians, such 
as Justin, Anselm, Augustine and Aquinas, seem so tied to metaphysical influences that 
exploring this connection in a sustained manner seems a worthwhile endeavor.  
This dissertation will focus upon those “metaphysical threads” in order to explore 
their past, present and possible future status within theology. In each section the goal is to 
investigate the contributions of John Paul II and Claude Tresmontant and the role they 
believe metaphysics has within Catholic Systematic theology. Arguably each has made 
highly significant contributions to the proposed focus of this dissertation. 
A survey of the field of metaphysics illustrates that its scope has been broad in-
deed, and thus the concerns which can be aptly placed within the realm of metaphysics 
are not so easily delineated. Avery Dulles, in his classic text, co-authored by James M. 
Demske and Robert J. O’Connell, notes that there is no single way to divide metaphysical 
content.4 This text will at times help to serve our aim inasmuch as it provides one intro-
duction to the study of metaphysics and presents a possible division of its content. The 
subtitle of the work reveals this division as ontology, cosmology and natural theology. 
Cosmological questions related to our topic include a consideration of various concep-
tions of the absolute, differing views of creation, along with belief or disbelief in eternal 
matter. Questions that fall under the umbrella of natural theology, including the role of 
metaphysics in understanding the divine attributes, are also relevant. And, of course, fun-
damental principles, or rules for engaging in any type of thought whatsoever, such as the 
principles of non contradiction and sufficient reason, also typically are featured in tradi-
tional metaphysics. The necessity of such rules has been traditionally held, because of the 
                                                 
4
 Avery R. Dulles, James M. Demske, and Robert J. O'Connell, Introductory Metaphysics: A Course Com-
bining Matter Treated in Ontology, Cosmology, and Natural Theology (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955) 
3-5. 
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claim that without such rules human thought is rendered nonsensical. Naturally the ques-
tion of “being” and the related issue of becoming have been dimensions of metaphysics 
since Aristotle. As can be seen, the range of possible issues is immense, and no disserta-
tion could do them the full justice they deserve. Our aim is more modest, namely, to keep 
these concerns from the tradition of metaphysics in mind, and to explore their proposed 
interpretations and the role they play or do not play in the thought of John Paul II and 
Claude Tresmontant. 
In light of modern challenges to the continued validity of accepting metaphysical 
presuppositions, I will attempt to present and assess whether, which, and why compo-
nents of metaphysics, according to John Paul II and Tresmontant, should be retained even 
in light of modern philosophical challenges.5 Of course, no assessment of this kind would 
be complete without a consideration of the philosophical “turn to the subject” and its 
bearing upon contemporary Catholic thought. 
 The inspiration for this dissertation was in great part due to the late Pope John 
Paul II’s Fides et Ratio (hereafter FR),6 and his call to reinstate the proper place of meta-
physics within the Catholic intellectual tradition. This call for metaphysical retrieval im-
plies two things. First it implies that metaphysics in our age has lost some intellectual 
ground and is in need of reinstating. Secondly, it implies that metaphysics has real value 
and is in fact worthy of retrieval. Since in the words of John Paul II “the church has no 
philosophy of its own,” I thought it worthwhile to investigate how John Paul II envi-
sioned integrating metaphysics within systematic Catholic thought. Through this study 
we may find one way, or at least important components of a way, to acknowledge the 
                                                 
5
 Avery Cardinal Dulles, The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System, new expanded ed. (New York: 
Crossroad, 2000) 119-133. 
6
 Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, trans.  Vatican Translation (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1998). 
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benefits derived from philosophical advances such as the contributions provided by phe-
nomenology and existentialism while not abandoning the intellectual achievements of the 
past. For the reasons just mentioned I have chosen John Paul II as one springboard for 
this project. He has contributed to both the philosophical and theological development of 
the Christian tradition. Much of his thought, admittedly, is still in need of serious reflec-
tion before its full merits can be honestly evaluated. He also may be looked towards as an 
example of a philosopher/theologian committed to faithful reception of the intellectual 
heritage of the past while remaining open to new ways of thinking as evidenced in his 
commitment to phenomenology.7 
For other reasons I have chosen Claude Tresmontant. Tresmontant was convinced 
that there was a distinct “Christian Metaphysics.”8 His considerations from both a biblical 
and patristic perspective are worthy of serious reflection. The metaphysics of Tresmon-
tant are more focused upon cosmology and anthropology, and as such will sharpen our 
attention in this direction while exploring his work. By a thoughtful reflection upon these 
two thinkers we might be able to gain a better understanding of at least some of what may 
be at stake by either maintaining, significantly revising, or abandoning the metaphysical 
tradition. 
 Although Pope John Paul II and Claude Tresmontant are the subjects of this con-
sideration, the contributions of Cardinal Dulles9 and Father W. Norris Clarke10 have been 
                                                 
7
 George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II (New York: Cliff Street Books, 
1999) 126-129. 
8
 Claude Tresmontant, Christian Metaphysics, trans. Gerard Slevin (New York:  Sheed and Ward, 1965). 
9
 Avery Cardinal Dulles, "Faith and Reason: From Vatican I to John Paul II," The Two Wings of Catholic 
Thought: Essays on Fides et Ratio, ed. David Ruel Foster and Joseph W. Koterski (Washington D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2003) 193-208. 
10
 W. Norris Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being- God - Person (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994); idem, "Metaphysics as Mediator Between Revelation and Natural Sciences," Com-
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particularly helpful in elucidating aspects of the tradition of metaphysics represented by 
the Pope and Tresmontant. In the period directly before the Second Vatican Council, Dul-
les’ co-authored text book in Metaphysics was the first encounter many young students 
had with metaphysical questions. Although after the Council Dulles was involved in a 
broad range of theological issues, most notably in the area of ecclesiology, his interest in 
fundamental theology did not wane. Recently in a speech given at the John Paul II Phe-
nomenology Conference at Duquesne University,11 he asserted that a return to a solid 
metaphysical grounding is essential for proper Catholic philosophical and theological 
thought to continue. Father Clarke has been a proponent of metaphysical studies for 
nearly three quarters of a century. He has encountered the many philosophical challenges 
posed to philosophers and theologians over these many years and has responded to them 
by seeking out the very best that each has had to offer and has nonetheless championed 
the continued study of a Thomistically inspired metaphysics. 
 I will also draw significantly from the work of Thomas Guarino. Father Guarino 
has been involved extensively in foundational thinking within theology for many years 
and displays a broad knowledge of how many of its controversies have played out. His 
work, Foundations in Systematic Thought, gives considerable evidence that he has 
closely followed classical as well as postmodern thought.12 For this reason, I will also 
explore his consideration of Fides et Ratio and the academic responses, both positive and 
negative, to which it gave rise. 
                                                                                                                                                 
munio XXVIII.3 (Fall 2001): 464-87; idem, W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary 
Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2001). 
11
 Avery Cardinal Dulles, "The Metaphysical Realism of Pope John Paul II," paper presented at the Pro-
ceedings of the Second Annual Fall Conference of the Simon Silverman Center- "The Phenomenology of 
Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II," December 1-2 Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, 2006. 
12
 Thomas Guarino, Foundations of Systematic Theology (New York: T&T Clark, 2005). 
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 My intention in writing this dissertation, then, is to draw attention to questions 
such as the following in light of the various authors treated: Do they make the case that 
there are in fact central metaphysical components attached to or inherent in Catholic sys-
tematic theology? If so, how do they do so? If there are, do they more specifically tell us 
what these are? In light of modern philosophy, how do they argue that the metaphysical 
project remains possible? More specifically yet, do they argue that Christianity in fact 
possesses a unique metaphysics? Do they employ and acknowledge foundational rules of 
thought, for example, the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason? Do they 
offer reasons to support one particular kind of metaphysics, for example, the Thomist or 
some other? How do they explain the nature of the relationship between magisterial 
teaching and metaphysics? And more broadly yet, how do they view the role of the 
Greco-Roman heritage vis-à-vis Roman Catholic theology? 
 I also hope to widen the range of my conversation partners in a controlled way, of 
course, by bringing the thought of the Pope and Tresmontant into dialogue with some 
others whose view of metaphysics is more negative.  This is to be done not in an adver-
sarial or co-opting spirit, but in a genuine desire to deepen my own capacity for self-
criticism, as well as to better facilitate my own ability to evaluate the thought of the Pope 
and Tresmontant. 
Section 2: Methodology 
I will first explore what has been traditionally thought of as subject matter falling 
within metaphysical study. Beginning with Aristotle,13 who himself was the recipient of a 
rich metaphysical tradition, I will lay out some of the basic questions that produced fruit-
                                                 
13
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978). 
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ful results by way of metaphysical inquiry. The focus will be placed on central questions 
asked by metaphysics so as not to become sidetracked by the innumerable debates that 
rage at the periphery. These issues, though important in themselves, could keep us from 
seeing the core. The thought of St. Thomas Aquinas14 will play a central role. Although it 
is abundantly clear that not all of our metaphysical heritage originates in Thomas, it 
might be argued that the synthesis of metaphysical thought he provided is singularly im-
portant for an understanding of the Catholic reception of metaphysics and its influence 
upon John Paul II and Tresmontant. When appropriate, I hope to present how the writings 
of Thomas have often synthesized the Christian thinkers that preceded him.  His thought, 
then, is something of a compendium of the Catholic reception of the metaphysical tradi-
tion. 
We will move, then, to a consideration of the contribution of Tresmontant. It was 
his conviction that there is a distinct Judeo-Christian set of metaphysical views that are so 
essential to our thought that it would be impossible to think apart from them and retain a 
consistent Christian position in continuity with an Apostolic faith.15 His work also leads 
us to consider the deep roots of particular metaphysical starting points which derived 
from our Jewish heritage long before being affected by any Greek influence.16 At the 
same time, I will explore whether and how, according to Tresmontant, the Christian re-
ception of metaphysics resulted in something of a reworking and/or revision of the Helle-
nistic metaphysical tradition, as Greek thought was brought into contact with Hebraic, 
                                                 
14
 Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1950), and Summa Theologica, trans.  Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
Complete English edition in five volumes (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1948). 
15
 Claude Tresmontant, Christian Metaphysics, trans. Gerard Slevin (New York:  Sheed and Ward, 1965), 
and The Origins of Christian Philosophy, trans. Mark Pontifex, Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy 11, ed. Henri Daniel-Rops (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963). 
16
 Claude Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, trans. Michael Francis Gibson (New York: Desclée de 
Brouwer Company, 1960). 
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historical thought. In this regard, for example, Walter Kasper appeals to the work of 
Tresmontant in a Christian refashioning of metaphysics. Holding that the “biblical under-
standing of reality properly needs an ontological interpretation,” still the biblical inheri-
tance would offer a “basis for an historical understanding of reality which sees being as 
process, without however reducing everything to a relativizing coming-to-be.”17 
I will then explore the case that Fides et Ratio, in combination with other works 
by Pope John Paul II, makes for the metaphysical dimensions of Christian revelation and 
theology. Tresmontant and John Paul II would seem to offer complementary but not iden-
tical approaches to our central concerns, but investigating this further will be one of this 
dissertation’s major goals. 
Jean-Luc Marion and Gianni Vattimo will be our central representatives of think-
ers who bring substantive but not identical challenges to metaphysical projects. It is not 
possible to survey the entire range of such thinkers, but it is hoped that these two repre-
sent significant thinkers whose views can at least aid us in our goal of exploring meta-
physic’s potential theological role in as critical a manner as possible.  I hope to place 
these two religiophilosophical thinkers in dialogue with the challenges of Fides et Ratio 
and the biblically founded work of Tresmontant. Hopefully this will result in a mutually 
fruitful exchange. 
Section 3: Content 
 This dissertation will contain five chapters.  Chapter one, the introduction, will 
contain an overture to the questions to be addressed. Much of what is contained in this 
proposal will be laid out in further detail and treated with greater precision. This chapter 
                                                 
17
 Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), 192 n.2. 
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will also set the parameters of the dissertation. I will attend to the issue of why the ques-
tion of the role of metaphysics is now being raised anew, requiring a reflection on the 
current philosophical context.  Finally, I will explain my choice of Pope John Paul II and 
Tresmontant as springboards for this discussion. 
 Chapter two will focus upon those writings of Tresmontant that pertain to the 
proposed metaphysical foundations rooted within Judeo-Christian history. His concentra-
tion upon Judeo-Christian thought from its Hebrew origin up to and through the early 
Church Fathers is helpful for tracing the origins of the Christian reception of metaphys-
ics. His contention that there is a specific biblically based Christian metaphysics will be 
particularly studied. My focus will be upon the unique contribution of Tresmontant, espe-
cially in regards to his metaphysical concentration in the areas of cosmology and anthro-
pology. Tresmontant will then lead us into a study of various long held church doctrines 
which, as his work suggests, intersect with such metaphysical notions as the absolute, 
creation, evil, time, the body/soul problem and cognition, along with some others. 
More specifically, the Tresmontant section will unfold in the following order.  It 
will begin with the re-exploration of the question of whether a Christian metaphysics can 
in fact exist. An overview of the development of the debate will be provided. Tresmon-
tant’s contention that there is a Biblical metaphysics will then be elaborated upon in some 
detail. This will be followed by the first set of themes explored by Tresmontant, namely, 
those which fall under the metaphysical umbrella of “cosmology.” I will then present the 
thought of Tresmontant as he investigates each of the following: the Absolute, Creation, 
Matter, Evil and Time. The unique methodology of Tresmontant will also be contained 
within this first set of topics. The second set of topics is more anthropological in orienta-
 10 
tion. These include: Tresmontant’s overall view of Anthropology, the Soul, Human Na-
ture, Cognition-Christian Reason, the Pneuma, the Heart and the Supernatural Destiny of 
the Human Person. All of this will then conclude with an evaluation of the contribution of 
Tresmontant. 
 Chapter three will begin with an overview of the philosophical background of 
Pope John Paul II. Special attention will be paid to Fides et Ratio as it relates to meta-
physics. We will consider what John Paul II meant by a retrieval of metaphysics and what 
he might consider vital as related to this end. Other pertinent works by the late pontiff 
will then be reviewed.18 Since John Paul II was influenced by both Thomism and Phe-
nomenology, how the two strains of thought relate to his metaphysical position will also 
be treated. We will conclude this chapter with a summary of the reception of his works 
thus far, with special attention upon the reception of Fides et Ratio. 
 The chapter begins with a short biography of the Pope and what influences 
may have contributed towards his propensity for both metaphysical realism and phe-
nomenology. Pertinent sections of Fides et Ratio will then be explored. This lengthy ex-
ploration will allow for a fuller vision of the Pope’s view of the importance of metaphys-
ics. The subsequent section will concern the affect of the thought of Kant upon John 
Paul’s philosophy. I will then move towards an investigation of his commitment to Phe-
nomenology and Personalism. The other writings of the Pontiff will subsequently be ex-
amined with a mind to how they reflect his position regarding metaphysics. The chapter 
ends with an evaluation and conclusion. 
                                                 
18
 Pope John Paul II, Crossing the Threshhold of Hope, trans. Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee, ed. Vit-
torio Messori (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994); idem, Fides et Ratio; Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, The Act-
ing Person, trans. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979); idem,  Love 
and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (New York: Farrar - Straus - Giroux, 1981); idem, The Jeweler's 
Shop, trans. Boleslaw Taborski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). 
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Chapter four will then seek to address the concerns of those religiophilosophical 
thinkers who bring substantive challenges to the metaphysical project.  As noted, the 
concerns of Vattimo and Marion will serve as our representative concerns in this regard. 
Both of these thinkers seek to lead theology in a new direction, and we will investigate 
how they recommend we should proceed. As this dissertation is unable to give full voice 
to either Vattimo or Marion, I will focus primarily upon one work from each as it pertains 
to the question of metaphysical essentials. For Vattimo we will primarily utilize After 
Christianity,19 and for Marion we will mainly employ God Without Being.20 Arguably 
these are central and substantive works, although they will need to be supplemented by a 
regard for other writings by these authors, as well as by the writings of their major com-
mentators. 
The larger part of this chapter will be devoted to Marion and his ongoing contri-
butions in the areas of philosophy and theology. Within this section I will lay out the lar-
ger postmodern commitments to which both Marion and Vattimo ascribe. I will open this 
section by providing a brief biography of Marion. I will then list some of the challenges 
one finds when first approaching his writings. I will then present Marion’s goal of elimi-
nating metaphysics, along with his reasoning for having such an aim. Several of the more 
influential thinkers whom he has encountered—and either integrated or rejected—will be 
presented. Specifically, these include Kant, Heidegger, Nietzsche and Aquinas. I will 
then explore several of the significant theological themes developed by Marion. This first 
section of the chapter will conclude with a reflection on the positive contributions he of-
fers, as well as some of the challenges that his work faces. The second section will pro-
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vide a brief biography of Vattimo followed by five considerations by Vattimo on a vari-
ety of topics. They include: postmodern thought, metaphysics, “weak thought,” Nietzsche 
and biblical understanding. The chapter will then conclude with brief remarks. 
Chapter five will then seek to assess the preceding chapters. Here I will attempt to 
address the questions asked in the first chapter in light of the many voices encountered in 
chapters two, three and four. It is in this chapter that I intend to provide an assessment of 
the contemporary role of metaphysics as seen by John Paul II and Tresmontant in light of 
placing them in dialogue with one another and with Vattimo and Marion. I also suggest 
that a focused investigation of the place of metaphysics might offer some future direction 
for Christian scholarship. It is admitted that much of this subject matter, most especially 
when Thomistically focused, tends to be of more interest to Catholic philosophers and 
theologians. However, I would also like, in small part, to attend to some of the ecumeni-
cal ramifications, and will do so as they come up within the dissertation.21 This is impor-
tant, since Reformed and Orthodox Christians dwell within the same philosophical mi-
lieu, and an elaboration upon the role of metaphysics may also prove useful for these 
Christians as well. This will be most true as concerns biblically-based positions deriving 
from our common Judeo-Christian heritage. Other parts of this dissertation will be more 
pertinent to Catholic theology, especially in our consideration of metaphysical language 
as found in official Church teaching. 
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Section 4: Elaboration on the Sphere of Metaphysics 
 When setting out to discuss the role of metaphysics within the work of Tresmon-
tant and John Paul II one is first obliged to define in a more restricted sense what, for the 
sake of understanding their work, will be meant by metaphysics. Often in common par-
lance the word metaphysics is used to refer to all spiritual realities whatsoever. In this 
dissertation the term will be more narrowly used. Although there is no single definition 
for metaphysics, by drawing from a few notable scholars we can arrive at a more refined 
notion of the term. Cardinal Dulles states that “by metaphysics we understand the phi-
losophical study of the real- that is, of that which exists independently of the act by which 
we know it.”22 Norris Clarke gives the following explanation of the science. 
Metaphysics fits into the overall project of philosophy as its in-
nermost ground, as that part which focuses its inquiry explicitly on 
the vision of the whole, that is , what is common to all real beings 
and what constitutes their connectedness to the universe as a mean-
ingful whole. It is the ultimate framework or horizon of inquiry, 
into which all other investigations, including all the sciences, fit as 
partial perspectives. Its work will then be to try to discern the great 
universal properties, constitutive principles, and governing laws of 
all that is real, in a word, the laws of intelligibility of being as 
such, including how all beings interrelate to form an intelligible 
whole, that is, a universe… This is the meaning of the ancient clas-
sical definition of metaphysics descending from Aristotle- the first 
to explicitly define metaphysics- namely, “Metaphysics is the 
study of being qua being” or being as such.23 
 
 
 Br. Benignus calls metaphysics a “master-science” as it does not just study parts 
or pieces of reality, but is the science which studies all being. He asserts that its creden-
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tials as a science have been thought sufficiently established as it possesses a proper ob-
ject, “being as such.” He notes that “this object not only is studied by no other science, 
but it underlies the object of every other science.”24  
 For the purposes for this dissertation we will use the following slightly modified 
definitions for the various branches of metaphysical study offered in Dulles’ text. 
Ontology = the study of reality in its most general aspects.  It is in the 
study of ontology that one attempts to answer questions such as these: 
What is being? What are the general types of beings? How can there by 
many beings? What is required in order for there to be change? This is 
also referred to as General Metaphysics. 
 
Natural Theology = the study of God: His existence, nature and opera-
tions. Included in this study is what is referred to as the divine attributes. 
 
Metaphysical Anthropology = the study of living bodies considered pre-
cisely with respect to their vital operations. This was in the past also re-
ferred to as rational psychology. 
 
Cosmology = the study of the common aspects of the visible universe, 
with special attention to non-living bodies.25 
 
 The two foundational principles that we will be referring to throughout this disser-
tation are the Principle of non-Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. We 
will rely on the broader view of these principles as held by Clarke rather than a narrower 
rationalistic perspective such as that of Leibniz on Sufficient Reason. Clarke defines 
these principles as follows: 
Principle of Non-Contradiction = This principle, often called simply the 
"principle of contradiction," lays down the basic law of intelligibility gov-
erning all being whatsoever and all discourse about anything whatsoever. 
Its classic formulation, coming down to us from Aristotle as probably its 
first explicit defender, is: "Nothing (i.e., no real being) can both be and not 
be at the same time and under the same aspect."  The principal also holds 
for all meaningful language: "No proposition can both be asserted and de-
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nied at the same time and under the same aspect," under pain of becoming 
meaningless, although one can, of course, say the words.26 
 
Principle of Sufficient Reason = “Every being has the sufficient reason 
for its existence (i.e., the adequate ground or basis in existence for its in-
telligibility) either in itself or in another.”  Just as the Principle of Non-
Contradiction is the static first principle of all being and thought, so the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason is the dynamic one, enabling the mind to 
pass from one being to another in the search to make sense out of it, to 
preserve it from falling into unintelligibility. All advance in thought to in-
fer the existence of some new being from what we already know depends 
on this principle. The ancient and medieval thinkers, including St. Tho-
mas, did not formulate the principle in these explicit terms, but simply in-
cluded it under the general affirmation of the intelligibility of being (being 
as “true"), or formulated it more precisely for particular kinds of inference, 
e.g., “Every being that begins to exist (or is finite, or participated, or 
changing, etc.) requires a cause.” But many modern Thomists welcome 
the explicit formulation given above, as I do, because of its convenience as 
the most all-inclusive expression of the dynamic intelligibility of being 
and distinct from the static principle, and one that all realistic metaphysi-
cians used constantly, whether they describe it in this way or not. Yet 
many still refuse, like Gilson, the great historian of Thomism, for fear it 
will be confused with the rationalistic interpretation of it by Leibniz.27 
 
 
 These few terms will begin to provide a framework out of which we can work, 
allowing us to refer to specific metaphysical content. Other terms and explanations will 
be provided within the body of each chapter as needed. These initial definitions are pur-
posely broad in order to encompass the way in which they are employed by the numerous 
thinkers who will present their views on metaphysics throughout the subsequent chapters. 
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As for Thomism, its philosophy of nature has needed reshaping for a long 
time. The task (a vanished dream of my youth) is certainly not impossible, 
but it is difficult in the highest degree. Yet I am confident it will be done. 
It would require a team in which scientists and philosophers would work 
together, and which would be led by a competent philosopher. Such a phi-
losopher seems to be improbable? I don’t think so, his name is on the tip 
of my tongue.1 
    -Jacques Maritain 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: TRESMONTANT AND METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
 The quotation by Jacques Maritain leads to a footnote naming Claude Tresmon-
tant as the philosopher he thinks capable of such a feat.  Although Maritain refers to a 
very specific philosophical undertaking, he nonetheless indicates his confidence in the 
intellectual ability of Tresmontant.  With similar confidence, this chapter will explore the 
thought of Tresmontant, in particular his work in metaphysics. 
 Claude Tresmontant was born in Paris in 1925.  He taught both medieval 
philosophy and philosophy of science at the Sorbonne, in Paris.  He was awarded the Prix 
Maximilien-Kolbe in 1973 and the Grand Prix de l’Académie des sciences morales et 
politiques in 1987 for his complete works.  Tresmontant spent a lifetime studying the 
interrelationship between scripture and metaphysics.  He died in 1997. 
 When confronting Tresmontant’s work, it becomes apparent that he concerns 
himself most with the foundations that underpin Judeo-Christian thought.  Although each 
of his works is distinct, one finds the author approaching the same subject matter with 
varied concentrations.  It is as if he were scaling the same mountain, but always from a 
different angle and employing a different path.  This continuous effort helps him to con-
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struct a consistent and nuanced metaphysics.  His work clearly displays the unique place 
occupied by a Christian metaphysics.  He asserts that logic itself demands that the Chris-
tian take seriously the place of revelation.  This is because Sacred Scripture posits certain 
givens or points of departure.  The Christian philosopher is able to construct a consistent 
philosophy in light of this revelation.  Applying logic to axiomatic principles that the 
Christian takes as “given” might be a worthwhile venture, but some question the integrity 
of accepting any “givens.”  To respond to this concern, Tresmontant seeks to expose the 
foundational presuppositions of all philosophical systems.  He believes all philosophical 
systems adopt certain presuppositions from their beginnings.  These presuppositions 
powerfully affect all subsequent developments of that system.  When given a fair hearing, 
the Judeo-Christian metaphysical foundation proves superior to all competitors.  In addi-
tion, he believes that pure reason, based in experience, will lead one to this conclusion, 
and that the findings of modern science additionally lend support to this claim. 
Section 1: The Existence of Christian Metaphysics 
Claude Tresmontant was in his early childhood when fierce debates raged over 
whether there could be a “Christian metaphysics.” Later when he entered the dispute, he 
held the conviction that there was a distinct Christian metaphysics. Indeed, he spent a 
lifetime of scholarship defending various aspects of this conviction. 
 Avery Cardinal Dulles provides an overview of the debate concerning the possi-
bility of a distinctively Christian metaphysics.2  We shall briefly recap his major points in 
order to grasp the pertinent issues confronted by Tresmontant and recognize how the dif-
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fering camps approached the problem and how they proposed a solution. Dulles’ essay 
places in context the work and conviction of Tresmontant and also provides insight into a 
new state of the question which can be subsequently taken up with the following chapter 
on the contribution of John Paul II in Fides et Ratio.3 
 The framing of the debate took shape with the help of Émile Bréhier, who denied 
the possibility of Christian Metaphysics.4  He argued that since there cannot be a Chris-
tian Mathematics or Christian Biology, there cannot be a Christian Philosophy.  Philoso-
phy, like mathematics and biology, is accessible to all through the human capacity to rea-
son. Étienne Gilson, on the other hand, maintained that although philosophy and theology 
were distinct undertakings, theology provided philosophy with support. Gilson was con-
vinced that theology could aid philosophical progress without damaging the integrity of 
philosophy. 
 Dulles concludes his overview with a brief excursus into a third group of mediat-
ing positions.  Members of this group emphasize the interconnected relationship between 
philosophy and theology and how they can be mutually beneficial to one another.  Dulles 
mentions that Maurice Blondel was quick to point out how this debate was framed to 
make revelation appear superfluous. Dulles notes: 
as an alternative to this extrinsicism Blondel contended that philosophy, 
when it operates without any reference to faith, becomes aware of its own 
limits. It can discover within the human person an inner dynamism toward 
a goal that nature cannot reach and toward a truth that reason cannot dis-
cover.5 
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 Maurice Blondel’s writings had a great impact on Tresmontant.  I will draw from 
his work on Blondel’s metaphysics to explain a number of his philosophical positions.6 
Tresmontant worked at a time when he was able to benefit from the theological and phi-
losophical controversies that immediately preceded him.  The creative work of these 
scholars sought to reconcile many of the philosophical issues raised anew by the contri-
butions and challenges of modern philosophy. 
Section 2: A Biblical Metaphysics 
 In order to make sense of Tresmontant’s work, I will discuss his approach to the 
relationship between biblical revelation and metaphysics.  Unlike most philosophers who 
shy away from biblical influences contained within their philosophy, Tresmontant firmly 
asserts the opposite.  He was convinced that there is a “Biblical Metaphysics.”  In his 
1960 article in Cross Currents, he writes: 
This article intends to demonstrate that biblical thought possesses a struc-
ture which can only be called metaphysical because no other term would 
be appropriate; that a metaphysical structure of Biblical theology exists, 
not extrinsically or accidentally, but, as analysis will reveal, of intrinsic 
necessity.  Biblical theology would not be possible, nor the biblical mes-
sage of revelation exist, if it were not metaphysically structured. The very 
existence of this theology, of this revelation, implies a certain metaphysi-
cal structure as a prerequisite.7 
 
 
 Again, in his Christian Metaphysics, he reiterates the same point.  This 
became his mantra throughout his academic career.  He states: 
I maintain that Christian theology and Christian dogma contain in them-
selves a metaphysical substructure, a body of very precise and very well-
defined theses which are properly metaphysical, though it is only progres-
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sively with time, in the course of its history, that Christian thought be-
comes conscious of it.8 
 
 
This probably strikes the reader as odd.  Indeed, most philosophers today seek to estab-
lish the credibility of their work solely using reason and without divine revelation. 
 To make sense of the above assertions, it is necessary to understand Tresmon-
tant’s approach to metaphysics.  He does not begin his work as a metaphysician dissatis-
fied with proposed metaphysical systems of the past and in search of a satisfactory meta-
physical alternative.  He instead finds that as a student of biblical theology there is in fact 
a coherent structure already in place.  This structure contains an internal coherence and is 
unique.  It is also clear upon a fleshing out of the structure that it stands in contradiction 
to other well-established metaphysical structures.  Tresmontant then investigates the 
foundations of these competing systems (Platonism, the varied forms of Pantheism, He-
gelianism, etc.) to see if the Judeo-Christian is weaker.  He concludes that the opposite is 
the case, each system begins with some mythical assumptions, and the Judeo-Christian 
myth is rationally the most plausible. 
 In order to make more explicit what Tresmontant means by a Christian metaphys-
ics, Edmond La B. Cherbonnier distinguishes between what we mean when we consider 
metaphysics in its general and specific forms.  In his article, which deals specifically with 
the topic of a biblical metaphysics and the thought of Tresmontant, he makes some help-
ful distinctions.9  Metaphysics in its general form is comparable to the general study of 
physics. Those who are engaged in this general pursuit seek to understand the varied as-
pects of physical reality. The more specific use refers to the proposed system employed 
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by a given thinker. For example, we can compare Aristotelian, Newtonian and quantum 
physics. Each proposes a system that seeks to offer the greatest explanation of the work-
ings of the same physical universe. It should be noted that each system is limited and 
cannot offer all the answers being asked of it. Yet, the system that provides the best an-
swers with greatest accuracy will be considered the most “true.” Reality itself stands as 
judge.  In this case, it is physical reality, and in metaphysics all reality. 
 Cherbonnier writes the following to clarify Tresmontant’s understanding of bibli-
cal metaphysics: 
Metaphysics, likewise, in its general sense, refers to a particular inquiry.  
The metaphysician asks: “What is true always and everywhere, regardless 
of time or place?  And how is this truth related to the particular truths of 
[times] and places?” Possible answers, from the atomic theory of De-
mocritus to the idealism of Hegel, are also “metaphysics,” in the specific 
sense.  When this sense is intended, the word is often spelled “meta-
physic,” without the final s.  The Biblical metaphysic is simply the sys-
tematic development of one possible answer to the metaphysician’s ques-
tion, based upon hints and latent assumptions within the Bible.10 
 
 
Tresmontant admits that a systematic biblical metaphysics does not exist within 
Scripture.  It “must be disengaged by analysis, bringing it from its natural mode of exis-
tence to the level of conceptual formulation, as in a traditional ‘treatise’ of western phi-
losophy.”11  A systematic treatise, like the one previously mentioned by Tresmontant, 
requires a person to draw from the texts those cosmological elements that sit at the core 
of Hebrew thought.  It includes the added difficulty of dealing with a people and lan-
guage that are very concrete and lack the more abstract vocabulary offered by Greek 
thought. 
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 The work of Tresmontant sets out to extract these elements.  His effort leads me 
to consider the Judeo-Christian view of the following topics: the absolute, creation, mat-
ter, evil, time, time and eternity, body and soul relations, human nature, the supernatural 
destiny of human beings, the heart, the mind, faith and the renewal of intellect.  Each of 
these concepts displays a distinct metaphysic that can bear no other title than Christian. 
 Even though a Jewish philosopher could adopt much of the metaphysics spoken 
of by Tresmontant, biblical metaphysics in its entirety includes the New Testament, 
which is not identical with Jewish thought.  As we deal with each specific element, we 
can see how they both differ and agree.  To be precise, Tresmontant’s concern is with a 
distinctly Christian metaphysics, which is rooted in Judaism. 
 In describing the relationship between biblical metaphysics and Christian phi-
losophy, Tresmontant says: 
Christian philosophy is biblical metaphysics, developed in a different cul-
tural context and philosophical milieu than that of Israel.  The language 
and technical formulation may be different, but the structure remains es-
sentially the same because it expresses what Blondel has called the phi-
losophical exigencies of Christianity.12  
 
 
 Tresmontant says this biblical metaphysics gives expression to “the Real.”  The 
Hebrew people concretely lived out of the real, and the Real has a metaphysical structure.  
To make his case, Tresmontant contrasts the worldviews of the Hebrews with those of the 
Canaanites, Egyptians, and Mesopotamians.  These worldviews, especially as they per-
tained to the Absolute, were in direct contrast to the Hebrews. 
 As put forth concisely in his article on biblical metaphysics, his thesis on this 
topic consists of two points: first, that “not every metaphysics is compatible with every 
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theology,” and second, that “not every metaphysics, and thus not every theology, is com-
patible with any conception of the Real, with any cosmology, with any anthropology 
whatsoever.”13 
 Cherbonnier finds that Tresmontant’s focus on the concrete approach to meta-
physical realism also aids in answering some of the difficulties found in religious lan-
guage. He writes that “the problem of specifically ‘religious’ language, currently receiv-
ing such solicitous attention, disappears within the Biblical metaphysics. In Platonism, 
the language of the everyday world, since it is characterized by the ‘subject-object struc-
ture,’ cannot apply to the ‘divine.’  At best, it can be used only suggestively, to stir up in 
the hearer a hint of what can never be said but only intuitively felt. Within such a meta-
physic, one is bound to conclude that ‘religion is the poetry men live by.’ One is saddled 
with the insoluble problem of which poetry is ‘more true.’”14 
 Cherbonnier finds the following quotation by Tresmontant representative 
of the universal approachability of Hebrew metaphysics: 
The advantage of the Hebrew method of metaphysical communication… 
consists in its being universally comprehensible.  [It] takes departure from 
what is most concrete and common, from the universally human.  It is not 
allied with any particular culture; with all the contingencies which accom-
pany it, nor with a particular system of abstractions generally reserved for 
a privileged class….The Biblical parable is equally intelligible to the Gali-
lean peasant, to the Corinthian docker at the time of St. Paul, and to the 
contemporary worker in the factories of Paris.  One must add, especially to 
them.  The sense of the meaningfulness of manual labor, the love of the 
concrete, which characterize the parables, are looked upon as a deficiency 
by the Platonic mentality.15 
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 It is Tresmontant’s love of the particular that at times puts him at odds with Pla-
tonic thought and its fascination with the universal.  While for Plato the universal was to 
be sought in attempting to attain the more real, for Tresmontant it is in the particular that 
the depths of reality are to be found.  This love of the particular proves to fit well within 
Christian theology which inevitably must admit revelation’s manifestation in the particu-
lar.  Biblical revelation takes place at a particular time, to a particular person(s), in a par-
ticular language etc.  There is an ironic sense in which the particular becomes the very 
springboard for the possibility of a universal relevance.  As Brian Cudahy states, “it could 
be said the Tresmontant characterizes Hebrew thought as materialistic, existential, and 
deeply conscious of the irreducibility of the historical and temporal dimension.”16 
 Before a sustained exploration of specific contributions made by Tresmontant in 
regard to specific metaphysical topics, a few preliminary comments are in order.  First, 
some may be concerned with Tresmontant’s use of Scripture and his apparent choice not 
to include extensive modern biblical exegesis as he treats some key passages related to 
his metaphysical conclusions.  For better or worse, Tresmontant does not often fill his 
texts with heavy exegetical footnotes.  He does, however, provide an in-depth exploration 
of scripture in his works where this is in fact the focus.  Fortunately, his interpretation 
and explanation of the texts were not outside of the parameters of the mainstream thought 
of his time.  Perhaps, in light of his work, some future scholarship could attempt a more 
critical look at the scriptural passages used by Tresmontant to see how they fare after un-
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dergoing critical exegesis in light of modern scholarship.17  It seems that the author is 
more set upon staying on task concerning his philosophical project as opposed to turning 
his efforts into an exercise in exegetical debate.  By his own admission, Tresmontant used 
and conceded to the best scholarship available during the time he wrote each of his 
works, most especially the earlier works.  It should also be noted that Tresmontant him-
self authored works in the field of biblical theology, particularly later in his career.18  His 
continued study seems to have led him to engage in different debates in the area of bibli-
cal theology, but did not result in his recanting on points of biblical interpretation, as far 
as I have been able to survey. 
 Secondly, the work of Tresmontant is only foundational in a sketchy sense, thus 
calling for further critique.  In the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Cudahy 
states: 
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his work is by no means a complete and adequate philosophical statement.  
At best it is a mere sketch of certain key lines that a philosophical system 
might take.  In the works we have discussed there is no rigorous analysis 
of being and knowledge and God, simply a series of vignettes that point 
toward such an analysis.19  
In several footnotes, Cudahy acknowledges that Tresmontant admitted this in his A Study 
of Hebrew Thought.  In the introduction, Tresmontant says his work is a “sketch” and a 
“blueprint.”  On the whole, Cudahy presents an optimistic view of Tresmontant’s work.  
Conceding that there are inevitably points which could have been more well defined or 
even possibly omitted, it is worthy of note that these sketches were subsequently filled 
out and built upon.  After its publication, Tresmontant wrote for thirty more years without 
making any substantial changes to his general thesis. 
 In his forward to A Study of Hebrew Thought, John M. Oesterreicher shares some 
of the same concerns, and yet pays considerable tribute to this author.  He underscores 
that his critical remarks concerning the work of Tresmontant should not be understood as 
overshadowing his great admiration for his contribution.  He writes: 
I hope that the expression of a few disagreements, rather than sweeping 
praise, will convince the reader of my genuine admiration for Tresmon-
tant’s work.  In a few instances, his language is not as precise as I should 
wish it to be, but to dwell on one or the other inexact word would be un-
grateful.  His book is that of a pioneer- he himself calls it an essai—and as 
such it is a remarkable achievement. Its greatest merit, it seems to me, is to 
have given us a fresh perspective of the biblical teaching on creation.20  
 
 
I agree with Oesterreicher that Tresmontant’s contribution in the area of creation 
stands out as exemplary.  Besides his distinctive treatment of metaphysical content, his 
unique approach to metaphysics is also worthy of mention.  Walter J. Ong, S.J. explains 
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the original contribution of Tresmontant in his introduction to Christian Metaphysics.  He 
highlights how each subject that Tresmontant works to present consistently meets three 
criteria. 
 First, each theme presented by Tresmontant is a reflection of what the Church 
teaches directly or by implication.  Tresmontant makes no claim to originality in content.  
Rather, he seeks to elaborate the rich content already contained within the Church.  Sec-
ond, the subject matter is truly metaphysical and therefore accessible through philosophy.  
Although faith sources helped to discover the metaphysical truth, it is now accessible to 
all.  Third, it is unique as a systematic whole.  No other group adheres to this system, and 
this is not only true of the entire system, but several of its key parts.21 
I will consider each of the areas of metaphysics as presented by Tresmontant.  Al-
though Tresmontant makes his greatest contribution in the area of creation theology, it is 
appropriate to begin with his treatment of the absolute.  I will use his Christian Meta-
physics to analyze this topic.  Even though Christian Metaphysics is not Tresmontant’s 
final work, it is arguably his most distilled and synthesized.  In addition to several topics 
outlined by Tresmontant, I will introduce some others that he discussed. 
Section 3: The Absolute 
Tresmontant begins his treatment of the absolute by comparing it to Brahmanism, 
Platonism, Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, Spinozism and German idealism.  It is in con-
trast to these cosmologies that he explores the unique metaphysical view posited by 
Christians.  He says: 
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According to Christianity the absolute is not the world, or—what comes to 
the same thing—the world is not the absolute.  The world is not uncreated, 
eternal, ontologically sufficient.  Neither is the world something of the ab-
solute; it is not a shadow of the absolute, nor an emanation, nor a modality 
of the divine substance.  Rather, the world is radically, ontologically other 
than the absolute.  It is neither of divine essence nor of divine nature.  Na-
ture is not absolute mind alienated, petrified, or exiled….According to 
Christianity the absolute is unique.22  
 
 
 Tresmontant contrasts the Judeo-Christian absolute with systems rooted in poly-
theism.  He notes the divisions within polytheism, which results in clashes among the 
gods.  It is from this setting of warring chaos that some philosophical systems attempt to 
explain their cosmology.  It is also at this level that one finds the roots of Manichaean 
dualism and its war between the principles of good and evil (matter). 
Tresmontant establishes that this forces people to make fundamental choices with 
limited options.  Logic dictates an absolute, either one or many, encompassed by or tran-
scending the whole.  That Judeo-Christian thought rejects the theogonic myths, Tresmon-
tant posits, is well established early on as found in the Yahwistic and Priestly writings.23  
It is at this level that people encounter the unique basis of Hebrew thought as distinct. 
Precision on this level is important because it defines core elements of the divine 
as conceived by a particular philosophy.  It is noteworthy to consider that these systems 
truly are philosophical systems.  They are not derived from supernatural revelation.  
Tresmontant takes issue with the mythical content underpinning the mainline philoso-
phies found in both East and West.24  In the Hindu Upanishads, Greek philosophy, Or-
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phic thought, the writings of Empedocles, and sporadically in Plato and Aristotle, he 
finds the myths that concern the division of the one, the fall of souls, and the theme of 
return. 
Tresmontant makes explicit the foundational beliefs found in each of these phi-
losophical systems.  They are axiomatic and play a crucial role in how they develop.  
These axiomatic beliefs directly connect with a philosophical conception of the absolute.  
According to Tresmontant, “every metaphysics is organically united to a certain concep-
tion of the absolute, and depends upon this conception.”25 
To illustrate these points, I will draw from his work La Métaphyique du Christi-
anisme.  In this work, Tresmontant argues that the earliest philosophical systems took a 
position on the absolute that is foreign to Judeo-Christian thought.  For example, he men-
tions that within the Upanishads there is a generation of the one.  He likens this to other 
theogonic explanations of the absolute.26  Concerning Greek thought, Tresmontant notes 
the repeated theme of the liberated soul found throughout their literature.  Tresmontant 
believed that a person has the ability to trace this thought back to a common source.  He 
points to Orphism as the root of all Gnostic systems.  From this source Christianity en-
countered, and continues to encounter, Gnosticism in all its permutations.27 
In several writings of Empedocles we find the belief that all beings were origi-
nally contained within the one absolute.  The implications of such a belief stand in con-
tradiction to a Judeo-Christian notion of creation.  Tresmontant cites Aristotle’s Physics 
(I, 8, 191 a) where Aristotle confirmed that the ancients were mistaken when they looked 
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on generation, birth, and death as mere appearances.  There can be only one being, and 
therefore only one subject.  Tresmontant points out through this comparison the vast dif-
ference that this implies.  He contrasts the weight and worth of persons as conceived by 
Judeo-Christian thought, which sees in their appearance the gift of being, not as necessar-
ily derived from the Absolute, since the being itself is part of the Absolute, but as another 
freely given existence.28  
Tresmontant assesses the work of Plato and Aristotle while duly recognizing the 
complexity of their thought.  He notes that they inherited dualistic tendencies, but their 
genius allowed them to further their predecessors’ thoughts.  He admits that while some 
level of dualism exists in their thought, in particular the divide between evil matter and 
the good soul, he found within Platonic thought an optimism that recognizes the interplay 
between matter and order.29  Werner Jaeger shared this same insight when he noted that 
Plato recognized order within the cosmos, giving an optimistic assessment of reality.  He 
notes, “the cosmos of Plato’s Timaeus made the education of man possible, for it requires 
for its realization a cosmic and not a chaotic world.  In his Laws we find a statement that 
relates all that is said in that work about the right paideia to God as its ultimate source.  
God is the pedagogue of the universe, ho theos paidagogei tom kosmon.”30 
Aristotle, according to Tresmontant, also defended a form of dualism.  This is 
evident in his writing to Proclus where Aristotle seeks to explain the preexistence of the 
soul.  He gives an account of the soul’s forgetfulness upon assuming flesh.  His later writ-
ings in De Anima presented a more evolved view of the soul and he rejects Orphic and 
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Platonic dualism.  It is this latter rejection of dualism that allowed Christian thinkers to 
build on his work.31  Nevertheless, as Tresmontant maintains, the cosmology of Aristotle 
teaches that “the world is uncreated, eternal, imperishable.  It is the absolute.”32 
The aforementioned reflections by Tresmontant serve a very specific purpose.  
They establish that the Judeo-Christian understanding of the absolute is in contrast to 
numerous other ancient beliefs.  In these considerations, the problem of the one and the 
many is brought to the fore again.  Throughout the work of Tresmontant, the unique 
metaphysical system attributable to Judeo-Christianity finds its roots in Sacred Scripture.  
In addition to the authority of Sacred Scripture, he uses Church teaching from the First 
Vatican Council.  After listing the traditional divine attributes, the Council speaks of a 
God who “must be declared to be really and essentially distinct from the world, and in 
himself and of himself most blessed and ineffably exalted above all things which are and 
which can be conceived outside him.” 33 
Tresmontant portrays materialism as a metaphysical option.  Similar to pantheism, 
it stands in contradiction to a Judeo-Christian understanding of the absolute.  Materialism 
pronounces the world as absolute.  In the words of Tresmontant, the world “is the abso-
lute because it is uncreated, eternal, self-creative, infinite in space and time, ontologically 
sufficient, furnished therefore with the classic attributes reserved to the absolute.”34  In 
contrast he notes that the “knowledge of the absolute conceived as transcendent, free and 
creative, was only achieved among the people of God.”35 
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Section 4: Creation 
I will now consider the role of creation in Judeo-Christian thought. Tresmontant 
calls the idea of creation “the keystone of Biblical theology and of Biblical metaphysics, 
of Christian theology and metaphysics.”  He points out that Islam and Christianity nota-
bly share the idea of creation, which comes from the encounter of God with the People of 
Israel.  The absolute is not the world and the world is not the absolute.  It is creation, ac-
cording to Tresmontant, which provides the relationship between the world and the abso-
lute.36 
Tresmontant maintains that the distinct view of creation held by Jews and Chris-
tians comes from the priestly account of creation and was subsequently affirmed by the 
Prophets and other biblical authors.  These early sources are credited with correcting 
prevalent creation myths found among the Egyptians and Assyrio-Babylonians.  He once 
again mentions that the unique account maintained by the Jewish people stood in contra-
diction to other established views concerning the origin of the cosmos, notably those of 
Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Gnosticism.37 
I cannot explore fully the creation metaphysics of Tresmontant.  I will focus on 
those key pieces of his writings that will allow me to survey his contribution to meta-
physics in the present context.  The following quotation presents this context and the role 
that creation plays within the metaphysics of Tresmontant: 
The first chapters of Genesis, the recital of creation, are the great founda-
tion stone of Christian metaphysics, from the beginning, through the cen-
turies, and at the present day.  When Christian thought struggled with the 
Gnostics, it was the recital of creation to which it appealed in defense of 
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the excellence of creation, of the natural world, of physical and bodily re-
ality, of the unity of the one creator God.  When the Fathers criticize Ori-
gen it was again in the name of the biblical doctrine of creation, and also 
of marriage, and of biblical anthropology.  The account in Genesis was his 
strongest weapon when Augustine disputed with the Manichees. In the 
twelfth century against the Catharists, and in the nineteenth century 
against German idealism, when Catholic thought had to reformulate its 
own metaphysical principles, it was again the great priestly passage at the 
beginning of our Bibles which was appealed to and quoted, and which 
formed the touchstone of orthodox Christian metaphysics.38 
 
 
 Tresmontant brought together scriptural teaching, Patristic teaching, and Church 
doctrine about creation to form a coherent whole.  Four principles offered by Tresmon-
tant, pertaining to creation, provide an outline.  First, creation is the work of one God.  
Second, creation is a free act of God, and is not imposed upon him “either by an external 
necessity (destiny, fate) or by an internal necessity of development.  “Cosmogony is in no 
way theogony.”39  Tresmontant believes this is in contrast to the Gnostic and theosophical 
system of Hegel.  Tresmontant says, “creation is grace; it is the first grace which Hugh of 
St Victor called the gratia creatrix, and which he distinguished from the gratia salvatrix 
and reparatrix. Creation is the work of the love of God.  Christianity is a metaphysic of 
love.”40  Third, un-created and eternal matter is unnecessary within the context of true 
creation.  Creation implies no preexisting matter, the matter, however conceived, relies 
on, and has its origin, in God.  Fourth, “creation is not an emanation, of the divine sub-
stance, not a procession from the divine substance.  Creation is not a generation.”41  
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Tresmontant makes it explicit that it is the Logos that proceeds from the Father, not the 
world.  This is the doctrine of creation called ex nihilo.42 
Tresmontant lays out two hypotheses about creation.  It is important that the 
reader grasps the necessity of having to choose.  He asks the reader to choose between 
these two hypotheses with no recourse to other options.  “Either the world is eternal and 
never had a beginning, or else the world came into existence a few billion years ago.”43  
His concern is that the universe had an actual date rather than trying to establish when 
that date took place.  In other words, whenever the universe came into existence, it hap-
pened then and does in fact have a “time stamp.” 
 The first hypothesis posits that the world is eternal.  In summary, he clarifies what 
an eternal world would mean, and what it could not mean.  Modern science has led us to 
know that the earth is not eternal.  We know it had a beginning in time.  The eternity of 
matter likely is implied.  In this case matter and space, in some form, have always existed 
and this has played itself out as an eternal series of permutations.  “We are thus con-
fronted with the image of an eternal cosmic history, conceived as an everlasting palpita-
tion: an endless recurrence of evolutions and involutions, syntheses and disintegra-
tions.”44  Tresmontant asks in relationship to this physical process how it can account for 
the coming to be of new beings, living creatures that were not and then are.45  Tresmon-
tant states that this experience of creation is not properly accounted for in the first hy-
pothesis.  This everyday experience of “coming to be” is powerful enough to throw this 
thesis into question.  
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 The coming to be of persons will later help me to confront those mysterious onto-
logical questions.  Despite the fact that human beings adhere to different philosophies and 
profess different faith convictions, every person faces the mystery of coming to be.  The 
only account people have of themselves is that of their conception and birth.  People have 
no recollection of themselves before conception and birth.  This compelled Proclus to 
elaborate upon Aristotle’s explanation of this forgetfulness.  It is necessary to account for 
human forgetfulness since it requires an act of faith to believe that human preexistence is 
in fact the case.  It is possible to ask what is essential in the soul that allows it to be the 
self-same soul that both pre-existed and then was incarnated?  What is the principle of 
identity in the soul that allows it to be stripped of all it was and possessed while remain-
ing itself? 
 A way out of this quandary is to adopt a metaphysics that holds that everything 
pre-exists.  What appears to us as a coming to be is actually “an appearing, an emerging 
of souls at the level of appearances, and these souls pre-existed in the heart of the One, 
the heart of the Absolute.”46  This is the view held by those sources recently mentioned, 
the Upanishads, the writings of Empedocles and also in Orphism.  This explanation al-
lows people to answer the above question of the identity of the soul by appealing to the 
primacy of the One and the appearance of the many. 
 The second hypothesis contends that the world came into being.  Tresmontant de-
fends this hypothesis through an appeal to science and its contention of an expanding 
universe.  An expanding universe implies a beginning.  According to Tresmontant, “we 
live in a world in which creation is the rule.”47  Creation continuously happens all the 
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time and it is part of the human experience of the world.  He asks whether there is need of 
a creator to make sense of creation.  He concedes to those who believe that the answer is 
found in our preexistence.  However, he cautions that to accept this position is to reject 
empirical knowledge, “giving up philosophy and proposing myths.” 48 
 In comparison with those who doubt that the human mind is able to achieve when 
endeavoring to answer large questions such as these, Tresmontant is optimistic.  Again, 
he refers to the ontological mystery concerning our very existence.  He demonstrates the 
insufficiency of accepting a skeptical stand in relationship to what the human mind is 
able to come to know.  Tresmontant writes: 
We exist, we are alive, but our existence and our life are a wonder and a 
mystery to us all.  It is a fact, of course, that we exist, but a fact which we 
cannot explain.  That the whole universe exists is another datum which is 
not self-explanatory, nor can we account for this fact either.  We may 
study the structure of the universe, and of matter and life, or we may con-
sider their development and evolution, but we are always without the an-
swer to the question of being and existence.  The universe is existent, with 
all the infinite richness of its structure and diversity, its development and 
evolution.  But its very existence seems to be a fact which in itself requires 
some kind of explanation.  Mere verification of the world’s existence is 
not sufficient for us.49 
 
 
 Tresmontant finds it does not suffice to accept the negative critique of Kant that 
answers this question by positing the limitation of human understanding.  He accuses 
Kant of a particular type of dogmatism that too quickly limits the extent of human know-
ing.  This pessimism tends to “prohibit the metaphysical quest, not to invite it.  It is, nev-
ertheless, an illegitimate and unjustified dogmatism.  Indeed, how could human reason 
possibly know a priori the limits of the possible or the impossible when it is not self-
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created?  It cannot know its own potentialities in the complete way, especially since 
metaphysical research is in the initial stage?”50 
 An intriguing point made by Tresmontant was that Kant failed to recognize that 
the relationship between the creature and the creator is itself a context out of which the 
one thinking is able to think.  A preexistent context cannot be ignored.  The hypothesis 
we accept radically affects what we consider the limits of human reason.  This context 
precedes the thought of the one thinking.  Tresmontant admits that to adopt a methodol-
ogy that purposely brackets out types of thought may prove useful.  To eliminate radi-
cally metaphysics, however, is premature.  Tresmontant argues: 
A provisional omission of all metaphysical affirmations rests upon certain 
possible hypotheses which require elucidation.  Either we live in the Abso-
lute, having our existence, motion and thought within it, or else we do not.  
There is no middle ground.  And the provisional exclusion changes in 
meaning with one or the other hypothesis.  That is, it is impossible to treat 
the problem of knowledge unless we adopt one of these hypotheses even 
though we pretended to accept neither.  The soul is either created or un-
created.  The whole problem of knowledge is posed in two different ways 
according to the hypothesis we adopt.  It is impossible to avoid the alterna-
tive, for we cannot study the structure of human reason or evaluate its 
power without posing the question of that radical origin.51 
 
 
 Tresmontant provides the reader with another refutation of Kant’s limiting ap-
proach.  He believes Kant constructed an artificial point of departure.  He eliminates the 
metaphysical questions proper to philosophy.  Tresmontant addresses Kant’s critique.  He 
says: 
The Kantian conscious subject will not discover the Absolute, because the 
whole analysis has been carried out with the presupposition that there is no 
dependence on the Absolute, and that the act of knowing does not origi-
nate in the Absolute.  But this is exactly what ought to be verified first of 
all.  If it is true that we exist and live and move within the absolute, the 
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problem of knowledge is posed in a wholly different way, and Kant’s cri-
tique can only lead us into error.  For if there is an Absolute then we must 
determine whether the empirical datum that the critique accepts, which is 
the world of experience, is even possible.  The conscious subject certainly 
exists.  But this existence is necessarily created or uncreated.  These are 
the two possibilities that we must consider now.  There are only two pos-
sibilities for metaphysics.  There is no middle ground.  Either we must 
turn toward a metaphysics of creation of the biblical type, or else toward a 
metaphysics which teaches that the self is uncreated.52 
 
 
 Throughout his writings, Tresmontant explores the shortcomings of Kant’s 
thought.  He finds his work debilitating because it does not allow for the advancement of 
philosophy.  He deems Kant’s work overly subjective and inward.  In other words, Kant’s 
approach renders the subject incapable of escaping its own self-imposed prison.  It does 
not allow itself to encounter other beings.  He states: 
Kantian critique is based upon a factitious presupposition, an uncritical 
and artificial separation between the conscious subject and being.  Inevita-
bly and ultimately, the mind no longer finds anything within itself which 
would confirm its consciousness of existence.  The subject remains en-
closed in a total subjectivity, simply because of an analysis conducted in 
artificial circumstances and conditions that are not relevant to the subject 
at all.53 
 
Needless to say, Tresmontant did not feel impeded in his metaphysical pursuits due to the 
Kantian critique of knowledge. 
 In his Introduction a la Métaphysique de Maurice Blondel, Tresmontant discusses 
the contributions made by Blondel in the area of creation.  He argued that Blondel’s work 
was not fully appreciated.  The following offers a short overview of the exposé of Blon-
del by Tresmontant concerning creation.54 
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 In agreement with Blondel, Tresmontant notes that the unique view of the Abso-
lute offered by Judeo-Christian thought is the basis for seeing creation as a work of 
agape.  It is the generosity of a free creative absolute that is found within Judeo-Christian 
thought that provides a uniquely Christian metaphysic of creation.  A portrait of the abso-
lute that has compulsion as the driving force of the world and all existent beings does not 
allow for a view of creation that evidences a theology of charity and grace. 
The Gnostic elimination of the Christian supernatural is a natural outgrowth of the 
pantheistic concept of the Absolute.  Although this view is consistent, it achieves an anti-
creation perspective.  In other words, this position eliminates a free God who chooses to 
create in love. 
 In his account of creation, Blondel insists on the perfect happiness of Absolute 
Being, as a Trinitarian communion, with no need to realize itself through any process of 
divine alienation and divine retrieval.  Blondel therefore portrays the distinctive view of 
creation as gift.  He asserts the divine “I AM” has fullness of being, and in this fullness 
freely bestows existence to others.55  Indeed, this leads to a consideration of the “why” of 
creation.  Why would an all-sufficient Being choose to create?  Tresmontant exposes two 
traditional answers as false.  One way is to deny the ontological distinction between abso-
lute being and created beings.  This position attempts to magnify the reality of the One 
and account for the others (the many) as mere illusions or manifestations of the One.  
With the other solution, the “Hegelian dialectic is put ‘on its head.’ Beings do not pro-
ceed from the idea; it is the Idea that is an abstraction extracted from the concrete.”56  In 
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other words, to take seriously the reality of the concrete beings, it is necessary to view the 
Absolute as the product that results from the whole of concrete beings. 
 He found the same type of problem when he approached the topic of action.  
Tresmontant framed the problem of action to explain how Blondel sought to solve it.  The 
problem is due to the two aforementioned tendencies, the first, of stressing the reality of 
the one at the expense of the many, and the other, of stressing human action to a point of 
eliminating the absolute, which in our case is God.  The task, according to Tresmontant, 
is to take seriously both realities, not to exalt one at the expense of the other.57  Strictly 
speaking, Tresmontant is not a Thomistic philosopher, however in approaching difficult 
questions, such as those pertaining to action or being, he recognizes the genius of St. 
Thomas.  He notes that Thomas’ firm affirmation of terms allows for the harmonization 
of beings and Being, and the action of human beings and the action of God.58 
The merit of Blondel’s work is that it gives full weight to each of these opposing 
views.  In this way, Tresmontant believes Blondel’s work possesses aspects of Aquinas’s 
genius.  Blondel insists on the both/and rather than the either/or.  He insists that people 
take seriously the fullness of being contained in the absolute, this being the Trinitarian 
life.  On the other hand, recognition of the one must not undermine the reality of beings.  
It is within this context that he recognizes the danger of Hegelian Idealism.59  I believe 
that Tresmontant thinks the work of Blondel greatly contributes to a metaphysics of crea-
tion.60  One familiar with Blondel’s work will find his influence throughout the writings 
of Tresmontant. 
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 Tresmontant believes the modern tools of contemporary philosophy need to be 
used in this exploration.  One such tool is Information Theory.  This tool carries with it 
the intellectual advantage of not being rooted in speculative thought.  Instead, it comes 
from experimental analysis in the area of message communication.  He proposes that the 
application of this tool will profit investigations into the topic of creation.  Tresmontant 
asserts that the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation expresses the belief that creation it-
self does indeed communicate a message.  The acknowledgement of this message leaves 
open the question of the origin of this communication.  The second step consists in de-
termining who or what is behind the message.  However, he insists that to say that no one 
communicates it and that these messages come from nothing markedly is absurd.  Mod-
ern atheism promotes this absurdity.  In contrast, he maintains that nature provides an in-
telligent language.  This conviction has led Christian thinkers to consider creation as one 
of the two paths to the knowledge of God.  I see in Tresmontant’s assertion that the natu-
ral sciences are an introduction to theology, the result of his positive appraisal of both 
creation and the human intellect.61 
 Tresmontant’s God is free, conscious, and personal.  Only with this conception of 
God is it possible to have a gratuitous creation.  In Plotinus, for example, the One is 
above consciousness.  Consciousness results from the division produced within the heart 
of the One.62  If consciousness derives from the division of the absolute, it does not speak 
positively for consciousness.  Tresmontant seeks to contrast the negative view of con-
sciousness as found in Hegel with the positive view found in Biblical thought.  In Biblical 
thought, consciousness is at the heart of creation.  It is here that the God of the universe 
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chooses to freely create.  He cites Deuteronomy 7:7-8 as evidencing within the Sacred 
Scriptures that God chooses human beings and freely loves them.63  Within the history of 
philosophy, this portrayal of the divine is the unique contribution of Israel.  Tresmontant 
insists that the Biblical metaphysics is not a fabrication of human hands but comes from 
the relationship of Yahweh with Israel.  Tresmontant notes this is a position contrary to 
reason.  Pure reason leads one to adhere to a God more in line with that of Spinoza.64  A 
personal and creative God is not the result of pure reason.  It results from an encounter 
with a particular people in time who struggled with the information given to them by 
God.  It is clear that the people of Israel were constantly tempted to abandon the God to 
which they were bound and to replace him with one of their own making. 
 Creation, according to Tresmontant, is not a one-time event.  On the contrary, it is 
an ongoing phenomenon.  Ontologically, it is a relationship of continual dependence, 
since the world and matter are not self-sufficient.  In addition to being, one must account 
for the fact that all is constantly becoming.  According to Tresmontant, the reality of be-
coming is vastly underestimated.  In simply recounting the history of the physical uni-
verse we are continually faced with this becoming.  Without elaborating on the intricacies 
of his thoughts pertaining to evolution in this paper, he is convinced of some form of evo-
lution.  However, a belief in any evolution poses serious questions.  As Tresmontant puts 
it, we evolve from hydrogen clouds to living, thinking human beings.  Although there are 
variously proposed forms of evolution, Tresmontant always returns to the same question: 
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how can the greater come from the lesser?  It is exactly this reception of new being which 
must be made sense of.  The world is constantly receiving new being.  How is this so?  
This, according to Tresmontant, is not accounted for by the mere existence of the world.  
There is a dependence and a causality that must be explained.65 
 Tresmontant takes causality seriously.  Based on his perception of biblical thought 
he defends the understanding of the Hebrew people in relation to this topic.  He notes that 
Hebrew thought is often reproached for having a simplistic notion of causality.  Philoso-
phers often level criticism against the Hebrew understanding of primary and secondary 
causes.  Tresmontant explains that the Hebrew people were able to discern the operation 
of the first cause in and with the secondary cause.  This first cause then is able to act in 
and with human beings without harming the integrity of their freedom.66 
Section 5: Tresmontant’s Methodology 
 In the area of creation Tresmontant employs a particular method.  He begins each 
study by drawing from the biblical sources to establish what they have to say about a co-
herent picture of reality.  He then seeks to clarify this view in light of other systems that 
stand in contradiction to it.  He usually follows this with a logical exposé of what each 
position entails.  In effect, he begins with particular axioms and shows the logical out-
growth that derives from these particular axiomatic positions.  He does the same with the 
varied axioms found in each system and then compares them all.  He then consults the 
teachings of the Fathers of the Church and the pronouncements of Ecumenical Councils 
and authoritative church teaching to support a biblically derived coherent philosophy. 
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 One possible way to challenge the thought of Tresmontant is to call into question 
his reading of scripture.  If one were to find fault with his reading of scripture, one could 
call into question the entire system that he constructs on questionable axiomatic princi-
ples.  To quell this challenge, Tresmontant consults the writings of the Early Church Fa-
thers and the pronouncements of the Ecumenical Councils.  By so doing he shows that he 
has constructed a system that is consistent with these revered interpreters of scripture and 
the authority of the Church. 
 It is now possible to understand the methodology of Tresmontant.  After citing the 
New Testament passages that are related to creation, he cites the Shepherd of Hermas, 
who writes in his Commandments, “ there is but one god, who has created all and set it in 
order, who has made everything pass from nothing to being, who upholds everything, and 
alone is upheld by nothing.”67  He quotes Aristides and his teaching that God is “without 
beginning and eternal, immortal and needing nothing, while the elements themselves are 
not gods; they are corruptible and subject to change; they have been produced out of not 
being by a commandment of him who is truly God.”68  He then uses Justin Martyr, 
Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus, the author of the Elenchos (which 
was formerly attributed to Origen), Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius of 
Caesarea, Athanasius of Alexandria, St. Aphraates, Basil of Caesarea and St. 
Augustine.69  
 Each of these writers attests to particular points of doctrine.  Tresmontant elicits 
these people to support his position.  One by one he claims support for doctrines such as 
creation ex nihilo, creation as distinct from the absolute, the role of matter, the eternal 
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existence of God, the insufficiency of the universe to account for itself, and God’s free-
dom to create.  Tresmontant chooses helpful passages from the Fathers to elucidate his 
points of discussion.  He highlights passages by the Early Church Fathers that correct 
Greek thought when it is incongruous with Christian positions.  He uses Clement, for ex-
ample, to correct Aristotle’s views about creation.  Clement writes, “ the father of the 
school (the Peripatetics), instead of conceiving the father of the universe, believes that he 
whom he calls ‘most high’ is the soul of all; that is to say, he contradicts himself by re-
garding the soul of the world as god.”70 
 The fourth level of support Tresmontant uses (after biblical exposé, and employ-
ment of logic and garnering support from the Fathers of the Church) is a presentation of 
official church teaching throughout the ages.  Beginning with the Apostles’ Creed, he ex-
plains the Judeo-Christian belief in creation.  He quotes the Council of Nicea, and points 
out how the council aimed to correct misguided theosophical systems that posited forms 
of dualism rejected by the church.71 
 The First Council of Constantinople then follows Nicea in 381.  The Council of 
Toledo followed with a decree.  Tresmontant indicates the Council’s desire to correct the 
mistakes of the Priscillianists who adopted a Manichaean metaphysics.  He quotes two 
anathematizations: 
1. If anyone says or believes that this world, together with all its elements, 
was not made by the omnipotent God, let him be anathema. 
 
9. If anyone says or believes that the world was made by another God and 
not by him of whom it is written: in the beginning God made heaven and 
earth, let him be anathema.72 
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 He then references the Fourth Lateran Council convened in 1215.  The Council 
states: 
We firmly believe and simply confess that the true God is one only, eter-
nal, immeasurable and unchangeable, incomprehensible, omnipotent and 
ineffable, Father and Son and Holy Ghost…; the sole origin of all things, 
creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who by 
his omnipotent excellence formed out of nothing from the beginning of 
time at once both the spiritual creature and the corporeal, that is to say the 
angelic and the worldly, and thereafter the human, as if jointly constituted 
of spirit and body.73 
 
 
 Tresmontant again points out the heresy of dualism and its reemergence through-
out history.  In this case, it was the twelfth century.  The Church once again sought to re-
establish the goodness of matter in the body.  He writes that the Council of Florence of 
1442 reaffirmed this position.  It said that both the spiritual and corporeal aspects of crea-
tures were in fact good “because they were made by the supreme good, but changeable 
because they were made out of nothing; and she declares that there is no nature of evil 
because all nature, insofar as it is nature, is good.”74 
 Tresmontant continues this approach up and through the First Vatican Council of 
1870 and concludes with the Canons three, four and five which reiterate the preceding 
council's teaching clearly and explicitly. 
 “The metaphysic of charity” is a phrase that Tresmontant adopted from Fr. Laber-
thonnière, and is a theme that he believes most accurately describes the freedom and gen-
erosity which is evidenced in creation.  Opposed to this freedom is any type of necessity 
in God to become aware of himself, and to then bring about this awareness through the 
unfolding of creation.  This is what he says is to be found in Hegel’s system.  A favorite 
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saying of Tresmontant in opposition to German idealism, or any like system, is that 
“cosmogony is in no way theogony.”75 
 Offering proper theological and philosophical nuance, Tresmontant counsels his 
readers that a proper reading of both the Biblical and conciliar texts is a necessity.  In his 
own words: 
It is necessary to recall here that in the chapters of a constitution promul-
gated by an Ecumenical Council, it is advisable, from the theological point 
of view as well as from the metaphysical, to distinguish between what the 
Fathers of the Council have in view (what they wish to define, or, more 
exactly, what they wish to preserve, to protect, their intention), and their 
language, the representations, their way of expressing themselves.  These 
latter can be bound up with a given culture, with a given vision of the 
world, with the state of knowledge in a given period, and for that very rea-
son can constitute a veneer which is possibly decayed. One cannot there-
fore take the chapters of an Ecumenical Council as the geometrician takes 
the propositions from which he makes mathematical deductions. One must 
ask in the first place what doctrine the Fathers of the council wish to repel.  
By virtue of this, the canon of a Council and its anathematizations in an 
apophatic manner define more exactly the intention, the aim of the Coun-
cil, what it wishes to repel and refuse, and what, in the same way, it 
wishes to protect and save in the thought of the Church.76 
 
 
 He then explains the necessity of a scientific approach to both scripture and con-
ciliar texts.  Tresmontant indicates, within his discussion of creation, what is and what is 
not defined by the teaching of the church.  He uses the example of Origen in the De Prin-
cipiis to indicate what might be permissible.  Origen asked whether the biblical teaching 
on creation pertained only to this world, without having to necessarily limit God’s possi-
ble creativity before and after this world.  Tresmontant sees no doctrinal problem with 
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this position either biblically or doctrinally, so long as this creative process is not a neces-
sary component of God’s nature.77 
 He recalls the thirteenth century debate between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure 
to show how to employ distinctions that allow for greater precision.  Aquinas considered 
the possibility of an eternal world.  He understood this in a particular sense that did not 
need to be contradictory to creation.  The world could have been created from all eternity.  
However, the absolute dependence of the world upon God and its lack of consubstantial 
status would have to be posited.78  St. Bonaventure did not consider this a possibility, 
even in the abstract. For Bonaventure, creation implied an actual beginning in time.  
Thomas was thinking in the abstract as to the possible, but “to philosophize about the re-
ality existing in fact, is another matter.  In fact, and from the point of view of our experi-
ence as it is known today, to speak of an eternal universe has little meaning…but it re-
mains possible to suppose an eternal creation, that is to say a creation which will eternally 
renew beings and things.”79 
 In treating the method of Claude Tresmontant, let us evaluate the order of his sys-
tem.  The first level of his thought begins with the data of revelation as found in scripture.  
This, however, does not render him religiously biased in such a way as to be useless to 
the “objective philosopher”.  He points out that the starting presuppositions used by all 
philosophers involve some level of mythological faith.80  One’s choice of beliefs regard-
ing the absolute, for instance, is not unlimited.  Logic demands that one choose a posi-
tion, or at the very least, refuse to choose, but minimally admit that logic requires that the 
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truth of one cancel out contradictory alternatives.  In other words, upon finding the true 
Absolute, opposing “absolutes” cancel each other out.  That some may claim that we are 
unable to ever know fully the true absolute does not mean we should not be clear in com-
ing to grips with the mandates of logic. 
 The basis in scripture is open to exegetical scrutiny.  This may be fruitfully pur-
sued in future studies.  Tresmontant admitted that he relied on the latest biblical scholar-
ship available when he began writing.  Later in his career, he became more confident in 
his own reading of scripture and postulated some new biblical theories.81  A critical look 
at Tresmontant would not so much call into question his interpretation of scripture as 
much as his subsequent elaboration on these texts.  It is his manner of interpreting the 
texts and the implications inherent in his interpretation of them that may lead some to 
question his findings. 
 The second level of logical exposition is Tresmontant’s comparison of philoso-
phical systems.  He does this to illumine points of agreement and difference and to indi-
cate where the logical development of these systems leads.  One example of such a logi-
cal development with real and substantial consequences is in his Études de Métaphysique 
Bibllique, where he employs this method to the Gnostic conception of God.82  The system 
of the Gnostics and of Plotinus explains the process of God’s becoming. This process of 
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becoming involves division, alienation, and eventual resolution.  It follows that the trage-
dies experienced by people, and most especially the tragedy of war is a necessary com-
ponent in this process.  Since history itself is the dramatic playing out of the process of 
the absolute, war becomes a constitutive element of the divine life.  Gnostic metaphysics, 
perfected in Hegel, leads to a mystification of war.  This is then theologically justified.  
 Much of Hegel’s work finds expression originally in Heraclitus.  Tresmontant 
mentions that Hegel makes the admission that there is not a single proposition of Heracli-
tus that he does not discuss in his own work.  According to Heraclitus, the physical uni-
verse resulted from the expansion of eternal fire, and was the cause of division and diver-
sification.  Heraclitus called this division war.  The return, or process of peace, results in 
the annihilation of the diversity of beings.  Because of this teaching, peace and friendship 
are the principles of annihilation.83 
 Logically, Christian thought is not tied to this process.  The Judeo-Christian God 
stands apart from his creation and therefore requires no turn of worldly events to bring 
about his fulfillment.  In his perfection, he transcends the world.  This transcendent God 
desires peace and good for his people even though no amount of good or evil affects him 
in his essence.  His desire for peace is the free longing for the fulfillment of his creation, 
and more specifically each creature.  This type of reflection represents the logical exposi-
tion of Tresmontant as he fleshes out an axiomatic metaphysical position and attempts to 
demonstrate its logical conclusion.  These axiomatic metaphysical starting points lead to 
serious conclusions. 
 The third and fourth steps intend to display the consistency found in remaining 
faithful to the Biblical foundations of Christian thought.  In calling on the Early Church 
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Fathers, Tresmontant displays how they developed these themes in a coherent manner.  I 
must note that this is not his starting point.  He uses this as the finishing strokes of a 
painting that has been long in the making.  The weight of these councils, however, does 
add force to his reading of scripture and his argument. 
 What I have called the scholarly methodology of Tresmontant is visible when 
considering the full body of his work.  In his Christian Metaphysics, for example, these 
four steps receive equal weight.  However, in other manuscripts we find Tresmontant 
concentrating more heavily on one or two of these steps.  For example, this is the case in 
A Study of Hebrew Thought.  In this work, he presents an in-depth study of Hebrew 
thought, followed by a logical analysis of the text. 
 Although Tresmontant concentrates heavily on creation and its implications, I will 
now investigate several other themes addressed by him.  This will further provide a 
means for evaluating Tresmontant’s thought.  He writes, “we shall observe how this 
metaphysical system, to which the key is the idea of creation, has its own particular inner 
coherence, just as we might demonstrate the inevitable logical consequences of the ab-
sence or rejection of this idea in the philosophies which ignore or deny it.”84  A rejection 
of the idea of creation will necessitate a rejection of the concepts of time, person, and 
love.85  Regarding time, Werner Jaeger, while explaining the inability of Greek thought to 
develop a theology of history, made a somewhat similar claim.  The Greek efforts were 
considered lacking by the Christians that evaluated them.  He writes that: 
[The Greek attempts] at demonstrating cultural evolution either in terms of 
Democritean causality or of Aristotelian teleology could not satisfy Chris-
tian thinkers.  His [Origen’s] basically different concept of cosmology 
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(cosmogony as creation) necessitated a philosophy of the mind and of hu-
man culture that looked for a plan in the world of history comparable to 
the divine planning of the physical world.86 
 
 
Section 6: Matter 
 Tresmontant’s reflection on creation naturally leads to a consideration of matter 
and its relation to his entire metaphysical system.  He begins his discussion of matter by 
elaborating on the distinction between creation and fabrication that he adopts mainly 
from Henri Bergson.  Fabrication “proceeds from periphery to center, or, as the philoso-
pher would put it, from the many to the one.  But organization proceeds from the center 
outwards.  It starts from a point which is almost a mathematical point and spreads around 
it in ever widening waves.”87  Organization is an act of creation.  He explains that fabri-
cation requires matter whereas creation does not begin with any matter whatsoever.  Fab-
rication takes natural objects, already in existence, and manipulates them to some end.  In 
line with Aristotle, Bergson believes a fabricated object worthy of ontological status, but 
is not worthy of the status of a subject.88  
 Human thought is already astray when people conceive of matter as underlying 
reality.  To clarify this position, Tresmontant makes the following assertion: 
The body does not model itself on the corpse.  An organism is not a syn-
thesis of multiplicity made one by some principle of unity called the soul.  
The organism grows from a germ which is a unity, and spreads outwards 
by assimilating exterior elements and integrating them.  To say that a liv-
ing organism is a composite of multiple matter unified by a “form” is an 
inversion of the understanding, an assumption that the multiple came first, 
that life is constructed from ashes.  
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Fabrication, we have said, assembles various materials and binds them to-
gether within a certain form.  This form, however, remains outward, ex-
trinsic, and does not really “inform” the material used.  Hence a dualism 
of “matter” and “form.”  Creative organization, contrariwise, actually does 
shape the elements which it incorporates; once taken in they are no longer 
what they were nor what they will return to after death. Unity rules, not 
outwardly, but inwardly by transformation.  The whole precedes the parts 
because a living organism is a form and man is a “living soul.”  With life 
there is not substantial duality of “matter and “form.”89 
 
 
 Tresmontant is once again concerned with avoiding a misunderstanding concern-
ing creation.  The idea of formless matter merely existing and awaiting use undermines 
the original need for God’s creative act to bring into being real things.  The belief in 
formless chaos leads to an uncomfortable closeness to a mythology that is not Christian.  
 Tresmontant presents three different views of matter before contrasting them with 
Hebrew thought.  The first view (matter as opposed to mind) is that of Platonic or Orphic 
dualism.  He notes that in this strain of thought “matter itself is a substance, res extensa, 
which stands opposed to mind, res cogitans.”90  The second option (matter as a meta-
physical principle) is the Aristotelian or Thomistic view91.  The Thomistic and Aristote-
lian framework sees matter as a metaphysical principle.  There is no such thing as matter 
as such existing in a pure state, rather matter as seen and being only in relation to form.  
The third position (matter as treated by modern science) is found in modern science, 
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which he equates with the thought of Descartes.  He writes, “modern science gives the 
name of matter to what Aristotle called the sensible.  This to Aristotle was composed of 
‘matter’ and ‘form’ in a quite different sense.”92 
 Tresmontant contrasts these positions with Hebrew thought.  Matter as an abstract 
principle is not present within the biblical concept of the world.  The realities experienced 
by the Hebrew people were experienced in the concrete, so that the Aristotelian concepts 
of matter and form were outside of their worldview.  They encountered water, sheep, 
trees, and men.  This anti-dualistic approach would lend itself to a love of the sensible.  It 
is the unique position of Hebrew thought that it both rejects idealism and materialism 
while embracing certain insights of both.  Its ability to hold together the goodness of mat-
ter and the intelligibility of the sensible world lend themselves to this task.93 
 Tresmontant turns once again to the early Christian writers to explicate how He-
brew thought developed into Christian theology and metaphysics.  He quotes Tatian who 
wrote, “matter is not without any external principle, as God is, and, since it is not without 
such a principle, it has not the same power as God.”94  He then quotes Theophilus of An-
tioch, who criticizes a poem by Hesiod since it contains references to belief in matter as 
preexisting.  He follows this with a critique by Pseudo-Justin who makes explicit the dis-
tinction between fashioning and creating.  St. Irenaeus is invoked to assert that God not 
only adds quality to matter, but is itself its cause, bringing it into being.  The author of the 
Elenchos rebukes the theory that an eternal chaotic matter was co-opted by God who took 
half and tamed it while leaving the other half to remain disordered.95  He goes on to elicit 
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the aid of Hippolytus, Origen, Methodius of Olympus, Eusebius, Athanasius, and St. 
Basil, ending with St. Thomas who states, “solius Dei est creare.”96 
Section 7: Evil 
 The topic of matter leads to a consideration of the principle and cause of evil.  
Tresmontant states, “matter is not the principle of evil.  Matter is created, and is good in 
its own order.  It has not that almost divine dignity, that wicked power, which the Gnos-
tics and Manichaeans attributed to it.  We must look elsewhere than in matter and in the 
many for the principle and cause of evil.  Christian thought has made a clear distinction 
between the problem of evil and the ontology of matter, from the standpoint of reason 
this is a great advance.”97  It is clear that Judeo-Christianity is the champion of the good-
ness of matter and most especially matter as it concerns man as flesh.  Indeed, the origin 
and principle of evil must be sought elsewhere. 
 Simply stated, “evil does not come from physical matter, but from man’s free-
dom.”98  After disassociating evil with matter, Tresmontant seeks to explain the meta-
physical origin of evil as rooted in a biblical perspective.  Because it is rooted in the bib-
lical understanding of creation as good, Christianity comes to develop an explanation that 
upholds this goodness and yet accounts for the reality of evil.  Tresmontant looks to 
Augustine as the founder of an established and well thought out doctrine of evil, although 
others such as Gregory of Nyssa held a similar view.99  Tresmontant says: 
Augustine sets in opposition to Manichaeism the two fundamental princi-
ples of Christian metaphysics: 1. God has created all things; 2. Everything 
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that God has created is very good.  Evil things are not by nature.  Sin is the 
result of human freedom; it is man’s work (De Gen. ad litt. Imperf. Liber, 
1,2,3).  “Often and indeed nearly always, you, Manichees, ask those whom 
you try to win over to your heresy, whence comes evil….You ask whence 
comes evil, and I, for my part, ask you what is evil” (De moribus ecclesiae 
cathol. et de moribus Manichaeorum, 2, 2, 2, 3).  When then is it taught in 
the catholic church that God is the author of all natures and of all sub-
stances, it is implied at the same time that God is not the author of evil.”  
What, then, is evil?  That which destroys, annihilates, corrupts, created na-
ture.  Evil is a corruption, and not a nature.  Now corruption does not exist 
of itself, but in the substance which it corrupts, for the substance is not 
corruption itself.100 
 
 
 Tresmontant does not devote much time to the problem of evil.  He found his 
treatment on the goodness of creation to make the point of matter’s goodness.  If matter is 
not the cause of evil, what might it be?  He finds the answer in human free choice.  He 
writes that if “this freedom is fallible, it is because it is created out of nothing and is not 
yet stabilized, confirmed, in the ultimate beatitude.”101  I will have to turn to his writings 
on what he calls Fundamental Choice and the Heart of Man to explore this issue more 
clearly.  I will treat this topic in a future section when I consider the metaphysical dimen-
sions of his anthropology. 
Section 8: Time 
 Another dimension of human experience that is crucial is time.  Once again, 
Tresmontant finds deep inter-connections in a proper understanding of creation.  Only 
after having grasped the difference between creation and fabrication can one begin to un-
derstand the Judeo-Christian concept of time.  Being able to grasp that new things are 
continually coming into existence allows for a proper discernment of time.  “This act of 
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creation is the most common, the most universal experimental fact, the richest in meta-
physical implications.  Something new is brought into being which in no manner existed 
before.  Such is the significance of the concept of time.  ‘Time’ is a concept that implies 
that reality did not appear at once.  It means that there is a progressive and incessant crea-
tion of new reality.  The real is engaged in making itself, little by little it is improvised; it 
means that something new is being engendered continually.”102  In essence, Tresmontant 
makes explicit the unique concept of time that Judeo-Christianity engenders.  As opposed 
to a cyclical concept of time, he maintains a linear concept of time.  This linear view pos-
its an actual beginning, a history marked by points that can be referenced by before and 
after, and works towards an end.103 
 Time does not truly exist in a pantheistic metaphysics according to Tresmontant.  
The dispersion of the One in the many is part of the eternal cycle awaiting reabsorbtion.  
He describes it as “an aimless, indefinite process, the serpent eating his own tail.”104 
 One way to compare the differing concepts of time is to investigate three different 
notions of movement: displacement, cycle, and evolution.  Displacement is the type of 
movement that is the least credible for Tresmontant. The displacement perspective of 
time he likens to the billiard ball model, as an inorganic chain of happenings. It presents a 
weak relation of “fabricated objects or of ‘things’ cut off from the organic whole which 
engendered them.”  He considers this type of perspective of time artificial and contribut-
ing to a poor understanding of causality and finality.105  The second type of movement is 
cyclical.  This is the type of movement of most interest to the Greeks.  It indicates a con-
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ception of time that is generally negative.  Aristotle writes that all change “is by its nature 
an undoing.  It is in time that all is engendered and destroyed…One can see that time it-
self is the cause of destruction rather than of generation….  For change itself is an undo-
ing; it is indeed only by accident a cause of generation and existence.”106  Finally, there is 
evolution.  He sees this idea of movement as a permanent, positive movement of organic 
growth.  It is a moving forward.  It is irreversible.  
 Tresmontant points out the metaphysical options that exist in relation to time.  
The choice of one over the other carries with it certain implications.  His technique 
verges on a reductio ad absurdum.  By proposing alternatives to the Judeo-Christian posi-
tion, which seem either counter to reason or presents a world view that is disturbing to 
one’s greatest sensibilities, he leads the reader to the Judeo-Christian perspective by ap-
pealing to reason.  Logical exposé also serves the purpose of forcing the reader to see 
how systematic wholes are necessary.  He does not permit the reader to cherry-pick com-
fortable pieces of reality that do not logically stand together systematically. 
 There is no denying that Hebrew, and subsequently Christian thought, is inextri-
cably tied to time and history.  He points out that history has a beginning (bereschit) and 
is moving towards an end (telos).  As opposed to the Greek notion of degradation and 
decline, time for the Judeo-Christian is moving towards ascent and victory.107 
 He calls on the Fathers and cites Ambrose from his Hexaemeron.  Ambrose main-
tains a beginning as mentioned in Genesis.  He notes how this crushes any possibility of 
the world being coeternal with God.  A further section elaborates on Ambrose and is very 
much in line with Tresmontant’s view of continuing creation.  He writes, “Ambrose ex-
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presses, in a picture, his intuition of the nature of time: time implies that the reality is not 
achieved all in a moment; it implies a progressive creation, a process of ripening.”108 
 In order to face the many difficult questions pertaining to a proper understanding 
of time, Christians needed to provide sufficient answers.  Tresmontant writes: 
Christianity introduced, indeed, a new conception of time, and of the rela-
tions between time and eternity.  According to the biblical and Christian 
view of the world, time is the measure of that irreversible creation which 
is still taking place today, and which is hastening to its conclusions. Hence 
time is not, as Plato thought, a changing image of eternity, nor is it, as 
Plotinus taught, evidence of the fall.  Time is the measure of a creation in 
process of realization.  Before creation there was no time.  Before creation 
there was God, who creates in his eternal present, his eternal noontime. 
We are created in God’s present moment.109 
 
 
 Indeed, “Time is the measure of a creation in process of realization.”  The empha-
sis placed on process within creation was a large theme in his writings.  This focus on 
process and continued creation was so pronounced that it led one writer to classify him as 
a proponent of process philosophy110.  I believe this assessment incorrect if by process 
thinker one implies that this process of becoming also applies to God.  There is no hard 
evidence to indicate that this is the case.  Even within his emphasis on process, Tresmon-
tant was a firm proponent of the immutability of God. 
Section 9: Anthropology 
 As concerns anthropology, I will follow the thought of Tresmontant on four dif-
ferent levels.  The four sections will cover the human soul, human nature, cogni-
tion/reason, and the supernatural destiny of human beings. 
                                                 
108
 Tresmontant, The Origins of Christian Philosophy, 69-70. 
109
 Tresmontant, The Origins of Christian Philosophy, 70. 
110
 Cudahy, “Claude Tresmontant and Biblical Metaphysics,” 222. 
 60 
 Concerning the soul, there are four main contentions presented by Tresmontant.  
The first maintains that from the Christian perspective “the soul is not of divine essence; 
it is not a particle of a modality of the divine substance.  It is really created.”111  This he 
posits against Brahmanism, Orphism, Platonism, and Neoplatonism.  This rejection of the 
thought of ancient India and Greece was a defining moment for Christianity.  In support 
of this position, he cites the Council of Toledo112 in 400 A.D., the Council of Braga113 in 
561, and the Symbolum fidei of Leo IX in 1053. He quotes Leo IX’s Symbolum fidei 
where he states, “Animam non esse partem Dei, sed ex nihilo creatam.”114  These afore-
mentioned councils concern themselves with affirming the creation of the human person 
in opposition to any form of divine emanation. 
 The second assertion concerning the soul is that “the soul is not pre-existent to the 
body” and … “the living body is the synthesis of the living soul and matter which it uni-
fies and informs.”115  He draws support from the Synod of Constantinople of 543, which 
states, “if anyone says or thinks that the souls of men pre-exist…let him be anathema.”116  
Tresmontant quotes from the Council of Vienne (15th Ecumenical, 1311-1312), which 
speaks of the soul as the “form” of the body.117  This form unifies the biochemical ele-
ments that make up the human person.  He stresses the unity of the body/soul composite.  
He emphasizes that the body is not one substance and the soul another.  Instead, the body 
is an essential component of the one person composed of body and soul, and of a soul 
created from nothing and brought into existence through the free will of God. 
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 His third assertion explains that the origin of the human soul is not the result of a 
physical process.  Neither the father nor the mother transmits the soul.  He writes: 
The materiality of two cells is not sufficient to account for this real creation of a 
subject, ontologically distinct from the parents.  Orthodox Christian thought, fol-
lowing biblical thought, discerns, in the conception of a child from two cells 
which come from the parents, a genuine and complete creation which can only 
have God himself for its author, directly.118  
 
 
 The fourth point is the Christian rejection of Neoplatonic monopsychism.  The 
unique individual soul cannot be reduced to being thought a part or piece of a universal 
soul.119  He cites the condemnation of this monopsychism by the bishop of Paris, by order 
of the Pope in the 1270’s.  Condemned was the position that there was one intellect in all 
men.  “Quod intellectus omnium hominum est unus et idem numero.”120  
Section 10: Human Nature 
 As concerns the metaphysical anthropology of human nature, Tresmontant ad-
dresses three key themes.  First is the divine intention to create the human person as em-
bodied.  Second is the dignity and goodness of human sexuality.  The third pertains to the 
freedom of the person.  
 Again, the first assertion stands in contradiction to the Gnostics, Manicheans, Neo-
platonists, Origenists and all forms of dualism.  The myth of the fallen soul must be dis-
carded and replaced with the Judeo-Christian creation account.  That men and women 
should have bodies was part of the original intention of God, and not an afterthought due 
to some heavenly infraction by which a soul, existing in heaven, is thrust down and im-
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prisoned in a body as punishment for some offense.  To illustrate this point, Tresmontant 
quotes Plato’s Gorgias, 493a and Phaedo, 65d, which speak of the unfortunate lot of the 
embodied soul.  “The body is a tomb… as long as we have our soul kneeded into this evil 
thing we shall never possess in sufficiency the object of our desire.”121  In contrast he 
quotes Fr. Teilhard de Chardin who articulates the Christian position, namely, a creature 
is “material matrix,” and is what it is supposed to be according to its own order.122 
 Pertaining to the second theme of the dignity of sexuality, Tresmontant finds no 
biblical grounds for thinking that people must consider the sexual act devoid of goodness.  
As opposed to the traditions of India and certain Greek tendencies of thought, the Judeo-
Christian tradition affirms the goodness of the body.  Tresmontant notes that these other 
schools of thought believed that “sexuality and desire are indeed doubly responsible for 
embodiedness, for the fall of souls in the body.  It is by desire that the soul is plunged 
into the material, and it is procreation which makes blissful souls fall into bodies.”123  He 
says that this negative view of sexuality influenced many Christian thinkers throughout 
the ages.  Among these thinkers are some of the most well regarded theologians.  This 
group includes Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, St. Basil, St. Jerome and St. Augustine as well 
as many others.  He mentions the well-known, often negative, perception of sexuality one 
finds in the writings of Augustine.  For Augustine the loss of intellectual control, as 
found in the abandonment experienced in sexual passion, was particularly troubling.  
Augustine imagined that in the preternatural state, the procreative act would be accom-
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plished in a dispassionate and self-controlled manner.124  Although Augustine battled the 
Manicheans, some have argued that his contact with them left some residual effects.  This 
tendency is also present in the other preeminent theologians listed above.  Tresmontant 
asserts that the remarkable thing is “that orthodox thought in its development and in its 
solemn decisions did not adopt these tendencies, which meanwhile were to be found in 
some of the most considerable inclinations of the Fathers of the Church.” 125  Official 
church teaching clearly condemns the remaining Manichean strains still found in Christi-
anity. 
 Regarding the third theme of freedom, Tresmontant maintains early orthodox 
Christian thought remained in agreement.  He stresses that the human person is truly free 
and that this freedom is presupposed for the person to choose to cooperate with God.  
Without this freedom to cooperate, divinization would not be possible.126  Tresmontant 
illustrates how Augustine establishes the role of freedom as he battled heresy on two 
fronts.  Against the Manicheans, Augustine does not blame matter for the evil that a per-
son does since it is fallen and corrupt.  Instead, he holds people responsible since they 
operate with a true freedom that places the culpability for sin directly upon them.  Al-
though matter may provide an opportunity for sin, it requires an act of the will, and the 
will operates in freedom.  Against the Pelagians, Augustine argued for the priority of 
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grace.  Grace, however, always works in harmony with the freedom of the person and 
never supersedes it.127  Tresmontant relies upon both Augustine128 and the Council of 
Trent to establish the role of cooperation in the salvation of the person.  Against certain 
forms of Protestant theology, he cites Trent’s repudiation of extrinsic imputation in favor 
of a regeneration and renewal of the whole person.  Although most of the writings of 
Tresmontant are ecumenical in nature, it is here the concern of Tresmontant to elaborate 
on the differences found in Catholic and Reformed theologies.  He asserts, “perhaps in-
deed it is at the metaphysical level that decisions are taken which will intervene on the 
theological plane…  ‘Original sin’, according to Catholic theology, has not altered human 
nature in its substance (or in its essence); it remains as it was on emerging from the hands 
of God.  It remains beautiful and excellent.  What is altered is not human nature itself, but 
the relations, properly supernatural, between God and man…for the theologies born of 
the Reformation ‘original sin’ has altered human nature itself.  Human nature is radically 
corrupted, vitiated, denatured, reduced to impotence, as much from the point of view of 
understanding as from the point of view of action and freedom.”129  The Catholic view 
holds that although sin affects our relationship with God, it has not affected our nature.  
Human nature remains fundamentally the same even after the fall.130 
 Evil, as we noted in a previous section, proceeds from human freedom, coming 
from the hearts of individuals.  It holds them accountable for the distortions and malevo-
lence that surface within the world.  This point concerning the status of human nature is 
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immensely important, since it bears heavily on the subsequent development of any 
Catholic moral theology. 
 Tresmontant raised the question of what bearing this position would have on the 
freedom and culpability of a child.  As concerns the relationship of the child to God, he 
says, “the child is not born with the life of God, to which he is called, in him…it must be 
brought to him…he must in the words of St. Paul and of the Fourth Gospel, consent to a 
new birth, which will make him a new creature… holiness begins with a breach.  Nothing 
can dispense the child from this personal act of breaking with ‘the world.’”131  The child, 
therefore, when at the proper age and maturity (able to exercise the will in freedom and 
with proper knowledge) is required to leave childish things behind. 
 In providing balance to the Catholic view of freedom, Tresmontant does insist, 
along with those in the Reformed tradition, that we are not right with God.  Something 
has gone dramatically wrong which requires correction.  In addition, even though our na-
ture has not been destroyed, we are nonetheless in need of serious restoration.  Our free-
dom remains, but it is a freedom that enables one to cooperate with God in a new birth.  
 Tresmontant notes another important point concerning freedom and human virtue.  
He draws from St. Irenaeus to affirm that the exercise of the will is an essential compo-
nent of human goodness.  St. Irenaeus taught that nonliving things have an inherent 
goodness because of their nature.  They have no ability to be other than they are.  In this 
way, they carry out their good design.  In contrast, God calls each person to exercise his 
will.  "His excellence must be a willed excellence, consented to and the fruit of his 
choice… man, a creature, must cooperate in his own creation."132 
                                                 
131
 Tresmontant, Christian Metaphysics, 99-100. 
132
 Tresmontant, The Origins of Christian Philosophy, 112. 
 66 
Section 11: Cognition—Christianity and Reason 
 The Christian doctrine of reason is united intricately to its ontology and meta-
physics.  The creative act of God forges a world that testifies to him and reveals him al-
beit only part.  God’s natural revelation is available to the intellect without the aid of su-
pernatural assistance.  For Tresmontant, this is the meaning of Romans 1:18.  
 The possibility to attain the natural knowledge of God is open to criticism on two 
fronts.  On the one hand are those who view the body and all matter as evil.  Creation in 
no way reveals God, but the workings of some other being, a principle of evil.  On the 
other hand are those who profess that the corruption of human nature by original sin 
makes the natural knowledge of God impossible.  To put this in perspective, he presents 
the cumulative thought of the Church in addressing this topic.  Tresmontant cites the po-
sition of the First Vatican Council that taught that human knowledge is capable of a natu-
ral knowledge of God.  He notes that this does not mean that all can or have achieved this 
knowledge.  It is possible.133  One central concern for Tresmontant regarding a natural 
knowledge of God is how it affects an understanding of faith.  One must not see faith as a 
violent intrusion on the human person.  The Catholic view insisted on cooperation at the 
level of faith and concerning justification.  Tresmontant writes: 
Faith is not a passion endured.  It is not the consequence of a breaking in, 
of a violent supernatural intrusion upon us.  Faith is a free [Denz, 1814] 
and reasonable [Denz, 1790] act, grounded in supernatural reason, but 
with the co-operation of all the natural powers of man.  Faith, both super-
natural and rational, is the joint work of the grace of God and human free-
dom, as is justification.134 
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 The preservation of the relationship between faith and reason brings into focus 
both sides of the equation.  Just as faith elevates reason, faith relies on reason as its 
ground and preserves faith from an irrational fideism.  As Tresmontant notes, 
…the divinely revealed truth presupposes the natural infallibility or certain au-
thority of the reason in those matters which are within its competence…it is to 
reason that God speaks, it is of the reason he asks faith, and he does not ask it of it 
until after he has made it see that it is indeed he who speaks…  Therefore, Catho-
lic, Christian thought has explicitly made clear that it comprises a doctrine of rea-
son which is not any doctrine whatsoever, and which is bound up with the whole 
of the Christian metaphysics.135 
 
 
 Tresmontant defends a “rationalism” properly understood, where the goal is to 
maintain the dignity of the intellect.  He cautions, however, that by holding the intellect 
as if it were self –sufficient, a misguided rationalism closes itself off from revelation 
since it is beyond its natural grasp.  Although much is offered in creation, God is free to 
offer more than can be known through creation.  The supernatural must not be ruled out, 
but instead the person must maintain a fundamental openness. 
Section 12: The “Pneuma” 
 Tresmontant explores several intriguing dimensions in Christian anthropology 
that have roots in Hebrew thought.  The Hebrew “ruah” is translated “pneuma” in the 
Septuagint.  According to Tresmontant, the pneuma is supernatural, and it allows us to 
encounter God.  Using the thought of Blondel, he states, “man was never in a purely 
natural state because it might be said that it is his nature to be a link between the created 
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and the Creator.  The pneuma within him is the immaterial bond by which he is raised up 
to the personal life of God.”136  
Tresmontant cautions his readers not to confuse the flesh-spirit conflicts that one 
finds throughout the New Testament with the body-soul conflicts prevalent in Greek 
thought.  While some may ask if Aristotle and St. Thomas dabble in some form of dual-
ism as they treat matter and form, Tresmontant responds, “’body’ here is not a substance- 
no more than ‘matter’ is – but merely a point of view on that concrete reality, living man.  
The body is man looked at from a certain angle.”137  Tresmontant states that to more ac-
curately express what Christians believe “we must not say: man is composed of a body 
and a soul; but: the living body that is man is composed of the dust of organic elements, 
and of soul that informs them.”138  In addition, “we should not say that man has a soul, 
but that he is a soul; nor consequently that he has a body, but that he is a body.”139  
 For Tresmontant it is extremely important to obtain a proper understanding of 
pneuma and its function within the human being.  He holds that it is the existence of the 
pneuma within man, which is a participation that allows for the inhabitation of man by 
God's very own spirit.  He draws biblically from three particular Scripture verses, which 
illustrate the fundamental and essential role that pneuma plays within the life of the hu-
man person.  "My spirit will not always remain in man, for man is but flesh."140  "You 
take away their breath (ruah), they die and return to dust."141  "The dust returns to the 
earth as it was, and the spirit returns unto God who gave it."142  These, among many Old 
                                                 
136
 Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, 108. 
137
 Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, 89. 
138
 Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, 90. 
139
 Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, 94. 
140
 Job 27:3. 
141
 Ps. 104:29. 
142
 Eccl. 12:7. 
 69 
Testament quotes, serve to substantiate the central place of the spirit and to establish how 
our spirit participates in the spirit of God.  Without the pneuma, men and women are not 
human beings. 
 The entire focus on the pneuma within man calls him above the biological order 
to a participation in the spirit of God.  Tresmontant contends that flesh and soul comprise 
what is natural to the human person.  Living out exclusively the biological dimension of 
human life to the exclusion of the spiritual dimension ends in death.  It is here that Tres-
montant makes known the necessity of a rebirth from above.  Simply put, flesh in the bib-
lical sense "is not what Plato called 'the body,' but is man, 'a living soul.'...'flesh' and 'soul' 
both stand for natural man."143  In a footnote Tresmontant quotes O. Procksch who states 
that "the soul is the substance into which the spirit comes."144 
Section 13: The Heart 
 Drawing heavily from Scripture Tresmontant produces an intriguing position per-
taining to understanding the place of the heart within a metaphysical anthropology. 
"Heart" in the Bible does not, as in our Western tradition, mean the affec-
tions, sensibility as opposed to reason.  It is rather man's liberty, the center 
which partakes in the fundamental decisions; in particular, the choice is 
between knowledge and ignorance, light and darkness, understanding and 
what the prophets call stupidity, foolishness.  In the "heart" the strife un-
folds, what will decide man's destiny, his very essence: according to the 
essence he has chosen, and will be judged.  For man chooses himself as he 
wills to be.  And this is the justification of the judgment upon him. 
 
 
 For Tresmontant, the heart is the center of fundamental human choosing.  Draw-
ing from a vast array of both Old Testament and New Testament texts, Tresmontant pre-
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sents a scriptural picture that portrays the heart as containing the secret depth of the hu-
man person.  Contained therein is the duplicity of the heart, which is free to choose evil 
or good.145  According to his analysis, the possibility of faith directly relates to under-
standing, and it is the heart that allows for this understanding.  This thesis is analogous in 
some ways to the issue that is explored in the sphere of moral theology referred to as fun-
damental option.146  Tresmontant posits that we begin with a fundamental disposition 
which originates from our hearts in absolute freedom and determines whether we will 
achieve understanding or be ground in a willful stupidity.147  Ultimately, one’s faith, or 
lack thereof, hinges on one’s initial disposition of the heart.  Without a fundamental 
openness there is no understanding, without understanding there cannot be faith. 
 Seen within its pneumatic context, "this relation between God and man that is un-
derstanding is established through the inhabitation within man of a supernatural element, 
ruah, the pneuma...the biblical conception of understanding is tied to its anthropology, 
and particularly to its doctrine of the pneuma.  Understanding, in the Bible, is a spiritual 
intelligence, sunesis pneumatikē.”148  However, this is not fideism.  Once again, faith and 
understanding must be understood within the context of the whole.  Tresmontant assures 
his readers that "nothing is more counter to the biblical theology of faith, and its concep-
tion of understanding, than the Cartesian dichotomies between ‘natural reason’ and 
‘faith.’”149  Again, "that spiritual (supernatural) understanding, which is faith, is rooted in 
the secret recesses of the heart, at the very base of our being.  It defines this being’s es-
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sence, whose main action it is.  It is a sign of the fundamental choice, the answer that 
cannot be constrained.”150 
 According to Tresmontant, idolatry remains a spiritual option for the human per-
son.  Idolatry consists in a metaphysical error that has the human person attributing and 
applying to something created that which is rightfully only due to the uniquely uncre-
ated.151  The heart is the battleground in which this war over the fundamental choice con-
cerning faith and disbelief is waged.  He notes that it is not only by intellectual and phi-
losophical discussions that one is to be persuaded, but that a discernment of spirits is re-
quired, and an increase in grace is needed for a renewal of the heart.152  He further states 
in a pointed footnote, “human understanding is dependent on a fundamental choice which 
defines the very being of man.  Man can find reasons to justify this initial choice.  This is 
why, in metaphysics too, there is a place for the discernment of spirits.”153 
 In one final note concerning idolatry, Tresmontant argues that the human intellect 
when grounded in creation can truly attain knowledge of God.  Addressing why it was 
that this knowledge was achieved in a superlative way among the People of Israel, Tres-
montant asserts that it was because, “God has freed his people from slavery to idols and 
in this way delivered the human intellect from the captivity of nothingness.  It is with the 
People of God that the human intellect has arrived at the fullness and the integrity of its 
normal exercise.”154 
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After affirming the complementary nature of faith with the intellect Tresmontant 
asserts that there exists a complex integration of the intellect with the heart.155  He says: 
Human intelligence does not “function” with invariable simplicity.  The 
act of the intellect is not dissociable from an assent to truth by our most 
secret freedom. The refusal to understand, of a lack of understanding, can-
not be explained apart from those secret human longings of the heart 
which are mentioned in the New Testament. Rationality is unattainable 
without moral conversion, which the Bible calls a “renewing of the heart,” 
that is to say, of both our freedom and our intelligence, which the New 
Testament translates as a “renewal of the mind.”156 
 
 
 Although I have drawn a comparison between fundamental option as found in 
moral theology and the fundamental choice/disposition discussed by Tresmontant, he 
maintains that nowhere in biblical thought is an "ethics" to be found.  It seems that he 
aims this comment at preserving the integrity of the whole Judeo-Christian contribution.  
To think of an ethics outside of the context of a people who live in the presence of the 
true God, he considers a betrayal.  As concerns ethics and its subject matter, "these con-
cepts find their meaning in a world that gravitates about him, whose name is I am.  They 
are integrated into a metaphysics and the theology and cannot be separated from them 
without losing their substance."157 
 Interestingly, this position raises a number of very serious questions. One notable 
point, if this position is indeed tenable, is that it certainly maintains a firm stance against 
an ethics isolated from all aspects of created existence.  He leaves no doubt that in his 
mind, the Christian must be absorbed in a universe, a whole, of which ethics is but one 
part, and from which ethics cannot be extricated.  To further establish his point he quotes 
M. Pohlens’ work Die Stoa in a footnote: 
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The fundamental notions of philosophical ethics are lacking in the New 
Testament.  They are either completely lacking as is the case of Eudaimo-
nia, or they appear very rarely, like aretē in the epistles of St. Peter and 
(only once) in the epistles of St. Paul, or again they acquire a new, reli-
gious meaning like dikaiosunē, a justice that has value in the eyes of God.  
Conversely, agapē which is so essential to Christianity is unknown in pa-
gan thought, even as a word. 158 
 
 
 Although we will need to say more about the possible merits and shortcomings 
encountered if one embraces this position, once again Tresmontant is convinced of the 
integrated whole.  It is based and has its foundation in the biblical conception of the 
world, one which is overarching.  This conceptual whole contains metaphysical, as well 
as ethical truths that are distinct to the Judeo-Christian worldview, and can only be prop-
erly viewed within this whole. 
Section 14: The Supernatural Destiny of the Human Person 
 The supernatural destiny of the human person stands as the other bookend in the 
thought of Tresmontant.  With creation at the beginning, this final section completes the 
work begun in creation and looks towards  an eternal destination.  The destined end of 
life for the human person is union with God.  The work of making the person capable of 
such a union, capax Dei, began in creation and carries forth with the hope of becoming 
participants in the divine nature.  Tresmontant holds that divinization is the completion of 
what was begun in creation, however, this supernatural call involves metaphysical “im-
plications and presuppositions.” Two essential presuppositions involve the freedom of the 
one being called and the person’s being preadapted to this end.159 
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 As I explained in the treatment on creation, since human beings are not divine 
emanations, they are ontologically distinct from God.  A union exists, although it is not at 
the level of divinization.  In order for this higher level of union to take place, it requires 
our free consent.  Tresmontant asserts, "our divinization is not a state of fact, established 
from all eternity. Our divinization is a process, a genesis, in which grace is primary, but 
in which we have to co-operate freely."160 This interim period for human beings is a nec-
essary part of the process.  Human beings are by nature creatures that live in time and 
progress moment by moment, gaining greater maturity, and by grace progress towards a 
supernatural destiny.  Tresmontant refers to St. Irenaeus.  He says: 
Irenaeus concludes: “Hence those are thoroughly unreasonable who do not 
await the time of growth, and blame God for the weakness of their na-
ture.”  Irenaeus shows how, by an inner and strictly metaphysical neces-
sity, creation is gradual, and, more so, is that divinization which God of-
fers to men.161 
 
 
 Tresmontant contrasts the Christian anthropology with other systems in order to 
show its unique place in relationship towards this supernatural destiny.  For example, in 
those philosophical systems in which the soul is by its nature a particle of the divine sub-
stance, and therefore divine, its natural resting place consists in the re-absorption within 
the one.  For Christianity, on the other hand, the immortality of the individual soul is as-
serted, but its divination is only possible through a grace-filled invitation.  There is no 
question of one assuming this place by right.  It is the result of adoption.  One cannot lay 
claim to this without the divine initiative.  
 What Tresmontant asserts is that the Christian metaphysics portrays an extremely 
optimistic view of the human person.  This supernatural destiny is so essential that Tres-
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montant contends, “from the ontological point of view, from the standpoint of Christian 
ontology and anthropology, what defines man precisely is the supernatural destiny of-
fered to him by grace, for which he is preadapted by creation.”162  
Within this view, and included in this destiny, it is the person who is valued, and 
invited to share in the divine life.  It is an invitation-only event, to which all receive an 
invitation.  The invitation itself bears witness to the value of the person, who is recog-
nized, remembered, and called to attend.  "Therefore, according to Christian metaphysics, 
relationships of dialogue exist between the uncreated being and the created beings.  The 
absolute enters into a personal relationship with man, in particular, within the outline of a 
new humanity -the people of God."163   
 Tresmontant presents a metaphysics, which once fully developed, becomes a sys-
tem that holds the person in the highest regard.  The person is so highly esteemed, and 
this includes their freedom, that God himself will not impinge on the freedom of the per-
son, even when persons exercise this freedom to their own detriment. 
 In contrast to this supernatural invitation, Tresmontant presents other philosophi-
cal positions that provide metaphysical alternatives.  It is his hope to show that these al-
ternative systems are pre-critically accepted although considered philosophically and 
metaphysically legitimate. 
   With the doctrine of divinization, we are at the heart of Christian theol-
ogy; we are in the midst of the revealed supernatural.  This must be admit-
ted.  It must also be noted that the philosophies most traditionally listed in 
the history of metaphysical thought - those of Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and many others - also comprise a doc-
trine of pantheistic divinization...the process is cyclic; it is natural, in the 
sense that it does not appeal to the supernatural gift, to a grace. This cycle 
is regarded as being fully entitled to form part of what is called metaphys-
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ics. The Platonic, Plotinian, Spinozan, or Hegelian doctrine of the divine, 
of the soul, of its origin or destiny, is not refused a place in our history of 
philosophy.  Why should Christian doctrine on the same subjects be dis-
missed from the field of metaphysics?  Is it because it is not pantheistic?  
But should pantheism be a priori identifiable with the rational and the phi-
losophic?164 
 
 
 In many ways, this gets at the heart of the metaphysical argument for Tresmon-
tant.  He asks why people call Christianity into question as a legitimate metaphysical sys-
tem.  Those who question its legitimacy do so by claiming that the Christian presupposi-
tions have roots in a revelation that is unachievable through purely rational means, and 
yet, when analyzed, many of the prevailing philosophical systems operate with an a pri-
ori acceptance of some form of pantheism.  In addition, the possibility of the supernatural 
revelation cannot be ruled out philosophically.  Until it is proven incompatible with rea-
son, if this were possible, then it deserves a fair hearing.  It needs to have a place along 
with other metaphysical systems. 
 The orthodox Christian tradition, according to Tresmontant, attests to the super-
natural destiny of human beings.  He believes that the law and the prophets, through the 
apostles, the Fathers, and the Church Councils, attest to this position.165  Christian theol-
ogy clearly trusts in divine adoption, which finds expression in the New Testament.  This 
is clear, as Tresmontant shows, in the marriage imagery found in the writings of St. Paul 
and other books of the New Testament.  New Testament marriage imagery indicates a 
profound union of Christ with his Church.  The language employed speaks of an “already 
but not yet” union.  For the one still en route, this destiny and final union requires fulfill-
ment.  The consummation of the marriage requires completion.  In evidence of the cen-
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trality of this marriage imagery, he posits that both the rabbis and Christian mystics find 
in the Canticle of Canticles the "central book of the Scriptures."166 
 Regarding the Conciliar evidence for this claim, Tresmontant cites the First Vati-
can Council.  From the constitution De Fide he quotes, "God, out of his infinite goodness, 
ordained man to a supernatural end, that is to say to a sharing in the divine estate, which 
altogether transcends the intelligence of the human mind."167 
 In further support of the philosophical legitimacy of the supernatural destiny of 
the human person, Tresmontant cites the lived experience of people as displaying a natu-
ral desire and orientation towards this supernatural end.  Found within the human person 
is a natural desire to see God.  Tresmontant admits that this point is debatable but finds 
evidence for it in the soul of each person.  In reality, in actual concrete persons, and in 
their hearts, minds, will, and inner core, these longings for the infinite seem undeniable.  
Norris Clarke says this when he speaks of the innate dissatisfaction that each person has 
in seeking to plummet the depths of reality.  Once we fully explore a finite good, we then 
“rebound” to seek out what is further.  Even an infinite exploration of the finite would 
prove unsatisfying to the intellect given its infinite capacity for knowing being. One can 
only rest in the infinite.168 
 In response to how Christianity can take its place among the many well-
established philosophies contained in history in spite of its conviction of a supernatural 
dimension, Tresmontant answers: 
 If  the Christian supernatural, taught by a revelation and by the Church,  
finds in man no rationally discoverable correspondence, no touchstone of 
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anticipation, no petition, and presents itself as a superfluous supplement 
falling on a complete, contented, fulfilled, self-satisfied human nature, 
then philosophy can question the rational value of this idea of the super-
natural for which experience offers no foundation. Then it will be possible 
to legitimately attempt to establish a separate philosophy. Christianity will 
remain a metaphysic...but it will not have a rational title. It will be de-
pendent on a gratuitous choice, or philosophically arbitrary preference, in-
stead of on philosophy.169 
 
 
 The above is precisely what Tresmontant believes is not the case.  He claims that 
on examination human beings do manifest many signs that would give evidence of such a 
predisposition, natural to the human person, towards a supernatural destiny.  Moreover, 
he holds that these supernatural longings, present in human beings from the dawn of time, 
have a corresponding fulfillment within Christianity that supersedes all other known phi-
losophical systems. For Tresmontant the supernatural destiny of the person is deeply re-
lated to creation. In creation the human person is given the capacity and freedom to 
choose an end that is a sharing in the very life of God. The person is not “entitled” to this 
supernatural end as if the person were a divine emanation, but is rather offered this des-
tiny as gift. However, this supernatural end is no foreign intrusion according to Tresmon-
tant, but is the final end for which God destined each creature. 
Section 15: Evaluation 
 A thorough evaluation of Tresmontant's metaphysical thought will be presented 
after I have placed him in dialogue with thinkers of the greater metaphysical tradition as 
well as some modern critics of the metaphysical project.  For now I will offer some gen-
eral remarks concerning the strengths and weaknesses of his writings. 
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 First, I admire Tresmontant’s willingness to address areas that verge on the scien-
tific front.  Too often theology and science operate independently of one another with no 
regard for the findings or achievements of the other.  Tresmontant's desire to explore new 
ways of contemplating ancient mysteries in light of modern scientific techniques is in-
deed admirable.  This is illustrated in his readiness to apply the findings of information 
theory to the issue of creation.  This is also found in his receptivity to new ways of think-
ing as concerns evolution. Further, his thoughts concerning creation and biological or-
ganization, from the center outwards, provides both a powerful point of reflection as well 
as a way to discuss matter and form which may better congeal with a scientific approach. 
 On the other hand, I believe that when engaging with certain metaphysical topics 
one ought to be cautious not to adopt any specific scientific theory as a basis for a meta-
physical position. For instance, I think it wise for the philosopher/theologian to continue 
to maintain the position of creation ex nihilo without having to base it specifically on the 
“Big Bang” or any like hypothesis. As a theory moves more closely to universal recogni-
tion, or is even regarded as fact, one may call upon it as an example of how science, for 
the time being, bears evidence that favors one position or another. I do not believe that 
Tresmontant relies on any theory to a serious degree, but at times he seems overly en-
thused with particular scientific findings as they tend towards  confirming his position. 
When this is done I think sufficient caveats are warranted. 
 As presented in this chapter, the scholarly method of Tresmontant is noteworthy. 
Employing scripture, logic, comparison, the Fathers and Church Councils is not new to 
theology, but applying it to metaphysics as he has done is unique. A biblically derived 
metaphysics is not found in the metaphysical manuals that were used from the scholastic 
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period until today. Although the thought and teaching of St. Thomas is thoroughly im-
bued with scripture, he does not begin his metaphysics in this way.  For example, in On 
Being and Essence, Thomas begins by citing the insights of Aristotle and Avicenna and 
then commences with a philosophical treatise of the meanings of being and essence.170 
 From the Christian perspective the authority of scripture serves as a reliable foun-
dation. The logical exposé illustrates the ramifications of maintaining a consistent sys-
tem. The elaboration on opposing positions illustrates what they entail. And finally the 
Early Church Fathers, the Councils and official Church teaching serve to validate the 
findings. They further indicate that systematically the metaphysics can hold together re-
flecting an accurate expression of Christian thought. This scriptural approach may possi-
bly carry the added benefit of being ecumenically well received.  
 From the non-Christian perspective his thought is still valuable as it presents what 
each philosophical system posits in a clear manner. The logical rigor applied to the axio-
matic principles from each philosophy helps to explain what each system practically en-
tails. For example, if you believe this world was crafted by a benevolent God who freely 
brought you into existence and actively desires your eternal happiness, you will approach 
reality in a specific way as informed by this world view. If, on the other hand, you be-
lieve that what we call this world, containing things and persons, is an illusion, and in 
fact what you perceive of as “yourself” is also an illusion soon to be swept back into the 
absolute from whence “you” came, you will surely have a different perspective of life. 
Such a position further illustrates that what you think of as yourself is not the result of 
being as gift, but is in fact the result of a cosmic play of which you are a small part. That 
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self which you have so long cultivated has been a fantasy and will come to naught.  This 
type of exercise may lead some to take another look at what they accept as foundationally 
true. 
 Concerning another topic, I think Tresmontant misspeaks when he insists that 
what philosophers call “ethics” is nowhere to be found in biblical thought. He is not 
maintaining that biblical thought lacks a prescribed way of behaving. Even a cursory 
reading of scripture could provide plenty of examples of biblical texts mandating how 
human beings ought to conduct themselves. He is however asserting that ethical conduct, 
according to scripture, is inextricably tied to a relationship with the One True God. Tres-
montant adds this clarifying remark.  He says, "to reduce this contribution to an “ethics” 
is in fact nothing less than the betrayal."171 This point is well taken. It emphasizes that the 
whole of the relationship between God and Israel cannot be simply reduced to a system 
of ethics.  He states this to counter those who would like to reduce Judeo-Christian 
thought to an ethical system without having to be troubled with a living God. It is well 
worth considering that Tresmontant has it in mind to counter the thought of Kant who 
favors an ethics over metaphysics. 
Nonetheless, the footnote that he cites indicates that the New Testament contains 
nothing like the Greek ethical concept of eudaimonia.  This is true if one is referring to an 
ethics of eudaimonia explicitly presented, but questionable if one were to investigate how 
the ethical teaching contained within Judeo-Christian thought may in fact be an ethics of 
"fullness of being."  It would not be difficult to cultivate a series of passages which speak 
to this effect. “I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly."172 "These things I 
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have spoken to you, that my joy may be in you, and that your joy may be full."173 These 
along with countless other passages could well serve to illustrate a Christian ethics which 
could employ the concept of eudaimonia.  Certainly this is implied in the famous saying 
of St. Irenaeus that “the glory of God is man fully alive." 
Tresmontant would be justified in trying to preserve the integrity of an ethics that 
is grounded in a relationship with God.  However, I think a denial of the possibility of 
extricating the ethical content contained within scripture can be problematic.  This is 
problematic on two fronts. First, in a pluralistic society this makes it impossible to appeal 
to any objective standard of behavior.  If Christians, inspired by the Scriptures, are unable 
to enter into an ethical discussion with those who are not biblically based we are in great 
trouble. This is especially true today when we stand poised on the brink of an ethical 
clash of cultures. Second, this underestimates any sort of natural law approach which 
may still offer the most promising means of dialogue between cultures. 
 It is true that the scriptures do not lay out a systematic natural law approach to 
ethics, but the question is whether an ethics can be legitimately extracted from it. This 
indeed is what Tresmontant claims to be doing in the sphere of metaphysics. I believe the 
same technique which he applies to metaphysics as biblically derived can be fruitfully 
applied to ethics as well. 
 Both Cudahy and Cherbonnier emphasize Tresmontant’s insistence on the value 
of the concrete. They do so by contrasting his work with Platonic thought.  On some lev-
els I think this justified. For too long an overly heavy emphasis on the more spiritual and 
the more universal may have detracted from a proper appreciation of the concrete. The 
Hebrew genius is found in encountering the presence of God as experienced in the con-
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crete and in an integrated way that did not downplay the body. The so called primitive 
perspective of the Hebrews may very well present the most advanced metaphysical per-
spective. 
On the other hand I do not find that there is a need to debunk what is sometimes 
called the classical approach. This classical approach is able to include both the Aristote-
lian and Platonic contributions, and does so in a way that is able to be reconciled with a 
metaphysics solely rooted in scripture. In fact, we have been the beneficiaries of a tradi-
tion that has purposely included the Aristotelian and the Platonic insights which have 
been able to aid Christianity. Certainly the Platonic notion of participation proves ex-
tremely valuable, and theology on the whole would be the poorer without the thought of 
St. Thomas and his use of Aristotle. 
Finally, I believe that Tresmontant’s critique of Kant is deserving of a good deal 
of consideration. As stated earlier, Kant’s failure to recognize the preexisting context of 
the subject may prove a fatal flaw in his thinking. Tresmontant’s assertion that Kant’s 
critique is based on an artificial presupposition which prevents the possibility of his dis-
covery of the Absolute must be addressed. The creation-based perspective of Tresmon-
tant presents new challenges to a philosophy that has sought to cripple the advance of 
metaphysics. 
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The intimate bond between theological and philosophical wisdom is one 
of the Christian tradition's most distinctive treasures in the exploration of 
revealed truth. This is why I urge them [theologians] to recover and ex-
press to the full the metaphysical dimension of truth in order to enter into a 
demanding critical dialogue with both contemporary philosophical thought 
and with the philosophical tradition in all its aspects, whether consonant 
with the word of God or not. FR §105 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: JOHN PAUL II AND FIDES ET RATIO 
 
 
Section 1: Formative Years 
 Karol Wojtyła was born on the 18th of May in 1920 in the town of Wadowice, Po-
land. His mother died early in his childhood and he was then raised by his father, who 
was a non-commissioned military officer. After high school he enrolled in the Jagiel-
lonian University in Krakow in 1938. His was a short-lived university experience due to 
the Nazi invasion in 1939 which forced him to discontinue studies. In 1942 he pursued 
the path to priesthood which entailed seminary study, first underground and then formally 
after the end of the war. After ordination he was sent to Rome to pursue his doctoral de-
gree at the Angelicum University. He did so under the renowned theologian, Fr. Gar-
rigou-Lagrange and completed his doctoral work in 1948. For a few years he was en-
gaged in pastoral work, until in 1951 he resumed his philosophical and theological pur-
suits.  At this time he considered the usefulness of Max Scheler’s phenomenology to-
wards the development of a Catholic ethics and defended his thesis on this subject at the 
Catholic University of Lublin in 1953. Shortly thereafter he was named professor of 
moral theology at the same university. His subsequent appointment to bishop, archbishop 
and eventually pope became his major occupation. Nonetheless, he sought to remain in-
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volved in academic pursuits for his entire life. His prolific writings as both Pontiff and as 
a Professor attest to his continued love of academia. 
 A number of circumstances exerted a significant influence over the writings of 
John Paul, as we shall refer to him for the remainder of the dissertation. Some of these 
encounters were more influential than others, but all of them were significant as they 
provided various elements towards the construction of an entire system of thought. Biog-
rapher George Weigel points out that at the very beginning of the future Pope’s studies in 
1942 he encountered metaphysics textbook which would forever change his vision of the 
world. This encounter will in great part have substantial bearing on this dissertation’s fo-
cus on the metaphysical writings of John Paul. Weigel notes how the literature John Paul 
read in his youth was so vastly different from a textbook that he was asked to master, that 
he had to strain to grasp this new approach to thought. Weigel quotes how the Pope later 
explained this new discovery to André Frossard: 
My literary training, centered around the humanities, had not prepared me 
at all for the scholastic theses and formulas with which the manual [Wais’s 
book] was filled. I had to cut a path through a thick undergrowth of con-
cepts, analyses, and axioms without even being able to identify the ground 
over which I was moving. After two months of hacking through this vege-
tation I came to a clearing, to the discovery of the deep reasons for what 
until then I had only lived and felt. When I passed the examination I told 
my examiner that… the new vision of the world which I had acquired in 
my struggle with that metaphysics manual was more valuable than the 
mark which I had obtained. I was not exaggerating. What intuition and 
sensibility had until then taught me about the world found solid confirma-
tion.1 
 
 
 This metaphysical illumination would continue to be the foundational underpin-
ning of all of his thought from this initial encounter through his papacy. It would color 
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and affect all of his subsequent reading. As he engaged modern schools of philosophy he 
did so with a mind to reconcile them with the insight he received from Wais’s manual. 
According to Cardinal Dulles, this metaphysical text did not just contain the classical ap-
proach but allowed him to come to grips with the transcendental philosophy that was cur-
rently being discussed. This school of thought coming out of Louvain included the 
thought of Cardinal Mercier and sought to reconcile the approaches of Thomas Aquinas 
and Kant. At the end of this course of study, Dulles notes that John Paul “was able to see 
that reality is intelligible and that an all-embracing realist philosophy is possible.”2 
 John Paul, as his teaching and writings evidence, was not strictly a traditionalist. 
As he encountered new approaches to philosophy he did not dismiss them if they were 
seemingly reconcilable with a Catholic world view. Weigel points out that his dissatisfac-
tion with strict neo-scholasticism was manifested in the conflict that he had with Fr. Gar-
rigou-Lagrange over the content in his first dissertation. Weigel notes that his grade suf-
fered as a result of his unwillingness to follow a more conservative course. He writes that 
his professor “was unhappy that Wojtyla, writing about the concept of faith in St. John of 
the Cross, did not refer to God as the ‘Divine Object’—and docked his grade accordingly. 
… He remained a Thomistic realist; but he seems to have been looking for a different 
method to get at the truth of things.”3 
 His exploration of the thought of St. John of the Cross helped him to expand his 
understanding of mystical experience. Dulles explains it by saying that John Paul realized 
that in this type of experience “the presence of God is grasped in a non-objective way, 
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through the mutual self-giving of two subjects. The insight into the dynamics of intersub-
jectivity set him on the way to constructing an original personalist form of Thomistic re-
alism.”4 
 For John Paul this would prove to be a life-long challenge, remaining faithful to 
the Thomistically based metaphysics in which he found the ability to ground his thought 
and experience while being open to integrate the truth that he found in both the realms of 
phenomenology and mysticism. His inability to find an adequate means of objective ex-
pression for a mystical encounter with God is reminiscent of Thomas’ own mystical ex-
perience. This reaction when facing the mystery of the Divine may be considered wholly 
faithful to Thomas’ own understanding of God who is ultimately beyond our intellectual 
categories. It is often thought that Thomas gave up on theology after this mystical en-
counter. However, even with this greater realization of the limited ability that our linguis-
tic and categorical terms provide, Thomas thought his contribution worthwhile enough to 
continue. Perhaps this affords greater evidence for the breadth of the Thomistic tradition 
which admits the limited capacity of language and human thought and nonetheless pro-
fesses its ability to grasp truth. 
 In John Paul’s pursuit of truth one finds evidence of a particular pattern which 
centers on the substantial truth to be found over and above its expression. Weigel makes 
known an interesting piece of evidence regarding the scholarship of John Paul. He writes 
that he “had a generally ‘unfootnoted’ way of doing philosophy:  - he did philosophy 
‘like a peasant,’ his premier student later noted – and he was far more concerned with 
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mapping the terrain of things-as-they-are than with providing an extensive academic ap-
paratus of citations and cross-references for every proposal or assertion.”5 
 As noted, John Paul's philosophical foundation was rooted in a realism derived 
from the thought of both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.  It may also help to place this 
study within the context in which it took place.  During the time that he was first studying 
metaphysics he was also working in a chemical factory and encountering the harsh reality 
that was a part of that labor while enduring the tragedies of war.  It is here, it could be 
posited, where John Paul's conviction of realism was solidly constructed. In this context 
the arguments posed by radical skepticism and moral relativism arguably lost their sway.6  
 The unique approach of John Paul was found in his combining of metaphysical 
realism rooted in Thomas, with a keen awareness of human experience illuminated in the 
writings of Max Scheler and other phenomenologists.7 For my purposes here I think it 
sufficient to point out how very committed John Paul was to both of these philosophical 
traditions. He was not wholly satisfied having only encountered the work of Wais, and so 
continued the study of metaphysics thereafter.8  
 Fides et Ratio, I will argue, is the greatest expression of the philosophical thought 
of John Paul. Although it can be said that more depth, complexity and further reaching 
speculative writing can be found in The Acting Person or Love and Responsibility, I 
maintain that Fides et Ratio represents the condensation of his thought. The metaphysical 
commitment balanced with phenomenology is presented in its “safest” form. Stripped of 
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the tentative speculations we have a crystallized account of what the Pontiff believes is 
worthy of the status of an encyclical letter. By presenting the core of his conviction in 
this encyclical, he marries his thought with that of the Church. In considering how much 
the encyclical represents his metaphysical past, Dulles notes that in the document we can 
find a consistency with all of his writings up till that point.9  In this document we find 
John Paul’s deep commitment to both Thomism as well as his commitment to the signifi-
cance of the contribution of phenomenology. The inclusion of an array of philosophers 
from varied traditions in §74 attests to the breadth of perspectives the Pope valued.  Rich-
ard Barrett concurs with the assessment of Fides et Ratio as the Pope’s most representa-
tive work. He writes that in this encyclical “we have, arguably, the most far-reaching and 
mature contribution of his time and one which justifies his election as a philosopher-
pope.”10 
Section 2: Introduction to Fides et Ratio 
 I will now address some of the questions that were raised in the first chapter. 
When John Paul called for a recovery of metaphysics, what exactly is it that the pope had 
in mind, and why is it needed? These two crucial questions will be the primary focus of 
this chapter. 
 Giving context to the Pope’s writing, it is appropriate to address the form that he 
has chosen to use to put forth his teaching. According to Francis Sullivan, the encyclical 
is a relatively new teaching venue within the church. He writes that it is usually thought 
that Pope Gregory XVI was the first to use this manner of teaching. It falls under what is 
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considered the pastoral teaching authority of the church. After Pope Gregory many suc-
cessive popes chose to make use of this means of teaching. Under Pius XII it was estab-
lished as a standard way for a pontiff to address the Church. The teaching force of the 
encyclical also grew during this time, although it was never claimed explicitly that it re-
quired the submission of the faithful as to an infallible statement. The reverence paid to 
an encyclical teaching has varied, from strong consent, called for in Humani generis, to a 
theological uncertainty on the part of some theologians in light of Humanae Vitae.11 John 
Paul’s continued use of the encyclical seems to have strengthened its position as a norma-
tive means of articulating the pastoral teaching authority of the Church. This trend in the 
ordinary use of the encyclical has been continued in the pontificate of Benedict XVI with 
his encyclical letters on love and hope.12 
 I will use the official English translation of the encyclical when quoting it 
throughout this dissertation, but will point out from time to time when this translation has 
been called into question. One outspoken critic of the translation draws our attention to 
some problematic English, especially pertaining to the metaphysical focus of this work. 
Laurence Paul Hemming is not restrained from a critical assessment of the translation 
when he comments on the “sheer awfulness of the English translation.” He refers to one 
pertinent portion in §49: 
At §49 the English tells us “The Church has no philosophy of her own nor 
does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others.” 
The Latin text has “Suam ipsius philosophiam non exhibet Ecclesia neque 
quamlibet praelegit peculiarem philosphiam aliarum damno.”  The sense 
here is quite different: the English implies that one philosophy could be 
chosen by the Church from a range of systems: rather like preferring white 
wine to red for a meal. The implication of the Latin is much sharper: to 
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choose one philosophy would be to pronounce a kind of judgment on the 
others. A quite different inference.13 
 
 
Hemming’s pointed insight seems to make better sense of the general tenor of the entire 
document. For while John Paul is clear as to the Church’s openness to philosophical con-
tributions from schools other than Thomism, he is more clear that in order for a philoso-
phical school to be appropriate to the task of aiding Christian thought it must have a 
metaphysical range.14 
 The metaphysical emphasis of the encyclical did not go unnoticed by theologians. 
In the Pope’s reasserting the intellect’s ability to grasp reality, John F. X. Knasas notes 
that in this document “what is striking is the ‘metaphysical’ character of the Pope’s plea. 
By my count, the word ‘metaphysics,’ or its equivalent ‘philosophy of being,’ is men-
tioned at least twenty three times.”15 It is this emphasis that I wish to draw attention to in 
the encyclical as each of its sections are assessed.  
 Timothy Sean Quinn asserts that perhaps the very purpose of the document is to 
address “the corrosion of any metaphysical basis for human life and thought. Not only 
does the loss of metaphysics deprive reason of any transcendental foundation. As well, it 
secures faith’s abolition from reason.16 John Paul later lays out six “isms” that he finds 
dangerous to both proper reason and faith. All of these six philosophies can be found to 
originate in modernity and what has become known as the philosophical approach that is 
rooted in the so called “turn to the subject.” 
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 The potential danger in this subjectivity is well described by Bishop Allen Vi-
gneron: 
The fundamental axioms of this Modern world had to do with the auton-
omy of the self, what is classically referred to as “the turn to subjectivity.” 
This highlighting of the self was a residue from the creation culture. How-
ever, withdrawn out of that context, the self becomes the “anti-creature,” 
not receiving existence as a created participation in divine Being, but ex-
isting over against God, competing with, if not usurping, his ultimacy. 
And in the name of this newly discovered autonomous self, the force of 
Christian belief in Western culture is gradually eroded.17 
 
As noted here, it is not the self in itself that is problematic, it is the self drawn out of its 
proper context. When rooted in a context of creation, the self can be looked on as a glori-
ous gift, a unique concrete expression of the divine. This is clearly what Tresmontant is 
looking to achieve in his work, to give a context out of which the self can be properly ap-
preciated. Outside of this context the self tends towards annihilation or a misplaced self-
aggrandizement. 
 The modernist rationalism, which later gave way to what we now call post mod-
ernism, was initially an optimistic movement which believed in reason and its ability to 
arrive at truth. These rationalist thinkers were convinced that once one undertook the 
study of reality this goal could be achieved, and once having achieved some well-
grounded first principles a logically well derived system would result. Metaphysics and 
moral theory were a part of this optimistic vision. This vision itself, however, presented 
problems for the Christian believer if it did not include a faith component. After confron-
tation with the challenges posed by Hume, Mills and others, and as a result of not having 
achieved the goals thought evidently possible, today this rationalistic optimism is mostly 
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nonexistent.18 According to Dulles, at this time “the prevailing mood was one of meta-
physical agnosticism. …[T]he rationalist mentality hardly survives today except in the 
spheres of mathematics, logic, and empirical science.”19 
 The doubt cast on reason’s ability led to what John Paul sees as the philosophical 
impotence of our age. Against a tendency towards a modern fideism in light of a discour-
aged intellect, the Pope hopes to restore the proper place of reason. The Pontiff hopes to 
reset the broken wing of reason and reinstate the metaphysical muscle on which that wing 
relies. Francis J. Selman asserts that “for John Paul II, metaphysics shows us the way out 
of what he discerns to be the present crisis in modern philosophy, which he says is a cri-
sis in meaning that has resulted from pluralism and the fragmentation of knowl-
edge…metaphysics clearly is the Pope’s means of restoring the unity of knowledge.”20 
 This unity of vision is found in what the Pope calls a sapiential dimension of phi-
losophy. This return to wisdom provides unity and order, it brings together faith and rea-
son. Reason, rooted in wisdom, helps to order rational truths. This represents well the 
philosophical tradition where “wisdom, as Aristotle understands it, requires the one who 
is wise, to be the one who orders all other kinds of truth into their highest form. This is 
pure theoria, so that even phronesis (Aquinas’ prudentia), when it takes not the prudence 
of the person, but truth, for its own sake is seen as ordered to Sophia itself.”21 
 This quest for wisdom must include a needed metaphysical component according 
to John Paul. As Dulles notes, “Pope John Paul’s most emphatic endorsement of meta-
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physics is contained in… Fides et Ratio, which is in large measure a plea to philosophers 
to recover the original vocation of philosophy as a search for wisdom.”22 Battista Mondin 
sums up much of what will be examined in greater detail, namely that the document af-
firmatively posits two truths that modern scholarship calls into question. The first truth 
concerns the actual ability of reason to in fact do metaphysics, and the second is that of 
the necessity of metaphysics for doing good theology.23 The following section will ex-
plore in greater detail what the Pope envisions regarding faith and reason and his ration-
ale behind his call for metaphysical recovery. 
Section 3: Pertinent Sections in Fides et Ratio 
 In light of the election of Benedict XVI, it is worth briefly presenting how our 
present Pontiff weighs in on Fides et Ratio. The following quote allows us to assess the 
importance that he has placed on the document, but more than that, to see the importance 
he places on a continued discussion of the interaction of faith and reason. He writes: 
If I had briefly to sketch the main intention of the encyclical, I would say 
that it is trying to rehabilitate the question of truth in a world characterized 
by relativism; it is trying to reinstate it as a rational and scientific task in 
the situation of modern science, which does indeed look for truths but 
which to a great extent disqualifies the search for the truth as being unsci-
entific; it is attempting this, because otherwise faith loses the air it 
breathes.  The encyclical is quite simply attempting to give courage for the 
adventure of truth. 24 
 
 
This desire to address issues pertaining to faith and reason has been a recurring theme in 
his short pontificate. In his Regensburg Address, Benedict sought to point out what can 
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be the result of a faith not tied to and properly restrained by reason. It is pertinent to this 
paper that he, along with John Paul, feels that philosophy is essential in the pursuit of 
truth within the context of the quest of faith. 
 Although there is contained within every section of the encyclical material which 
arguably is tied to metaphysical content, I will for the sake of brevity restrict myself to 
those sections which most poignantly relate to John Paul’s metaphysical focus. 
§4 
First Principles 
Although times change and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a 
core of philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. 
Consider, for example, the principles of non-contradiction, finality and 
causality, as well as the concept of the person as a free and intelligent sub-
ject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness. Consider as well 
certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are 
among the indications that, beyond different schools of thought, there ex-
ists a body of knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage 
of humanity. It is as if we had come upon an implicit philosophy, as a re-
sult of which all feel that they possess these principles, albeit in a general 
and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some measure by 
all, this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the differ-
ent philosophical schools. Once reason successfully intuits and formulates 
the first universal principles of being and correctly draws from them con-
clusions which are coherent both logically and ethically, then it may be 
called right reason or, as the ancients called it, orthós logos, recta ratio.§4 
 
 
 At the very inception of the encyclical, John Paul places our focus on those ele-
ments of metaphysics which have been traditionally considered most essential. In §4 he 
makes mention of how many foundational elements remain constant, even in light of 
changing times and the increase of knowledge. Among these he notes: the principle of 
non-contradiction, finality and causality, human beings as free and intelligent and the ca-
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pacity of the person to know God-truth-beauty. William Thompson-Uberuaga concurs 
and elaborates on their necessity when he writes that: 
These are “first principles” in the sense that they are not the result of an 
argument, but the basis upon which any argument might unfold. They are, 
so to speak, implied in our participation in reality, guiding our ability to 
meaningfully participate therein.25  
 
 
The early establishment of these key elements helps to set the shiftless foundation which 
places in context subsequent sections where he emphasizes dynamic growth and open-
ness to “new” philosophical systems. This insistence on these foundational metaphysical 
points of departure provides evidence for what Dulles calls John Paul’s principal concern, 
“to encourage a metaphysical realism.”26  Dulles points out that John Paul is here also 
paying tribute to the established contributions of Plato and Aristotle who laid the 
groundwork and brought to light these metaphysical principles.27 In defending how truth 
cannot be opposed to truth, John Paul reaffirms this same principle of non-contradiction 
also in §34. His focus on causality attempts to confirm that these underpinnings of reason 
make thought possible. As Selman points out, “for without the idea of cause there is no 
intelligible order…intelligence is not explained by natural science, for it is the very con-
dition which makes it possible.”28  
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§5 
The Place of Logic 
Modern philosophy clearly has the great merit of focusing attention upon 
man. From this starting-point, human reason with its many questions has 
developed further its yearning to know more and to know it ever more 
deeply. …Yet the positive results achieved must not obscure the fact that 
reason, in its one-sided concern to investigate human subjectivity, seems 
to have forgotten that men and women are always called to direct their 
steps towards a truth which transcends them. ...It has happened therefore 
that reason, rather than voicing the human orientation towards truth, has 
wilted under the weight of so much knowledge and little by little has lost 
the capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise to the truth of 
being. Abandoning the investigation of being, modern philosophical re-
search has concentrated instead upon human knowing. Rather than make 
use of the human capacity to know the truth, modern philosophy has pre-
ferred to accentuate the ways in which this capacity is limited and condi-
tioned. 
…Recent times have seen the rise to prominence of various doctrines 
which tend to devalue even the truths which had been judged certain. A 
legitimate plurality of positions has yielded to an undifferentiated plural-
ism, based upon the assumption that all positions are equally valid, which 
is one of today's most widespread symptoms of the lack of confidence in 
truth. Even certain conceptions of life coming from the East betray this 
lack of confidence, denying truth its exclusive character and assuming that 
truth reveals itself equally in different doctrines, even if they contradict 
one another. On this understanding, everything is reduced to opinion; and 
there is a sense of being adrift. …With a false modesty, people rest con-
tent with partial and provisional truths, no longer seeking to ask radical 
questions about the meaning and ultimate foundation of human, personal 
and social existence. In short, the hope that philosophy might be able to 
provide definitive answers to these questions has dwindled. §5 
 
 
 Section 5 begins with a discussion of modern philosophy and its subjective focus.  
After acknowledging the merits of this approach he also offers words of caution, remind-
ing the reader that they must pursue the truth which is transcendent.  As the subjective 
focus has shifted attention from ontology to epistemology it has achieved a broad skepti-
cism.  John Paul's seeks to reestablish the intellect’s ability to know, and to know with 
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certainty.  He begins by reinstating the place of logic.  This he does in contrast to particu-
lar Eastern forms of thought which call into question the validity of logic itself.  John 
Paul knows very well that without logic, most especially exhibited in the principle of 
non-contradiction, our utterances carry no more weight than babbling.  If the Pope is to 
ask us to become seekers of truth we must have at least the minimal tools requisite to 
recognize its existence.  Although the pontiff seeks to engage the modern philosophical 
milieu, he is unwilling to give even an inch at this foundational level.  Logic stands. 
§22 
Scripture and Metaphysical Enquiry 
In the first chapter of his Letter to the Romans, Saint Paul helps us to ap-
preciate better the depth of insight of the Wisdom literature's reflection. 
Developing a philosophical argument in popular language, the Apostle de-
clares a profound truth: through all that is created the “eyes of the mind” 
can come to know God. Through the medium of creatures, God stirs in 
reason an intuition of his “power” and his “divinity” (cf. Rom 1:20). This 
is to concede to human reason a capacity which seems almost to surpass 
its natural limitations. Not only is it not restricted to sensory knowledge, 
from the moment that it can reflect critically upon the data of the senses, 
but, by discoursing on the data provided by the senses, reason can reach 
the cause which lies at the origin of all perceptible reality. In philosophical 
terms, we could say that this important Pauline text affirms the human ca-
pacity for metaphysical enquiry. 
According to the Apostle, it was part of the original plan of the creation 
that reason should without difficulty reach beyond the sensory data to the 
origin of all things: the Creator. But because of the disobedience by which 
man and woman chose to set themselves in full and absolute autonomy in 
relation to the One who had created them, this ready access to God the 
Creator diminished. §22 
 John Paul did not shy away from the use of Scripture in Fides et Ratio, in fact, 
Scripture is to be found throughout the document when it appropriately illustrates a 
needed point.  Section 22 seeks to give Scriptural support to the intellect’s capacity for 
metaphysical questioning and knowing.  The Pauline passage taken from the first chapter 
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of Romans is used as evidence against a strict Empiricist approach to reason which pre-
maturely limits it to sensory knowledge. An empirical approach would only validate sen-
sory findings without their subsequent transcendence towards  ultimate meaning. This 
type of elaboration on pertinent passages brings forth the philosophical substructure in-
herent within the Scriptures and is very much in line with the work of Tresmontant. 
§28-29 
The Human Being as the Seeker of Truth and the Human Heart 
Yet, for all that they may evade it, the truth still influences life. Life in fact 
can never be grounded upon doubt, uncertainty or deceit; such an exis-
tence would be threatened constantly by fear and anxiety. One may define 
the human being, therefore, as the one who seeks the truth. §28 
 
 
 These two sections bear upon the metaphysical focus only in a secondary way, but 
nonetheless warrant attention. In §28 we find a very pointed insight of John Paul on the 
very definition of a human being. He states that the human being may be defined as “the 
one who seeks the truth.” This definition heavily influences his metaphysical anthropol-
ogy. Truth for John Paul is not an illusory thing which purposely evades our grip, but 
seems graspable and palpable as one reads the encyclical. It is not surprising then that the 
Pontiff includes truth-seeking within the very definition of a human being. 
The thirst for truth is so rooted in the human heart that to be obliged to ig-
nore it would cast our existence into jeopardy. Everyday life shows well 
enough how each one of us is preoccupied by the pressure of a few fun-
damental questions and how in the soul of each of us there is at least an 
outline of the answers. §29 
 
 
 100 
 In section §29 he roots this search for truth within the human heart.29 This is also 
of interest for this paper in so far as it was part of the thesis of Tresmontant. Tresmontant 
held that it is at the level of the heart that one makes a fundamental decision towards or 
against an open disposition towards truth. John Paul’s focus does not extend to the human 
heart as the locus of fundamental choice which he does in the Theology of the Body, but 
rather as the foundation of desire for truth. Some have commented on the Augustinian 
influences found within the document.30 The focus in this section would certainly support 
that case. Most noteworthy is the fact that truth and the heart are viewed as intricately 
related, and that this quest for truth is no purely logical and dispassionate pursuit. 
§32 
The Truth of the Person 
In believing, we entrust ourselves to the knowledge acquired by other 
people. This suggests an important tension. On the one hand, the knowl-
edge acquired through belief can seem an imperfect form of knowledge, to 
be perfected gradually through personal accumulation of evidence; on the 
other hand, belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it 
involves an interpersonal relationship and brings into play not only a per-
son's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to 
others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and endur-
ing. 
It should be stressed that the truths sought in this interpersonal relationship 
are not primarily empirical or philosophical. Rather, what is sought is the 
truth of the person—what the person is and what the person reveals from 
deep within. Human perfection, then, consists not simply in acquiring an 
abstract knowledge of the truth, but in a dynamic relationship of faithful 
self-giving with others. §32 
Section 32 provides insight into the more progressive thought of John Paul.  Al-
though the document affirms many traditional points, sections such as this make explicit 
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the pontiff's commitment to Personalism.  He places his focus on the interpersonal di-
mension of coming to know.  He is not seeking to undermine the objective content of 
truth, but rather is seeking to make explicit that this truth is situated within a personal 
subjective context.  This type of approach has proven to be a fruitful venue for furthering 
metaphysical reflection.  For example, W. Norris Clarke has suggested a similar approach 
in his paper “The ‘We Are’ of Interpersonal Dialogue As the Starting Point of Metaphys-
ics.”  In this work he writes: 
To sum up, I am suggesting that the most fruitful starting point of Thomis-
tic metaphysics-in the sense only of the initial paradigm encounter with 
real being (actually existing being), from which the richest notion of being 
can be brought to reflective awareness-is neither the "I am" of Descartes, 
nor the experience of the real but non-personal sensible world, nor the 
neutral "S is P" of any affirmative true judgment (because embracing inde-
terminately both real and mental being).  It is rather the "We are" of inter-
personal dialogue.  In a word, the full dimensions of what it means "to be" 
can be found only in personal being, in its interpersonal manifestation.  
Why not start there from the beginning?31 
 
 
This type of thought exhibited by Pope John Paul and Clarke may help to bridge the gap 
between a traditional scholastic past and a subjectively focused philosophical present. 
§39 
Encountering Greek Thought 
It is clear from history, then, that Christian thinkers were critical in adopt-
ing philosophical thought. …But in the light of Christian Revelation what 
had signified a generic doctrine about the gods assumed a wholly new 
meaning, signifying now the reflection undertaken by the believer in order 
to express the true doctrine about God. As it developed, this new Christian 
thought made use of philosophy, but at the same time tended to distinguish 
itself clearly from philosophy. History shows how Platonic thought, once 
adopted by theology, underwent profound changes, especially with regard 
to concepts such as the immortality of the soul, the divinization of man 
and the origin of evil. §39 
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 This section, however brief, contains a couple of statements that should not go 
unnoticed. John Paul wants to dispel the concerns of some, that by mixing with philoso-
phy, theology will inevitably compromise itself. He notes that from the beginning it was 
philosophy, in this case Platonic thought, which underwent profound changes in order to 
aid theology. He mentions three specific philosophical positions that required a very spe-
cific Christian perspective: the immortality of the soul, the divinization of human beings 
and the origin of evil. Tresmontant also sought to point this out in many of his works, and 
the previous chapter attempted to make explicit the absolutely unique Christian view. It 
was, and is, philosophy that must be reconciled with revelation, and not vice versa. 
§43 and §44 
St. Thomas Aquinas 
A quite special place in this long development belongs to Saint Thomas, 
Thomas had the great merit of giving pride of place to the harmony which 
exists between faith and reason. Both the light of reason and the light of 
faith come from God, he argued; hence there can be no contradiction be-
tween them. §43 
 
 
 Recently the status of Thomism within the continued teaching of the Church has 
been challenged.  Positions range from those who believe that nothing less than Thomis-
tically expressed official teaching is appropriate, to those who believe that the Thomistic 
mode is outdated and can no longer accommodate modern forms of expression.  No mat-
ter where one stands in this regard, the fact that Thomism has seen a decline in light of its 
past exalted status is undeniable.  Timothy Sean Quinn attributes the decline of Thomism 
to forces that were at work since the time of the Enlightenment.  It is his contention that, 
unable to attack church teaching directly, Enlightenment thinkers set out to undermine 
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the Aristotelian underpinnings of Thomistic thought.  He says that, "the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment thus do not simply provoke a conflict between Athens and Jerusalem. 
They foment civil war within Athens itself."  He goes on to write that their sharpest point 
of attack was aimed at an Aristotelian understanding of final causality and teleology.  He 
points out that Bacon out-rightly denied final causality and considered the very notion as 
a human construct.  He continues, "the extent to which the new science will do away with 
final causality as an explanation for the natural order is the extent to which it will remain 
‘metaphysically neutral,’ if not downright hostile to metaphysical inquiry.  And meta-
physics, by the seventeenth century, had become in effect code for theology, as Bacon's 
criticism reveals. Liberation from any supernatural order would henceforth require a tan-
dem liberation from a theological natural order."32 
 A comparison of the status of Thomism as found in Aeterni Patris, Humani 
generis and Fides et Ratio reveals this decline in status. Harold E. Ernst puts it thus: 
Aeterni Patris insisted on Thomism as the only adequate Catholic philoso-
phy, with a guarded admission that not all philosophical novelty was per-
nicious. Humani generis repeated the requirement of Thomism, though 
with substantially greater optimism regarding the possibility of its enrich-
ment through critically engaging diverse philosophical approaches.  Fides 
et ratio moves still further in this direction by explicitly endorsing a le-
gitimate philosophical pluralism, though still espousing an enriched 
Thomism as a demonstrably-successful philosophical system for the pur-
poses of Christian theology.33 
 
 
It is this type of diminished Thomistic emphasis that makes it difficult to build a case that 
the Church, at least officially, is interested in restating Thomism. This decision has meta-
physical consequences. It is worth noting that whereas Pope Leo XIII called for a renewal 
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in the thought of Thomas, Pope John Paul II calls for the reinstatement of a “metaphysi-
cal element” and a “philosophy of genuinely metaphysical range.”34  It is admittedly hard 
to pin down John Paul as concerns his commitment to promote a new Thomism. On the 
one hand he most definitely places this document in the line of teaching consistent with 
his predecessors, and of his own accord offers lavish praise for Thomas.35 Yet, his com-
mitment to phenomenology and new schools of thought keeps him from placing a more 
concentrated emphasis on a renewed Thomism. This position may have its roots in the 
attitude of the Second Vatican Council.  Dulles notes that although there are to be found 
Thomistic elements throughout the documents of the Council, and even at times explicit 
praise of Thomas, it was not a central focus of the Council.36 By all accounts John Paul’s 
vision of the future of theology and the Church was at the very heart of the work that took 
place at the council. As the Second Vatican council was not set upon a Thomistic exclu-
sivity, neither was John Paul. 
 It should also be mentioned that by the time of the Second Vatican Council 
Thomism could be referred to by three distinct groups: Aristotelian Thomism, Existential 
Thomism and Transcendental Thomism.37 This added to the difficulty of a carte blanche 
recommendation of Thomistic pursuits, since one’s choice of “Thomisms” could be di-
rected in substantially different directions. 
 Conservatively speaking, I believe that two elements of Thomistic thought are 
undoubtedly contained in the writings of John Paul, including Fides et Ratio. These two 
elements display how Thomas contributed in a substantial way to the thought of John 
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Paul on two important theological stances: 1) an emphasis on a philosophy of Being, and 
2) a conviction on the truth of Metaphysical Realism. 
 This point is well made by John Paul himself as he builds on the foundation laid 
by Leo XIII.  John Paul declares " the philosophy of St. Thomas...is a philosophy of be-
ing, that is, of the ‘act of existence’ (actus essendi) whose transcendental value paves the 
most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to 
God.  On account of this we can even call this philosophy: a philosophy of the proclama-
tion of being, a chant of praise of what exists.”38 This emphasis on being can be found 
throughout the encyclical.  In §66 he notes that being has truth as its foundation, and in 
§76 advocates a philosophy of being. In §86 he speaks of the person as a privileged locus 
for encounter with being and for metaphysical enquiry. In §90 he cautions that many phi-
losophies reject the meaningfulness of being. And in § 97 he posits the necessity of a phi-
losophy of being to be adequate to interact with theology. 
 As was previously mentioned, John Paul was concerned with firmly rooting ethics 
within a metaphysically sound base. Thomism, he holds, provides the proper metaphysics 
of being needed in this pursuit.  Within this context we are able to see the Thomistic 
commitments of John Paul.  As an example Dulles writes that “in his lectures at Lublin 
he contended that goodness consists primarily in the objective perfection of actual exis-
tence, and only secondarily in that which satisfies the natural aspirations of a particular 
agent. ‘The Aristotelian concept of the good,’ he wrote, ‘which placed the primary em-
phasis on teleology, underwent a reconstruction in Thomas' view, which gave priority to 
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the aspect of existence, such that Thomas’ concept of the good may properly be called 
existential.’”39 
 The second undeniable element is found in his commitment to Realism. Selman 
clearly articulates this point when he writes, "when the Pope calls for return to metaphys-
ics, he means a realist metaphysics, for he says that philosophy, if it is going to serve the-
ology, must affirm our ability to know the truth, which includes the world around us.  
Realism is the doctrine that 1) there is an external world, and 2) we can know it.”40 Dul-
les, who is one of the most ardent proponents of the metaphysical realism of John Paul, is 
convinced that the Pope’s realist ontology of actual existence is attributable to St. Tho-
mas.41 He also states that despite the Pope’s allowing a plurality of systems, they must 
share the metaphysical realism of Thomas.42 
 The ability to grasp what is externally objective is one of the characteristics of 
realism. In this regard Thomas stands as a supreme model, especially as this ability relies 
on a comprehension of nature. In dealing with questions of both faith and reason, Michael 
Sweeney posits that the ability to grasp these truths “presupposes that human reason is 
capable of attaining metaphysical and ethical truths through its own power, which, in turn 
implies that there is such a thing as ‘nature,’ and here we find in Fides et ratio another 
reason to consider Aquinas a ‘model.’” He goes on to say that although Thomas is not 
posited as the only route for grasping the truths of faith and reason, “some concept of na-
ture and some form of metaphysics and objective ethics are presupposed.”43 
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 Since the “turn to the subject” most of the emphasis on knowing has been focused 
on epistemological questions. This is not a prevalent focus of Thomistic thought. The 
Transcendental Thomists, out of a concern to counter a modern wholesale rejection of 
Aquinas, sought to address this epistemological concern. Richard Barrett comments on 
the neo-Thomistic starting place of Lonergan as contrasted to the traditional Thomist one: 
He [Lonergan] took his point of departure from the epistemological ques-
tion, “how do we know?” whereas they [the medievals] were convinced 
Aquinas had it right when he took his starting-point from the metaphysical 
question “what is the nature of being?” For Aquinas, so they argued, the 
starting-point was a kind of metaphysical certainty, evidenced from top to 
bottom in the human family, by the jurist who asked what law was to the 
peasant who sunk his spade into the topsoil. The peasant did so with a 
kind of metaphysical certainty, that the world in which he worked was real 
and not rumbled by metaphysical doubt.44 
 
 
 In the debate over whether John Paul is predominantly a Thomist or Phenome-
nologist, as concerns the above, I believe he sides with Thomas. I am convinced of this 
for two reasons: first, John Paul reasserts our knowing as adaequatio rei et intellectus. 
This is no slight move, and many have thought it ill-advised. The second reason is in his 
assertion that our phenomenological reflections must be adequately grounded. In both 
cases the Pope shows his hand. It is not an either or proposition, but where one system 
must reign, he sides with Thomas. A more complete treatment on John Paul’s reassertion 
of knowing as adaequatio will be conducted in §82 as it most appropriately falls within 
this section. 
 As previously noted, Fides et ratio does not call for all philosophers to become 
Thomists, and yet praises Thomas for the “right way of doing philosophy.” Perhaps it is 
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the fear expressed by Aiden Nichols that prevents the Church from a strict promotion of 
Thomism. The Church must remain open to new philosophical systems if they are ade-
quate conveyers of truth. Nichols cautions that if we are to take these new philosophical 
systems seriously, they cannot become just an absorption by Thomism.45  This is in fact 
one of the possibilities.  If this were to happen, as a new philosophical system discovered 
revelatory insights, that truth content would be absorbed within the Thomistic system us-
ing Thomistic terms etc., but the system of the new philosophy itself could be ignored or 
discarded.  In this way no new systems would be recognized, only portions of "things in 
themselves," to be added to the Thomistic body.  The case may be made that this is in 
fact the most plausible way to integrate new information and yet safeguard the deposit of 
faith, but it is not what Fides et ratio calls for. 
 It has been argued by many contemporary Thomists that in order for Thomism to 
be relevant to contemporary scholarship you must in some manner embrace the turn to-
wards the subject.  Notable scholars such as Norris Clarke have endeavored to do just 
that.  In his The Philosophical Approach to God, Clarke provides a concise overview of 
the lacunas of traditional Thomism and advocates a contemporary approach.46 Clarke 
would be among those philosophers who consider Thomism an appropriate philosophy of 
being, meeting the challenge of what John Paul calls for in the encyclical.  Clarke con-
tends that Heidegger misread the history of philosophy, and that Thomism is in fact the 
most pronounced "philosophy of being" available.47 The Thomism advocated by Clarke 
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is a Personalist Thomism and seriously takes into account the subjective dimensions of 
knowing. 
 As concerns postmodern thought a more detailed treatment will be available in 
Chapter Four, but suffice it to say, philosophers like Sweeney find that although the 
thought of Aquinas is compatible with diverse philosophical systems it will not prove 
compatible with analytical or postmodern philosophy.48 Many postmodern thinkers 
would agree and would opt for a discarding of Thomism by replacing it with new modes 
of thought. 
§46 
Nihilism et al. 
As a result of the crisis of rationalism, what has appeared finally is nihil-
ism. As a philosophy of nothingness, it has a certain attraction for people 
of our time. Its adherents claim that the search is an end in itself, without 
any hope or possibility of ever attaining the goal of truth. In the nihilist in-
terpretation, life is no more than an occasion for sensations and experi-
ences in which the ephemeral has pride of place. §46 
 
 
 This section explores what John Paul considers the six most dangerous “isms” 
indicative of our age. Quinn writes that Fides et ratio diagnoses a sextet of malaises that 
by and large emerge in the nineteenth century, in consequence of the Enlightenment: ide-
alism, atheistic humanism, scientific positivism, pragmatism, eclecticism and, finally, 
nihilism.”49 A good part these philosophies are either a cause or outgrowth of metaphysi-
cal skepticism. Quinn notes that within scientific positivism there is no room for meta-
physics, aesthetics and morals, and pragmatism shares this “metaphysical neutrality.”50 In 
contrast to this pragmatism, Freddoso cites the example of Augustine who moved beyond 
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pragmatist skepticism towards the possibility of finding truth. He was an example of one 
in possession of the moral urgency spoken of by John Paul as a requirement for attaining 
wisdom.51  The six philosophies at times overlap, but they all lead towards nihilism and 
the total absurdity of human life. Devoid of a metaphysical base there is no way to anchor 
thought, and in turn to assert an actual system of values. As Quinn notes: 
Nihilistic despair, in turn, encouraged the tendency to seek solace in utili-
tarianian or commercial modes of satisfaction- it encourages a liberalism 
without conviction. Perhaps the deepest issue that Fides et ratio wishes to 
expose, though, is the corrosion of any metaphysical basis for human life 
and thought. Not only does the loss of metaphysics deprive reason of any 
transcendent foundation. As well, it secures faith’s abolition from rea-
son.52 
 
 
 The Pope’s historical overview of how these systems presented themselves as 
“new religions” is worthy of consideration. These religions contain within their very 
structure a metaphysics, although unrecognized. This poor metaphysical structure led to 
what John Paul called “totalitarian systems which have been disastrous for humanity.” It 
is not a small matter that these disastrous happenings have dissuaded some postmodern 
thinkers from the pursuit of any metaphysical system of belief whatsoever. In their minds 
the causal link from metaphysics to the violence of totalitarianism looms large, and can 
only be avoided by remaining ontologically neutral. 
§49—§63 
The Church Has No Philosophy of Its Own 
 The following sections on the intervention of the Church in philosophical matters 
each contain a point or two which are relevant to our metaphysical concentration. The 
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first and most notable point is found in §49 where John Paul states that “the Church has 
no philosophy of its own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in prefer-
ence to others.” I noted at the commencement of this section what may rightly be consid-
ered a poor translation of this very key passage. The point was made that the Latin does 
seem to indicate permitting less latitude in the Church’s adoption of systems. David Ruel 
Foster seems to capture the spirit of John Paul’s document as pertains to this passage. The 
plurality called for is meant to respect the breadth and depth of the subject matter, not to 
promote a plurality that infers that this vastness allows nothing definitive to be said. Fos-
ter writes: 
The pluralism that is appropriate to philosophy and that finds support in 
the documents of Vatican II is not based on the impossibility of truth but 
on the impossible richness of truth. A healthy pluralism stems from the 
depth of being that is never exhausted by our researches. We will never 
say all there is about love or friendship, but it is true to say that we need 
friends. The richness of being always leaves us with something more to 
explore. Our human nature makes misunderstanding possible but does not 
make understanding impossible.53 
 
 
I think this a crucial assertion. Foster both recognized the vastness of the subject matter 
and the respect one must have in not brashly confining it, and at the same time realizes 
our need to articulate what can indeed be firmly established and built upon. 
 In the second paragraph of §49 the Pope asserts his dissatisfaction with some sys-
tems of modern philosophy. While seeking to recognize the legitimate authority of phi-
losophy to undertake its own task, John Paul insists that the Magisterium is forced to act 
when a philosophical system undermines truths of revelation. As §50 noted, it is the task 
of the Magisterium to indicate both philosophical presuppositions and conclusions in-
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compatible with revelation. Thomas Guarino says this is true: “because of revelation’s 
primacy, any particular philosophy must ultimately be congruent with theological teach-
ing.”54 
§52 
Magisterial Intervention 
It is not only in recent times that the Magisterium of the Church has inter-
vened to make its mind known with regard to particular philosophical 
teachings. It is enough to recall, by way of example, the pronouncements 
made through the centuries concerning theories which argued in favour of 
the pre-existence of the soul, or concerning the different forms of idolatry 
and esoteric superstition… §52 
 
 
 This section is concerned with showing how magisterial intervention is not unique 
in our age, but how the Church has intervened throughout history when it was deemed 
appropriate.  It cites a number of instances, one of which concerns the pre-existence of 
the soul and the Church’s intervention in the Synod of Constantinople, DS 403. Tresmon-
tant has provided an extended treatment of this issue, asserting the very same point, and 
his thesis that certain systems are incompatible with Christianity fits in quite well as con-
cerns many of the encyclical’s claims. Tresmontant’s desired end, however, seems to fa-
vor the construction of a very specific Christian metaphysics and is by and large uninter-
ested in co-opting portions of other systems. 
§55 and §61 
The Distrust of Metaphysics 
An example of this is the deep-seated distrust of reason which has sur-
faced in the most recent developments of much of philosophical research, 
to the point where there is talk at times of “the end of metaphysics.” Phi-
losophy is expected to rest content with more modest tasks such as the 
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simple interpretation of facts or an enquiry into restricted fields of human 
knowing or its structures. §55 
 
 
 In §55 the Pontiff once again notes that the current intellectual climate tends to 
focus on epistemological issues or to explore a more narrowly focused portion of phi-
losophy to the neglect or abandonment of metaphysics. When John Paul speaks of “the 
end of metaphysics” he sees well how the climate of skepticism has left some thinking 
the task of metaphysics too ambitious. In contrasting rationalism and fideism he hopes to 
point out a middle way which respects the spheres of both faith and reason. 
 This section contains a short remark by the Pope on the importance of maintain-
ing the traditional philosophical and theological terminology employed by the Church. 
John Paul cites his predecessor, Pope Pius XII, who warned against abandoning this ter-
minology. Although John Paul does not give lengthy consideration to the maintenance of 
traditional terminology, he nonetheless could have chosen to omit it without much notice. 
The fact that he included it seems to me to indicate his perception of a possible problem 
facing the Church in the future. Without access to a common language, the continuance 
of a consistent and coherent body of teaching may be rendered difficult if not impossible. 
He furthers this point in §65 and §66. In §65 he speaks of the need for the theologian to 
have a mastery over the philosophical content, including whole philosophical systems 
and the terminology that is used and employed by the Church in its explanation of her 
teaching. In §66 he elaborates on the intellectus fidei, which he says “expounds this truth, 
not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure of the propositions in which the 
Church teaching is framed, but also, indeed primarily, in bringing  to light the salvific 
meaning of these propositions for the individual and for humanity.” Additionally, foot-
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note 112 continues to establish the place of traditional philosophical systems and the ter-
minology which they employ.55 I will further elaborate on this point in my concluding 
remarks in chapter five. 
 His remarks in §61 reiterate how the distrust of reason results in the demise of 
metaphysics. 
There are various reasons for this disenchantment. First, there is the dis-
trust of reason found in much contemporary philosophy, which has largely 
abandoned metaphysical study of the ultimate human questions in order to 
concentrate upon problems which are more detailed and restricted, at 
times even purely formal. §61 
 
 
 At each turn it is the modern dissatisfaction with reason’s ability in terms of epis-
temological certainty that undermines the role of metaphysics. In contrast there are those 
who believe that the intellect can achieve more than a restricted knowing of peripheral 
truths that have little bearing on the central concerns of the human person. But regardless, 
the questions posed by metaphysics do not disappear if one chooses not to engage them. 
It remains the eight-hundred pound gorilla in the room that no one wishes to address. 
Those like Clarke ask why we should prematurely dismiss reason’s ability to give an-
swers to the questions that most matter. For some, the answers to questions like these can 
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only be found in the area of faith, but to give the intellect no competence of its own, as 
has been earlier mentioned, leads to serious problems of another nature, namely, a faith 
devoid of reason. 
§62 
Philosophical Formation of Priestly Candidates 
I wish to repeat clearly that the study of philosophy is fundamental and in-
dispensable to the structure of theological studies and to the formation of 
candidates for the priesthood. It is not by chance that the curriculum of 
theological studies is preceded by a time of special study of philosophy. 
This decision, confirmed by the Fifth Lateran Council, is rooted in the ex-
perience which matured through the Middle Ages, when the importance of 
a constructive harmony of philosophical and theological learning emerged. 
§62 
 
 
 John Paul concentrates in this section of the document on a particularly practical 
application of his philosophical position. He addresses the need for a philosophical un-
derpinning for theological studies, and for the formation of seminarians. Although he 
briefly presents how this has been the mind of the Church as confirmed by the Fifth 
Lateran Council onward, he does not address the present situation facing schools of the-
ology as well as seminaries. As this directly touches on the present and future state of 
metaphysical studies, a few words are in order. 
 At present there are a diminishing number of college seminaries. Many dioceses, 
as well as religious orders are asking candidates to consider seminary upon completion of 
their undergraduate studies. In addition, many of the men who enter seminary today come 
to this decision during or after college. Oftentimes these men were pursuing, or have pur-
sued to great lengths, other fields of study. Upon entering formation for the priesthood, 
they are asked to complete a short period of philosophical preparation. It is not unjusti-
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fied to ask whether this shorter course of studies provides ample time for true philosophi-
cal readiness.  This new “Pre-theology” often omits courses, such as metaphysics, which 
were previously thought necessary. This is more so the case for schools of theology 
which focus primarily on instructing laypeople. I say more so since the ecclesiastical re-
quirements for seminarians do not apply to laypeople pursuing higher degrees in theol-
ogy. 
 With this new state of affairs we stand in danger of having documents the like Fi-
des et Ratio rendered incomprehensible in part, or perhaps seen as inconsequential. This 
is worth noting since a call for metaphysical retrieval could fall on deaf ears. Since many 
of these pre-theology courses of study do not include a specific course in metaphysics, 
metaphysical content may be mentioned in courses without the student having had to sys-
tematically approach the study. In other words, you may be asking the students, and per-
haps younger faculty to appreciate the necessity of something they may feel they have 
thus far done well enough without. 
 Much of this will depend on the future course of universities. Whether or not 
Catholic universities are tied to dioceses and religious orders may determine the future 
direction of philosophical programs within the universities. In the past, a layman who 
sought to be competitive with those who received seminary training would have felt an 
obligation to be versed in the same studies that priests and religious had undertaken, thus 
including sufficient philosophical preparedness. The future of universities concerning 
theological training today yet remains to be seen. 
§64 through §79 
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 In light of the above the Pope seeks to point out the importance of philosophy and 
its interaction with theology. He notes the principles and criteria necessary for a proper 
relationship between the two. I will in the interest of time, as concerns Chapter VI, con-
centrate only on four sections which most readily pertain to metaphysics. 
 In §69 the Pope addresses the concern of those who ask whether in light of mod-
ern scholarship we should focus on other fields of human knowledge and less on philoso-
phy. He responds by placing emphasis on transcending the skepticism that would clip our 
wings and going beyond the study of the particular to obtain knowledge of the universal. 
By this he not only highlights the human being’s ability to grasp universals in the Pla-
tonic way, but also seeks to accentuate how the message of the Gospel is universal. He 
wants to assert the timelessness of the message as well as the ability of the individual to 
grasp this “good news.” This Gospel message is understandable, even if it be received by 
different cultures, by those speaking different languages or living in various times and 
places. 
 The balance that John Paul wished to reach in §72 is a delicate one. Two decisive 
points are made. The first is that as the Church marches through time it is to make the 
most of its encounter with various cultures and share in their wisdom and insights. Spe-
cifically, in this section he calls for an exploration of the contribution of India. On this 
side of the equation he wishes to emphasize an openness. What is asserted is an optimis-
tic assessment of the future, and a belief that the rich diversity present in the world and 
through time has something positive to offer the work of salvation. This receptiveness 
establishes a disposition of gratitude for the goods offered by diverse cultures as the 
Church moves towards the future. 
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 The second point asserts the specificity of salvation history as it has taken place 
within a certain time and a certain culture. This specific encounter must be seen within 
the context of divine providence. It is no chance encounter. This point is clearly meant to 
respond to those who seek to diminish the Greco-Roman heritage which has in great part 
influenced the first two millennia of the Church’s teaching. In commenting on this en-
counter with Greek thought, Weigel noted that “the synthesis of Greek philosophy and 
Christian theology in the patristic period taught a wise lesson: human beings can know 
the true, the good, and the beautiful, even if we can never know them completely. Recov-
ering that sense of confidence, John Paul asserted, is essential to creating a genuine hu-
manism in the third millennium. The path to a wiser, nobler, more humane future runs 
through the wisdom of the first centuries of encounter between Jerusalem and Athens.”56  
 Dulles reads the whole of this section less as an affirmation of the Greco-Roman 
contribution than as an invitation to further development. He contrasts the view of Vati-
can I, which spoke of the passing down of tradition in a passively received way, with 
John Paul’s and Vatican II’s developmental and more dynamic approach. He writes that 
“while extolling the merits of the great philosophical tradition that comes down to us 
from the Greeks, the pope does not see it as a closed chapter. The philosophical tradition, 
he contends, can be further developed by dialogue with the religious and philosophical 
traditions of other civilizations, such as those of India, China, and Japan, as well as the 
traditional cultures of Africa, which are for the most part orally transmitted.”57  
 One may here question, in light of the passage by Pope John Paul concerning 
providential encounter, whether the same prestige should be afforded to what may be as 
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to what actually has been. In other words, we are able to see the actual fruits derived 
from the encounter with Greek thought. From this context the early councils worked out 
and formulated many crucial teachings in the areas of Christology as well as ecclesial and 
sacramental theology. Where we go from here has yet to be seen. Whatever the future 
holds in store will in great part require taking with us the accumulated wisdom which is 
by and large Greco-Roman in origin. 
§74 
Philosophers Who Made the List 
The fruitfulness of this relationship is confirmed by the experience of 
great Christian theologians who also distinguished themselves as great 
philosophers, … We see the same fruitful relationship between philosophy 
and the word of God in the courageous research pursued by more recent 
thinkers, among whom I gladly mention, in a Western context, figures 
such as John Henry Newman, Antonio Rosmini, Jacques Maritain, Étienne 
Gilson and Edith Stein and, in an Eastern context, eminent scholars such 
as Vladimir S. Soloviev, Pavel A. Florensky, Petr Chaadaev and Vladimir 
N. Lossky. Obviously other names could be cited; and in referring to these 
I intend not to endorse every aspect of their thought, but simply to offer 
significant examples of a process of philosophical enquiry which was en-
riched by engaging the data of faith. §74 
 
 
 The importance of this section in regard to metaphysics lies in the significance of 
those philosophers and theologians mentioned or not mentioned in the document. Is this 
list indicative of the Pope’s proclivities, or should we look elsewhere for an indication of 
the philosophical approbation of John Paul? 
 There are some like Dulles who are surprised that the name of Maurice Blondel 
does not appear in the document. He footnotes a possible explanation provided in an arti-
cle by Peter Henrici. Henrici was of the opinion that John Paul avoided using Blondel’s 
name because the Pope’s thought concerning the analysis of immanence was so close to 
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Blondel’s that he feared naming him would canonize his thought. Dulles contends the 
same may have been true for De Lubac as well.58 If this is in fact the case, then not being 
mentioned in some instances speaks more highly of the unmentioned than for the named. 
There has been ample speculation as to the reasons behind the Pope’s choices.  
 The inclusion of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson and the exclusion of any 
Thomists from the Transcendentalist camp raises some questions. To make this more 
pointed, let us consider Gilson. Since he is among those mentioned in the document, how 
much does it imply John Paul’s concurrence with his philosophical system? Steven Bald-
ner thinks that although John Paul adopted some of Gilson’s terminology this in no way 
indicates his buying into the entire philosophical approach of Gilson.59 Others, like Kna-
sas, believe that the Pope’s preference for Existential Thomism is more pronounced and 
can be deduced from other sections of the document. In making his case Knasas does not 
think the issue of name recognition in §74 worthy of mention. Instead, he focuses on a 
specific point present in Existential Thomism, and believes that John Paul is making a 
decisive move by the use of Thomistic teaching. He writes that “the Pope’s concern with 
the specific Thomistic doctrine of actus essendi, or esse, is patent. Through this actus es-
sendi understanding of what is meant by the existence of a thing, Aquinas’ philosophy is 
so open to all of reality that the human intellect comes to know God.” He goes on to as-
sert the “Pope’s clear preference is for the Existential Thomism camp” even in the face of 
a few arguments contained in the encyclical which can be leveled against this position. 
He further mentions that despite the encyclical’s insistence on the Church’s not having a 
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single philosophy (§49), its claim that no historical form of philosophy can embrace the 
totality of truth (§51) and the fact that the Church has never demanded adherence to 
Thomism, John Paul is on a crucial point advocating Existential Thomism. He continues: 
Hence, among encyclicals enjoining intellectuals to study Aquinas, Fides 
et Ratio stands out for one reason. Though singling out Aquinas for strong 
Papal endorsement, previous encyclicals hardly, if ever, singled out spe-
cific points of Thomistic doctrine. Rather, they confined themselves to of-
fering Aquinas as a general model or an ideal case, of how Catholic intel-
lectuals should try, to do “the kind” of thing that Aquinas did, though not 
necessarily what he did. Hence proponents of Teilhard de Chardin and of 
Liberation Theology in their attempts to harmonize faith and science or 
faith and politics could all claim to be following the recommendations of 
the Church to do “the kind” of thing done so exemplarily by Aquinas. Fi-
des et Ratio breaks the mould of these past Papal encyclicals. John Paul 
recommends the study of a specific point of Thomist doctrine. His clear 
preference and recommendation is that the actus essendi discovery of the 
twentieth century Thomistic scholarship and its development in Existential 
Thomism be not eclipsed from philosophical discussion at century’s end. 
In this manner Fides et Ratio continues the Thomistic Revival into the 
twenty first century.60 
 
 
 Here we find a point in need of further discussion in relation to the divergent 
starting places and approaches to theology now present. Some of this will be considered 
in light of Tresmontant and the post-modern thinkers of the next chapter. 
 In continuing to comment on the “named” philosophers of Fides et Ratio, Fergus 
Kerr thinks the Pope’s “list” so random and eclectic as to not even warrant serious criti-
cism. He questions a fair number of the choices made by the Pontiff, most notably that of 
Peter Chaadev, who he points out, does not even make his way into the Oxford Diction-
ary of the Christian Church. He criticizes the Pope’s rationale and thinks this list clearly 
irrelevant. He writes that “it is hard to believe that this mishmash of Hegelian pantheism 
and neo-Gnostic sophiology, however innovative and challenging, constitutes a particu-
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larly convincing paradigm of a ‘fruitful relationship between philosophy and the word of 
God.’” He concludes that “a document that hails Chaadev as an eminent scholar, and 
never actually names Blondel, offers too random a history of modern Christian thought to 
warrant this kind of criticism.”61 
§76 
John Paul II on “Christian Philosophy” 
Christian philosophy therefore has two aspects. The first is subjective, in 
the sense that faith purifies reason. As a theological virtue, faith liberates 
reason from presumption, the typical temptation of the philosopher. Saint 
Paul, the Fathers of the Church and, closer to our own time, philosophers 
such as Pascal and Kierkegaard reproached such presumption. The phi-
losopher who learns humility will also find courage to tackle questions 
which are difficult to resolve if the data of Revelation are ignored—for 
example, the problem of evil and suffering, the personal nature of God and 
the question of the meaning of life or, more directly, the radical meta-
physical question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”. 
The second aspect of Christian philosophy is objective, in the sense that it 
concerns content. Revelation clearly proposes certain truths which might 
never have been discovered by reason unaided, although they are not of 
themselves inaccessible to reason. Among these truths is the notion of a 
free and personal God who is the Creator of the world, a truth which has 
been so crucial for the development of philosophical thinking, especially 
the philosophy of being. §76 
 
 
 Since the question of a Christian Philosophy, specifically, a Christian Metaphys-
ics has been taken up in the first chapter, this section will help indicate where John Paul 
stands concerning this issue. He begins by limiting the question. He considers the term 
“Christian Philosophy” under two headings: subjective and objective. Under the subjec-
tive aspect falls the affect of Christianity on the individual and its subsequent conse-
quences. While John Paul does not go into detail, it is implied that this subjective benefit 
is derived from a personal holiness. Once again Thomas comes to mind. It is purported 
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that Thomas himself admitted that he learned more on his knees before the crucifix than 
through his studies. Not only Thomas, but a sizable number of the best thinkers in the 
Christian tradition were also models of holiness. One can easily call to mind a myriad of 
saintly Church Fathers and Doctors, St. Bonaventure, St. Augustine, St. John Chry-
sostom, St. Teresa of Avila, St. Ignatius Loyola etc., to name only a few. John Paul be-
lieves that a disposition of humility, derived from this subjective aspect of Christian Phi-
losophy is what may lead the philosophical inquisitor to the radical metaphysical ques-
tion, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” It must be clearly admitted that John 
Paul’s position concerning this subjective benefit might not be easily granted by the non-
Christian philosophers.  
 In the second category is the objective aspect. Included in this category are truths 
of the faith accessible to reason but not always arrived at without the aid of faith. The list 
of truths arrived at in this way includes: sin, the person as spiritual, the Christian procla-
mation of human dignity, freedom etc.. Many of these topics were also taken up by 
Tresmontant as derived from a Judeo-Christian perspective. In line with the work of 
Tresmontant, John Paul mentions the need to “explore the rationality of certain truths ex-
pressed in Sacred Scripture, such as the possibility of man’s supernatural vocation and 
original sin itself.” Arguably, a number of intellectual positions which were once only 
accepted by faith have come to the surface as now credible and verifiable by reason. This 
would be the case, for instance, in the Judeo-Christian belief in creation ex nihilo. The 
general scientific consensus today favors some type of “Big Bang” cosmology. This is 
arguably a commendation of the type of work undertaken by Tresmontant. 
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 Sweeney notes that John Paul’s assessment of Christian philosophy in large part 
follows the thought of Aquinas. Sweeney explains the document’s two levels of meaning 
as relates to the term Christian Philosophy. The first level pertains to revealed truths 
achievable by reason, noting that faith can “indirectly or externally guide philosophy.” 
The second level “points to where revelation and philosophy meet. Aquinas is important 
here insofar as he exemplifies the necessity of explaing these revealed truths accessible to 
reason through nature, metaphysics and ethics.62 He goes on to say that it is this second 
level of meaning that brings about the most difficult questions, the ones that pertain to 
metaphysics. These questions include the existence of God, creation ex nihilo and the 
immortality of the soul. Sweeney asks, “how do we know where revelation and philoso-
phy meet? Why should they meet in metaphysics? Why not merely in ethics, or solely in 
the area of hermeneutics and language?” His answer comes from the document itself. He 
writes, “One answer to this question that we can find in Fides et ratio is the way that it 
uses the history of philosophy. The modern failure to look for a union between faith and 
reason in metaphysics, it is argued, has led not only to the separation of faith and reason, 
and not only to the diminishment of theology, but to the impoverishment of philoso-
phy.”63 
Chapter VII §80 through §99 
 The following chapter contains many of the core assertions of John Paul and his 
call to “recover and express to the full the metaphysical dimension of truth.” §105 As it is 
dense in content I will once again attempt to explore only those portions most directly 
tied to the issue of metaphysics. 
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§80 
The Place of Sacred Scripture 
 This section is important in as much as it provides a point of convergence be-
tween John Paul’s vision of philosophy and the work of Claude Tresmontant. The first 
sentence of this section could be derived from the very thesis of Tresmontant himself: “In 
sacred Scripture are found elements, both implicit and explicit, which allow a vision of 
the human being and the world which has exceptional philosophical density.” Out of this 
context, the Pope says, comes an awareness of God as absolute, man as imago Dei, the 
freedom of the person, creation, the immortality of the human spirit and the sinfulness of 
human beings. In light of the preceding chapter one can see the Pope making many of the 
same assertions that were made by Tresmontant. John Paul then concludes by connecting 
this “philosophy” found in the Bible with its culmination in the “mystery of the Incarna-
tion.” 
§81 
A Crisis of Meaning and the Sapiential Dimension 
 This section begins by describing our current climate as experiencing a “crisis of 
meaning.” Many of the contemporary modes of thinking have not aided us, but have re-
sulted in skepticism, indifference and nihilism. Reason has been reduced to purely a prac-
tical instrument no longer thought capable of finding truth. In light of this situation John 
Paul enumerates three requirements necessary for any philosophy that seeks to be con-
gruent with the word of God. The first in found in this section, §81, where he says phi-
losophy must recover its sapiential dimension. As the word of God is especially able to 
elucidate the destiny of all people, it invites philosophy to contemplate this destiny. 
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§82 
Adaequatio Rei et Intellectus 
Yet this sapiential function could not be performed by a philosophy which 
was not itself a true and authentic knowledge, addressed, that is, not only 
to particular and subordinate aspects of reality—functional, formal or utili-
tarian—but to its total and definitive truth, to the very being of the object 
which is known. This prompts a second requirement: that philosophy ver-
ify the human capacity to know the truth, to come to a knowledge which 
can reach objective truth by means of that adaequatio rei et intellectus to 
which the Scholastic Doctors referred.(99) This requirement, proper to 
faith, was explicitly reaffirmed by the Second Vatican Council: “Intelli-
gence is not confined to observable data alone. It can with genuine certi-
tude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin that 
certitude is partially obscured and weakened.” §82 
 
 
 In §82 John Paul lays out the second philosophical requirement, that it “verify the 
human capacity to know the truth, to come to a knowledge which can reach objective 
truth by means of that adaequatio rei et intellectus to which the Scholastic Doctors re-
ferred.” The scholastic Doctors referred to are St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. There are 
two points of interest to note before returning to discuss adaequatio. The first is that John 
Paul limits the extent to which one can adopt a phenomenological philosophy, as he con-
siders it in its radical form incompatible with the Word of God. The second point is that 
he once again speaks of ontological content (metaphysical) contained in the Old and New 
Testaments. 
 The use of adaequatio is not easily passed over. This section follows up on §43 
and §44 where the question of John Paul’s primary leanings, pertaining to phenomenol-
ogy and Thomism, as addressed. The Pope’s choice of an adaequatio understanding of 
knowledge says much in favor of his faithfulness to Thomas. Hemming notes that it is 
Thomas himself who “to a certain degree codifies and invents the correspondence theory 
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of truth.” He goes on to say that “Inasmuch as he argues that the truth of every thing is 
given by a correspondence between thing and the mind (“truth is the adequation [corre-
spondence] of the thing and [its] intellection”) he can do so only because for him every-
thing is already perfectly intellected and known by God before it can be known by us. To 
know something to be true, therefore, is to bring my mind naturaliter into conformity 
with the intellect of God.”64 He further states that Thomas explains that the very name 
mind is derived from measuring. “What does the mind measure? The adequation of intel-
lectus and thing- the definition of truth. The mind measures truth. However the measur-
ing and the intellection are one.  Intellectus, he says is the power or faculty of measuring 
that the mind itself is.”65 John Paul’s choice of using this description of knowing is both 
controversial and telling.66 The Pope quotes a passage from Gaudium et Spes67 affirming 
that the intellect is capable of attaining reality, but it does not specify its taking place 
through the adaequatio of Thomas. 
 In this section, John Paul begins by drawing attention to the sapiential function of 
philosophy before moving on to discuss adaequatio. Hemming describes how they are 
joined: 
St. Thomas, although he holds [the correspondence] view of truth, has an 
entirely rounded view of wisdom, sapiential, or Sophia which he derives 
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from Aristotle. Here wisdom, as the highest of Aristotle’s five grades of 
truth, is synonymous with “intellectus”- intellection of understanding as 
such. Now because Aquinas has decided that God already is “highest”, ‘ 
“best”, ‘most perfect’ of all that is in whatever is insofar as it is (Aquinas 
explicitly does not think God is the highest being, but rather is highest be-
ing. God is not a being for him) then to ascribe the highest truth to God is 
to ascribe wisdom to God. When Aristotle says wisdom is the highest or 
best, noein, intellectus, St. Thomas takes this to be properly ascribed to 
God.68 
 
 
The sapiential dimension referred to in this section is intended to address a lacuna 
within contemporary culture. Freddoso points out what John Paul thinks will occur when 
this wisdom factor is missing. The Pope “explicitly ties the absence of the cognitive di-
mension of faith to the ‘technocratic logic’ that dominates formerly Christian cultures in 
which economic and technological innovations now take place in what we might aptly 
call a ‘sapiential vacuum’ with no systematic advertence to the transcendent metaphysical 
and moral questions that such innovations should occasion.”69 
§83 
Theology and the Genuinely Metaphysical Range and Need for Metaphysics 
The two requirements already stipulated imply a third: the need for a phi-
losophy of genuinely metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending 
empirical data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and founda-
tional in its search for truth. This requirement is implicit in sapiential and 
analytical knowledge alike; and in particular it is a requirement for know-
ing the moral good, which has its ultimate foundation in the Supreme 
Good, God himself. Here I do not mean to speak of metaphysics in the 
sense of a specific school or a particular historical current of thought. I 
want only to state that reality and truth do transcend the factual and the 
empirical, and to vindicate the human being's capacity to know this tran-
scendent and metaphysical dimension in a way that is true and certain, al-
beit imperfect and analogical. In this sense, metaphysics should not be 
seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it is metaphysics which 
makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of 
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their spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged 
locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry. 
Wherever men and women discover a call to the absolute and transcen-
dent, the metaphysical dimension of reality opens up before them: in truth, 
in beauty, in moral values, in other persons, in being itself, in God. We 
face a great challenge at the end of this millennium to move from phe-
nomenon to foundation, a step as necessary as it is urgent. We cannot stop 
short at experience alone; even if experience does reveal the human be-
ing's interiority and spirituality, speculative thinking must penetrate to the 
spiritual core and the ground from which it rises. Therefore, a philosophy 
which shuns metaphysics would be radically unsuited to the task of media-
tion in the understanding of Revelation. 
The word of God refers constantly to things which transcend human ex-
perience and even human thought; but this “mystery” could not be re-
vealed, nor could theology render it in some way intelligible, (102) were 
human knowledge limited strictly to the world of sense experience. Meta-
physics thus plays an essential role of mediation in theological research. A 
theology without a metaphysical horizon could not move beyond an analy-
sis of religious experience, nor would it allow the intellectus fidei to give a 
coherent account of the universal and transcendent value of revealed truth. 
If I insist so strongly on the metaphysical element, it is because I am con-
vinced that it is the path to be taken in order to move beyond the crisis 
pervading large sectors of philosophy at the moment, and thus to correct 
certain mistaken modes of behaviour now widespread in our society. §83 
 
 
 This section, more than any other, focuses on metaphysics. If the Pope would 
have stopped at saying that a philosophy “of a genuinely metaphysical range” was neces-
sary, we could conclude that what he was calling for is a philosophy that is broad and 
able to ask and give answer to questions that are transcendental in nature. This would 
have been vague and open to any number of systems, some like those offered by post—
modern thinkers, like Marion, that are able to handle larger issues (such as a treatment of 
creation) but attempt to do so without metaphysics proper. However, John Paul speaks 
specifically of the need for metaphysics, only softening this call slightly by the qualifica-
tion that no “specific school” is required. 
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 Although Thomas is not mentioned here by name, Lluis Clavell comments on this 
section by saying that those who know the philosophical and theological itinerary of the 
Pope recognize his personal experience in the study of Thomas in some of the formula-
tions on the necessity of a philosophy with an authentically metaphysical scope. He 
points out the passage where the person is noted as a “privileged locus for the encounter 
with being” as one such example that hints of Thomas.70 
 John Paul repeatedly explains the rationale for his metaphysical insistence by 
drawing attention to the consequences of metaphysical neglect. “A theology without a 
metaphysical horizon could not move beyond an analysis of religious experience.” In his 
plea that we go beyond experience to the foundation, Barrett claims that he is not ad-
dressing his remarks to empiricists only: “this passage is directed to theologians as well 
as philosophers. There have been schools of theology in the post-conciliar period who 
have aped the empiricists rejection of metaphysics.”71 
 Barrett goes on to point out some interesting implications resulting from John 
Paul’s comments. The Pope draws attention to what is lacking in a system which places 
too heavy an emphasis on the subjective without recourse to the metaphysical dimension. 
Barrett notes that this faulty system would not “allow that intellectus fidei to give a co-
herent account of the universal and transcendental value of revealed truth,” and says that 
“one could also see this statement of the encyclical as a rebuke of Transcendental Thom-
ism. It seems to suggest that it is not enough to reconfigure a faulty epistemological struc-
ture in order to provide a foundation for theologians, there must be a serious adscription 
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to the entire objective super-structure of metaphysics, old or new.”72 Barrett may be cor-
rect, but the document in no way clearly comes out against Transcendental Thomism. 
One may counter that when in §86 the Pope speaks of “the person as a privileged locus 
for encounter with being” he is indicating a friendliness towards Transcendental Thom-
ism. At most one may see in this move a desire to warn philosophers and theologians to 
evaluate whether a considered system is honestly able to bear the weight of revelation. 
§84 
Hermeneutics 
The importance of metaphysics becomes still more evident if we consider 
current developments in hermeneutics and the analysis of language. §84 
 
 
 No treatment of philosophy in general and metaphysics specifically would be 
complete without addressing hermeneutics (the study of the methodological principles of 
interpretation) and linguistic analysis. Without establishing language’s ability to actually 
convey truth, John Paul would render his entire project problematic. In not securing this 
capacity of language his entire structure could be chopped off at the legs. The metaphysi-
cal project requires that we believe that language can convey actual meaning and that true 
discourse can take place. John Paul qualifies the assertion that language is able to “ex-
press divine and transcendent reality in a universal way” by mentioning the meaningful-
ness of the analogical dimension of language. Without going into great detail, the Pope 
does wish to acknowledge that the work recently undertaken in the area of linguistics 
must be well considered, and its worthwhile findings need to be incorporated. This lin-
guistic contribution can in no way, however, render language meaningless. If language 
were rendered meaningless, then even the arguments offered by linguists themselves 
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would likewise be incomprehensible. This insistence on the actual meaning of language 
not only affects the work carried out in metaphysics, but has bearing on theology as a 
whole. 
§95 and §96 
Linguistics 
 Continuing his effort to free language from the bonds of a post-modern attempt to 
render it wholly time-conditioned, John Paul calls for the use of “a hermeneutic open to 
the appeal of metaphysics.” (§95) Here again, it is to metaphysics that the Pope looks for 
answers. He goes on in the following section to claim that the ability of language extends 
to Conciliar definitions. The point being made is how it is impossible to imagine the 
Church proclaiming a message so time-conditioned that it is rendered incomprehensible. 
There would be nothing to pass on, and no unity in truth around which to gather. The 
very existence of the Church and of a coherent doctrine that has survived the test of time 
dismantles the radical historicist claim. Once again the Pope’s approach is not an ei-
ther/or, but a both/and. 
 On the other hand, John Paul admits that time, history and linguistics play into 
how we understand the message of faith in its formulations. Guarino comments on this 
section by stating: 
Two points need to be made here: (1) the encyclical recognizes that one 
must ultimately reconcile the sociocultural limitations of particular formu-
lations within the universality of truth, and (2) an appropriate hermeneuti-
cal theory must be able to employ metaphysics, at least in some broad and 
commodious sense. 
 
 
And in light of the 1989 statement by the International Theological Commission, “On the 
Interpretation of Dogmas,” he writes: 
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The truth of revelation transmitted in the paradosis of the church is uni-
versally valid and unchangeable in substance (A.II.1). …In a statement re-
plete with implications for hermeneutical theory, the commission observes 
that while development of dogma certainly takes place, “the development 
occurs within the same sense and meaning (eodem sensu eademque sen-
tentia). Thus, the council [Vatican I] taught that in the case of dogmas, the 
meaning must be continually adhered to which was once set forth by the 
church” (B.II.1). At the same time the commission is well aware that its 
accent on doctrinal objectivity and universality must necessarily be bal-
anced with the fact that all truth comes to language only within history.73 
 
 
Guarino’s interjections hope to remind the reader of the encyclical of the necessary bal-
ance that is required. The quotation offered by the ITC is meant to hold both of the essen-
tial truths in this balance. The challenge offered by an unchanging truth in a changing 
world, or a unified content being offered in a plurality of forms, remains a perennial one. 
§97, §105, §106, and §108 
Other Brief Notes 
 Some commentators on Fides et Ratio have found in the statements of §97 the 
crux of the message both as pertains to John Paul’s proclivities regarding Thomas, and to 
the more specific metaphysical direction he advocates. According to the Pope, the intel-
lectus fidei “ must turn to the philosophy of being.” I am convinced the word “must” was 
carefully thought out, especially in light of how the Pope is not given to overstatement in 
this document. This focus on a philosophy of being finds confirmation in the “intimate 
relationship which exists between faith and metaphysical reasoning.” Knasas draws atten-
tion to the footnote found within §97 which includes portions of an address given by John 
Paul at the Angelicum in 1979. This address is one of his strongest statements in praise of 
Thomas. Reading the address as it stands in the background of the Pope’s teaching in §97 
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makes a stronger case for a continued Thomistic approach being advocated. A portion of 
the address states the following:  
The basis and source of this openness lie in the fact that the philosophy of 
St. Thomas is a philosophy of being, that is, of  the “act of existing” (actus 
essendi) whose transcendental value paves the most direct way to rise to 
the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God. On ac-
count of this we can even call this philosophy: the philosophy of the proc-
lamation of being, a chant in praise of what exists. …it is by reason of this 
affirmation of being that the philosophy of St. Thomas is able to, and in-
deed must, go beyond all that presents itself directly in knowledge as an 
existing thing ( given to experience) in order to reach "that which subsists 
as sheer Existing" (ipsum Esse subsistens)  and also creative Love; for it is 
this which provides the ultimate( and therefore necessary) explanation of 
the fact that "it is preferable to be than not to be" (Potius est ess quam non 
esse) and, in particular, of the fact that we exist.74 
 
 
 In §105-§106 we find John Paul's final appeal to "recover and express to the full 
the metaphysical dimension of truth" (§105) and to "have the courage to recover, in the 
flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom and 
truth-metaphysical truth included-which is proper to philosophical enquiry." (§106) The 
call for recovery carries with it the implications mentioned in Chapter One, namely, that 
what was once present has now been lost (at least in part, or by some). Secondly, that 
what was lost is in fact valuable and worthy of recovery. The Pope has insisted that mod-
ern trends in philosophy, most especially those which have been influenced by the “isms” 
criticized by the Pontiff, have lost that sapiential dimension which a philosophy with a 
proper metaphysics provides. 
 In concluding, an investigation of Fides et Ratio reveals many notable statements 
made by the Holy Father that directly relate to the recovery and restoration of the place of 
metaphysics within Christian Philosophy. By asking the most substantial questions, as are 
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found in the realm of metaphysics, and proceeding by way of reason, John Paul is opti-
mistic about our ability to achieve truth. As our current Pontiff Benedict XVI has said, “a 
philosophy that no longer asks who we are, what we are here for, whether there is a God 
and eternal life, has abdicated its role as a philosophy.75 The subsequent sections will 
concentrate on particular aspects of John Paul’s thought in order to flesh out more fully 
the points of discussion presented in Fides et Ratio. 
Section 4: The Influence of Kant 
 By way of an historical overview of the status of modern philosophy, John Paul 
notes how Continental Philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is rooted in 
Cartesian thought. From Kant and Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger, we find he argues 
against a Cartesian starting point. The Pope writes that the “author of the Meditationes de 
Prima Philosophia with his ontological proofs, distanced us from the philosophy of exis-
tence, and also from the traditional approaches of St. Thomas which led to God who is 
‘autonomous existence,’ Ipsum esse subsistens. By making subjective consciousness ab-
solute, Descartes moves instead toward pure consciousness of the Absolute, which is pure 
thought.”76 He then goes on to identify the problem incurred by this shift. It takes our fo-
cus off of the objective truth and instead places it on the subjective awareness, or the in-
dividual consciousness of the thinker. The fallout from this Cartesian shift is tremendous 
in relation to a Catholic pursuit of philosophy. Descartes, writes the Pope, “turns his back 
on metaphysics and concentrates on the philosophy of knowledge. Kant is his most nota-
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ble representative.”77 Quinn concurs with the Pope as he points out the underlying mind-
set of these and like thinkers. He mentions how “the ‘modern’ philosophy understood it-
self less as a quest for wisdom than as a project of emancipation from any authority, natu-
ral or supernatural, to which human reason had allowed itself to become subject.” He 
goes on to cite Kant who reveals his vision of the enlightenment as being liberated from 
the constraints of all authority. In Kant’s words, “Enlightenment is man’s emergence 
from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own under-
standing without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is 
not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without guidance of 
another.”78 This type of thought mirrors that of Descartes, who, Quinn notes, “recom-
mends obedience to a ‘provisional morality,’ that is one that will be replaced once mod-
ern science is in full swing.”79 
 The influence that Kant had on the intellectual life of John Paul is undeniable. 
That Kant in many ways proved a formidable challenge to the Pope and to Catholic 
thinkers in general is best conveyed in a story conveyed by Weigel. He writes that “the 
young priest was open to engaging modern philosophy on its own terms, and would recall 
years later that wrestling with Kant’s second categorical imperative80 was ‘particularly 
important’ for his later thinking. (That it was indeed wrestling was neatly conveyed by 
John Paul II on one occasion when he remarked to guests, ‘Kant, Mein Gott! Kant!’).”81 
Prudence Allen notes interestingly that seminarians at Catholic University during the 
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mid-forties had as a text a popular work by Farges and Barbedette subtitled Ad mentem S. 
Thomae Aquinatis esposita et regentioribus scientiarum inventis aptata necnon instructa 
contra Kantismum.82 The refutation of Kant was seemingly considered one of the many 
maneuvers to master on the way to orders. 
 Kant’s profound effect on modern philosophy was such that it caused some to ac-
cuse phenomenologists and personalists of being “Kantian.” Robert Kraynak is one of 
those who make this charge against John Paul and other Catholics who have bought into 
Personalism. He maintains that when these Personalists concede to Kantian insight in the 
area of ethics they buy into Kant’s system in a way which affects the rest of their writ-
ings. Derek Jeffreys, on the other hand, takes issue with this accusation. He writes that 
“John Paul II uses Kant’s ethics without generating into a Kantian…Christian intellectu-
als are perfectly capable of retrieving aspects of modern thought while securing them in a 
sound metaphysic.”83 And this, according to Dulles is the path taken by John Paul. Dulles 
writes, “Giving some credit to Kant for his analysis of moral experience, Wojtyla agrees 
that the experience of conscience and obligation leads to God as the personal source of 
moral necessity. He accepts Kant’s principle that we may never treat other persons as 
mere means to an end. But whereas Kant argued formalistically from a postulate of prac-
tical reason, Wojtyla grounds the transcendental precept in a metaphysical insight into the 
intrinsic and inviolable dignity of the person as such.”84 
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 The influence of Kant on modern thought is indisputable among all philosophers. 
To ignore the power and appeal he has in the thought of many philosophers would do a 
disservice to an authentic philosophical assessment of modernity. Certainly the Thomistic 
approach to inquiry would seek to give full range to his voice where correct, and to 
counter him where mistaken. John Paul’s willingness to engage modern philosophers 
speaks well of a “Church in the Modern World” and of one who calls on this Church to 
be engaged with the contemporary culture. 
Section 5: Phenomenology and Personalism 
 John Paul was part of a philosophy faculty that agreed that its first principle of 
investigation would make use of the phenomenological approach. This method sought to 
discover the treasures of human experience before entertaining cosmological questions. If 
it proved fruitful, it could help to reconcile the thought of the Church with modernity on a 
number of fronts.85 This more personal technique may have led the university professor 
to be a bit more adventurous and liberated than if he were part of a more traditionally 
minded faculty. This, coupled with his natural propensity to pursue scholarship in a 
minimally footnoted manner, allowed the Pope to take human experience, perhaps espe-
cially his personal experience, seriously. The Pope’s subjective approach is substantiated 
in Fides et Ratio in his choice to employ two proofs (§14, §15) for the existence of God 
from Augustine and Anselm rather than from Thomas. Sweeney thinks this choice dem-
onstrates a fundamental disposition on the part of the Pope concerning his preference of a 
philosophical starting point. In his footnote he writes that “given the later emphasis on 
metaphysics and an account of nature within Christian philosophy, this focus on 
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Augustine’s and Anselm’s proofs is striking, and it supports the contention that ‘nature’ 
and ‘metaphysics’ in Fides et ratio are not necessarily tied to a philosophical  starting 
point in the material world.”86 Certainly some of this personal emphasis can be attributed 
to the influence of Max Scheler. However, as was earlier noted, despite his appreciation 
of some of his personalist insights, John Paul thought that Scheler fell short.87 
 The personal dimension is also elaborated upon by Hemming when he mentions 
that the first lines of the encyclical indicate how both faith and reason (the two wings) are 
to aid the person to rise to the contemplation of truth. His point is that the document 
properly relates the animus and contemplation. It asserts that the “human being is the 
place of unfolding of faith and reason. The proper hypostasis or locus of faith and reason 
is the human intellective being, me and you. Faith and reason are not things in their own 
right, they are ways of bringing the thing that is my being into the province of God.”88 
This concentration on the person reflects the modern atmosphere following the “turn to 
the subject,” and yet points to the subject concentrating on the objective Reality, which is 
God. 
 As the human person is the locus of both the act of faith and the ability to reason, 
there should therefore be no necessary conflict between the two, at least in principle. 
Faith and reason are subsequent to the human person. Both of these activities begin with 
the person who precedes them. In other words, they exist in virtue of the being of the per-
son.89 In this context faith and reason appear as instrumental goods. They serve to draw 
the person into a relationship with truth, both finite and infinite. 
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 Beginning with the person opens up the discovery of the undeniable ethical di-
mension. It was within this sphere of ethics that the Lublin school hoped that metaphysics 
and anthropology could meet.90 In the thought of John Paul, a proper investigation of the 
person, a true anthropology, will inevitably lead to metaphysics. In fact he wrote that “we 
are witnessing a symptomatic return to metaphysics through anthropology.”91 What is 
exposed here is the necessary interplay of truth as approached from every angle. Whether 
one begins with the objective or subjective point of view, a realist system is what binds 
them together and allows all investigations to bear fruit. An objective truth does not nec-
essarily cancel out subjective perspectives concerning that truth. Ethics, anthropology and 
metaphysics appear in the writings of the Pope as intimately intertwined. However, even 
though we find in his writings an insistence on the objectively real, Barrett notes that The 
Acting Person is “designed to put anthropology as the centre-stage of philosophy for the 
twenty-first century.”92 Barrett is convinced that the substantiation for this claim of an-
thropological superiority is found in John Paul’s choice of a first encyclical, Redemptoris 
Hominis. It is believed by some that the initial encyclical offered by a Pontiff indicates 
the direction and emphasis of his pontificate. While John Paul’s initial encyclical letter 
focused on the person, its content was certainly laden with metaphysics. 
 For all of the positive acclaim, not all thinkers are pleased with Christian Person-
alism. Robert Kraynak, as previously mentioned, thinks that Christian Personalism has 
done more harm to the Church than good. His argument is briefly as follows: Christian 
believers have been confused by Personalism inasmuch as it has been tied to the language 
of modern liberal democracy. The language (personhood, human rights, subjective con-
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sciousness, etc.) has brought about a confusion which places religion into the sphere of 
the personal, private and subjective. Religion has become a private affair, more con-
cerned with subjective religious convictions rather than an adherence to objective truth. 
As we live in a culture where many believe that one should avoid discussing religion and 
politics in polite company, it then follows that one’s personal views are best kept to one-
self. As a consequence, a misunderstood Personalism has not influenced and transformed 
the world, but the world has instead exerted a greater influence on the Church.93 
 Although this may adequately reflect the current climate, it says nothing about the 
merits or failings of Personalism itself. Rather, it focuses on how Personalism has been 
misconstrued and has failed to bring to bear its message. The Christian system of beliefs 
if held to the same standard of how it has been perceived could be accused of the same 
charge. Historically, Christianity has largely been misunderstood and its terms have often 
been co-opted and used against it. This line of attack (that it is often misunderstood) has 
as much to say about the tenets and approach of Personalism as it would for Christianity 
as a whole. If Personalism has been misrepresented it may stand to exhort its proponents 
to clarify their position so that its merits may be properly evaluated. A wholesale dis-
missal in light of perceived shortcomings seems rash. 
 Another facet to consider, and also tied to metaphysical thinking, is the communal 
aspect found within the thought of John Paul. Both reason and faith are communal in na-
ture. Both are received and are subsequently meant to be passed on. As concerns intellec-
tual inquiry, Freddoso considers the communal setting “absolutely crucial to the Pope’s 
account.” He finds that §70-§73 speak clearly to this end, and continues “For even though 
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inquiry is seen as perfecting the individual inquirers themselves, its most important func-
tion is to serve the broader community that gives rise to and sustains it. … So the ideal 
life of inquiry is essentially social in both its origins and its aims.”94 He goes on to quote 
a germane passage from St. Thomas who writes, “just as it is greater to illuminate than 
merely to shine, so too is it greater to give to others what one has contemplated than 
merely to contemplate.”95 And yet, this communal focus is never to overshadow the pri-
mary importance of the individual. Thomistic Personalism “is based on the view that the 
individual good of a person must, as a matter of principle, be subordinated to the com-
mon good, but… such subordination can not in any event erase and devaluate the per-
son.”96 
 Following this line of thought there are some who believe that the communal em-
phasis is the future direction and the necessary path for the Church as it continues to con-
front modernity. Some have even proposed it as the direction of metaphysics for the third 
millennium. Bishop Vigneron writes: 
As the inculturation of the Gospel in the first two millennia required the 
reshaping of all convictions and values in the light of the first principles 
that eventually emerged in creation metaphysics, the convictions and val-
ues of the culture needed for the next Christian millennium will rest upon 
the metaphysics of communion. Thomas taught us that ens commune ex-
ists as a participation in Ipsum Esse Subsistens, ens commune has esse, but 
is not esse. Could we not look for the day when we will see that “to be,” 
whether subsistent or by participation, cannot not be “to be with”? That 
sort of metaphysics would be the highest achievement of a culture of 
communion, the episteme for all the many elements that would constitute 
its doxa.97 
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Interestingly enough, the appeal of this metaphysical approach should not be underesti-
mated. The cases made against metaphysics are often waged with a mind towards empha-
sizing interpersonal relations which at times has been pivoted against a cold objectivist 
approach.  
 Upon pondering metaphysics on the whole, what is being called into considera-
tion is a change in emphasis. Whether we start from the observation of creation, the ex-
perience of the person, or our communal existence, often stress is placed on the point of 
departure. However, the point of departure one chooses does not necessarily cancel out or 
invalidate other points of departure. If it is well received it may indicate a starting place 
amenable to the current climate of scholarship. Since the current climate is influenced by 
post-modern thinkers, the next chapter will examine some of their thoughts and will seek 
to ascertain possible ways to proceed in light of their findings. 
 In support of the promising place that John Paul’s approach may provide, Dulles 
believes that “Personalist phenomenology, practiced according to the Lublin school of 
Thomism, can contribute to a much-needed renewal of metaphysics.”98 He also perceived 
that the phenomenological approach might be more able to produce desirable results in 
light of John Paul’s stance concerning the objective status of the world and the objective 
ethical requirements made of the person in response to it. The insistence on objective re-
ality in the thought of John Paul does not diminish the “phenomenological analysis but 
rather enriches it by placing human experience within the framework of a metaphysics of 
being.”99  
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 There is an undeniable reciprocity between person and metaphysics. Metaphysics 
aids the person seeking truth. It is a tool which is meant to assist the human person in 
grasping what is real. Since the truth is related to God, as ultimate Truth, all discovery of 
reality aids in our ascent to God.100 However much metaphysics may aid in this task it is 
also necessary to keep in mind the conviction of John Paul, that metaphysics is at the ser-
vice of the person, and not vice versa. 
 The phenomenological method of John Paul couples experience and metaphysics 
in a manner which brings about a valuable contribution. His metaphysics “enables him to 
penetrate beyond the phenomena to their ontological ground, thus moving from raw ex-
perience to understanding. He makes use of metaphysical principles for purposes of rea-
soning from phenomena as data to the principles and causes that explain them.”101 
 In addition to the influence that Thomas had on him, the added impact of existen-
tialism and phenomenology upon John Paul was considerable.102 One could argue that it 
was so considerable that he continued to remain one of its proponents even in light of the 
difficulties faced when trying to reconcile the two. What has become known as Phe-
nomenological Realism works to affirm the truth grasped in and through both pursuits. 
Starting with the person we are able to grasp things as they are in themselves. A grasping, 
as previously noted, that John Paul thinks best described as an adaequatio. In any case, 
according to John Paul, what is being asserted is that a synthesis is possible.103 This 
methodology was adopted by a number of philosophers and even inspired the work of the 
International Academy of Philosophy in Liechtenstein. One of the most prolific of the 
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group, Josef Seifert, has persisted in directing this effort and continues to maintain a fol-
lowing.104 
 In the mind of John Paul, the person is the focal point and center of all philoso-
phical pursuits, and he holds this as biblically grounded. This status is due to the person’s 
being created as in the imago Dei. The anthropological focus is employed by John Paul in 
light of a number of modern problems facing society. In response to the many contempo-
rary problems mentioned in Fides et Ratio, Koterski says John Paul draws our attention 
to the solution. This solution, he believes, is to be found in using the best traditions of 
anthropology and metaphysics.105 This approach is echoed in §83 where the Pope articu-
lates his marriage of metaphysics and anthropology. 
 The focus upon the person can be found in all the writings of John Paul’s lengthy 
pontificate. This personal focus is in no way a narrowing of the Catholic perspective, but 
broadens the possible horizon of scholarship. Unlike many of the challenges posed by 
post-modern thinkers who opt to dismiss past systems and replace them with new ones of 
their own making, John Paul seeks to synthesize the heritage of the past and add a new 
dimension. A “turn to the subject” does not have to result in an endless drift. The person 
viewed as a ship in the sea may legitimately constitute a valid starting point for the com-
mencement of an adventure while still acknowledging an objective world in which to 
travel. While taking a voyage an objective focus helps one to stay clear of danger and to 
reach one’s destination. As noted by Admiral Nimitz, “you should chart your course by 
the fixed stars rather than by the lights of every passing ship.” The objectively fixed stars 
in no way invalidate the viewpoint of the subjective voyaging ship. The person is in fact 
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the center of all encounters, of all adventures, of all that is objectively perceived. To take 
it a step further, it is the person (the whole person) who thinks, believes and acts in the 
Act of Faith which is central to the Christian life.106  
 Lest the personal concentration seem to focus too much on an isolated individual, 
the Pope always seeks to place the person in the context of the community. As Koterski 
notes, the Pope has spent a lifetime arguing for dignity that essentially emanates from the 
human person, but he does so within the context of community.107  Prudence Allen con-
curs when she notes that John Paul teaches that it is necessary for a person to be in rela-
tionship with God and with others for the fulfillment of one’s own essence.108  
 One illustration of how the extension of traditional metaphysics takes on new life 
with the personal focus can be found by examining a passage taken from The Acting Per-
son. In this passage we see John Paul using the theory of potency-act to elaborate upon 
his anthropology of change. 
It is these transitions that objectivize the structure of all dynamism inher-
ent in being, in being as such, which constitutes the proper object of meta-
physics, and at the same time in every and any being, regardless of the 
branch of human knowledge whose specific concern it constitutes. 
We may with justice say that at this point metaphysics appears as the intel-
lectual soil wherein all the domains of knowledge have their roots. Indeed, 
we do not seem to have as yet any other conceptions and any other lan-
guage which would adequately render the dynamic essence of change – of 
all change wherever occurring in any being – apart from those that we 
have been endowed with by the philosophy of potency and act.109 
 
 
Dulles refers to this passage when he asserts that John Paul acknowledges that both the 
objective and subjective dimensions of truth are necessary for a satisfactory philosophy 
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of being.110 John Paul also reveals his conviction that to date there are no other concepts 
or an alternative language that better explains change. This statement implies two things. 
The first is that the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics has not been surpassed, according 
to the Pope, by any other competitor.111 The second implication is that he admits of the 
possibility of another system which in theory could in fact supersede, or at least be 
equivalent to, the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of change. 
Section 6: Metaphysical Statements from Other Writings 
 The study of the thought progression of John Paul offers us some further insight.  
He declares that "there were two stages to my intellectual journey: in the first I moved 
from literature to metaphysics, while the second led me from metaphysics to phenome-
nology.  This was the grounding for my own scholarly work."112  
 The first intellectual movement was one of imagination.  The free range of play 
that is present in literature may have set in place a broad love for beauty which is difficult 
to confine to systematic treatments of reality.  And yet, the imagination and the experi-
ence of beauty call for systematic explanation.  Within this context, John Paul is poised to 
ask penetrating questions of reality.  This first movement from literature to metaphysics 
allows for the development of the beautiful and the imaginative while grounding it in re-
alism. It is realism which allows for the communication of beauty in a way which marks 
its objective as well as its subjective reality.  And the final move to phenomenology may 
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have provided the means by which the subjective, experiential apprehension of reality 
might find its home in an objective universe. 
 An example that draws together all three dimensions, literature, metaphysics and 
phenomenology, can be found in the dramatic work of then Cardinal Wojtyla, The Jew-
eler's Shop. In that work Andrew, a young man who is beginning to fall in love, contem-
plates the nature of love and the choices it involves. The interplay between the subjective 
and objective is important to note. Andrew reflects, "For my senses fed at every step on 
the charms of the women I met.  When once or twice I tried following them, I met soli-
tary islands. This made me think that beauty accessible to the senses can be a difficult gift 
or a dangerous one; I met people led by it to hurt others-and so, gradually, I learned to 
value beauty accessible to the mind, that is to say, truth."113  
 In Love and Responsibility John Paul includes two sections dealing with meta-
physics. The first is a metaphysical analysis of love. He considers this a metaphysical 
analysis due to the universal nature of love.  His point of departure on this universal level 
states that: 
…love is always a mutual relationship between persons. This relationship 
in turn is based on particular attitudes towards the good, adapted by each 
of them individually and by both jointly.  This is the point of departure for 
the first part of our analysis of love, the general analysis....These elements 
are found in any love.  There is, for instance, in every love attraction and 
goodwill.  Love between man and woman is one particular form of love, 
in which elements common to all of its forms are embodied in a specific 
way.  That is why we have called our general analysis metaphysical.  
Metaphysical analysis will clear the way for psychological analysis.114 
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 John Paul is expanding the traditional subject matter of metaphysics to include 
those dimensions of anthropology that have universal bearing. In this case he is expand-
ing the treatment of the pursuit of the good within the context of love experienced by 
couples in pursuit of the good. This exploration of relation has been the focus of more 
recent works as, for example, previously noted in Clarke’s “The ‘We Are’ of Interper-
sonal Dialogue As the Starting Point of Metaphysics.”115 
 The second section of this work also includes a metaphysical analysis in an ex-
posé upon shame. As in the previous section, the writing is meant to draw attention to 
universal elements found in human nature. Shame, being a universal experience, is ex-
plored and related to love and human sexuality. This phenomenological approach to 
shame has been taken up before, he notes, in the works of Scheler and Sawicki.  A later 
treatment which bears some resemblance to the Pope’s is to be found in the writings of 
Dietrich von Hilbebrand in his work In Defense of Purity.116 In both works the premise 
regarding shame is that “ the phenomenon of shame arises when something which of its 
very nature or in view of its purpose ought to be private passes the bounds of a person’s 
privacy and somehow becomes public.” The second movement is that of love. In this 
movement shame is absorbed by love. Within the context of love the person is valued and 
is not subjected to being used by another. Here we find the phenomenological experience 
of shame properly directed and rooted in love. In other words we find metaphysics as 
able to ground ethics which is the concern of John Paul.  Once again, this topic was not 
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treated by Aristotle in his classical Metaphysics, but is considered by John Paul to fall 
within the realm of the “new metaphysics.”117 
 Continuing with the above, the Pope’s metaphysical anthropology is further de-
veloped in his Theology of the Body. In his General Audience of December 2, 1981, he 
takes up what did in fact fall under the sphere of metaphysics proper: the relationship be-
tween the body and the soul. It is John Paul’s contention that theological anthropology 
for the Christian must place its concentration upon the resurrection. This anthropology of 
resurrection so influenced the thought of Thomas, according to the Pope, that he was 
drawn away from Plato and towards Aristotle concerning an understanding of bodily ex-
istence. He notes how the “body as prison” imagery used by Plato is wholly insufficient 
for genuinely Christian Anthropology.118 Following the thought of Tresmontant, the 
Christian understanding of the person as a body/soul composite is a necessity. This more 
Aristotelian approach understood that the human person was lacking when the soul was 
separated from the body. The whole of this treatment serves to clarify the eschatological 
character of the body and emphasizes the body’s importance in the present.119 
Section 7: Evaluation 
 The following section draws upon a good number of those who have contributed 
thus far in our understanding of John Paul as well as some new contributors. Particular 
focus is placed upon two works by Thomas Guarino as he nicely lays out many points 
both pro and con that bear upon foundational Christian thought, and metaphysics in par-
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ticular. In addressing many modern attempts at formulating a systematic theology, 
Guarino quotes Walter Kasper who acutely felt the need for metaphysics as a means to 
establish a timeless, consistent message that is faithful and trustworthy through the ages. 
Kasper states that “the true and deepest crisis of present theology is that there is now no 
metaphysics.” He attributes this crisis to anti-metaphysical philosophies and an over 
zealous effort to overcome narrow thinking, thereby dismissing metaphysics alto-
gether.120 Further framing up the problem, Quinn succinctly surveys the contemporary 
philosophical climate and says “no faith, in short, no metaphysics; and with no metaphys-
ics, faith comes to seek refuge in private experience.”121 Selman quotes Clifford Longley 
who says much the same thing when he asserts: 
Unless it is grounded in reality, one must doubt whether a sense of the sa-
cred can be much more than a kind of aesthetic sensitivity, an accoutre-
ment of a man or a woman of exemplary taste. And one must doubt 
whether it can be grounded in reality without something like metaphysics 
to give it a firm anchor.122 
 
 
 Perhaps worse than being relegated to the realm of aesthetics, the demise of meta-
physics may result in agnosticism. Through a denial of the knowledge of God that is as-
certainable through reason one is left with few options to explain faith. On the rational 
level agnosticism ensues. This movement towards agnosticism was laid out by the Pope 
as he presented the dangerous philosophies of our day. These precarious paths devoid of 
metaphysics lead inevitably towards agnosticism. Mario Enrique Sacchi writes that “the 
plain truth is that metaphysics and agnosticism are irreconcilable enemies. …agnosticism 
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is a denial of first philosophy because this science would have no raison d’être if the hu-
man intellect cannot get a certain knowledge of the divine being.”123 
 How do the critics respond to John Paul and his call for a metaphysical retrieval? 
Guarino begins to present contrary voices by opining that Fides et Ratio does not particu-
larly call for metaphysics as much as “philosophies with a genuinely metaphysical 
range.” Allowing for those who are dissatisfied with the metaphysical attempts to date, 
Guarino, however, does see the need for some foundation. He writes that “without a 
‘foundationalist’ ontology of some sort, there is no possibility for logically sustaining the 
universality and continuity of doctrine.”124 He adds that substantial thinkers have 
weighed in on this topic. Among them he mentions Rahner, Lonergan and Sokolowski, 
who all think that “some kind of broadly metaphysical approach is necessary if one is to 
defend adequately fundamental positions regarding Christian teaching.”125 Yet, some 
foundation is not of necessity metaphysics. 
 Guarino offers four arguments posited against Fides et Ratio, one from his book 
and three from an article he authored in Theological Studies. For the first, he presents the 
criticisms of Richard Bernstein.  Bernstein expresses some frustration over the lack of 
freedom he feels the Pope offers to those he invites on the philosophical search or jour-
ney. Bernstein is convinced that John Paul has already exerted a nonnegotiable founda-
tionalist approach while feigning an openness.  He also calls into question whether all 
people universally seek ultimate or final truth as the Pope asserts.  Bernstein, a non-
foundationalist, believes that John Paul has built into his premises his conclusions.  In 
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effect, he is begging the question.  Bernstein is convinced that the very best philosophy of 
the moderns has thrown into question the idea of absolute truth.  Although Guarino thinks 
that Bernstein does not understand what is called for in the fides quaerens intellectum, he 
does agree that the document tends to misrepresent postmodern and pragmatic thought.126 
 The second criticism calls into question the way that John Paul has insisted upon 
our ability to know the truth. In §82, as noted earlier, John Paul chose to use the Thomis-
tic correspondence theory of understanding to indicate the appropriate type of realism 
that the encyclical was espousing. Guarino himself questions the prudence of such a sid-
ing with Thomas. Guarino does admit that the Pontiff must defend realism, and states that 
“realism alone allows the Church to defend Christian doctrine as not only symbolic and 
disclosive but also as ontologically true.” He likewise notes that “theological language 
and interpretation cannot simply ‘defer’ in the Derridean sense but must ultimately offer 
us ‘a statement which is simply true; otherwise there would  be no Revelation of God, but 
only the expression of human notions about God.”127 Yet, he asks if this realism must 
necessarily be tied to adaequatio as is called for by John Paul. He wonders whether this 
undermines the portion of the document that allows for, and may in effect promote a plu-
ralism of theological approaches. Does the Pope bind us to an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
means for understanding? Guarino offers Sokolowski as an example of a thinker bearing 
a realist epistemology who does not fall under the adaequatio conception of understand-
ing. In his footnote he asks “whether the encyclical would not have been further strength-
ened, had it noted, as [Louis] Dupré does, that while correspondence should not be re-
jected, speaking about truth as ‘disclosure’ serves to protect the truly religious nature of 
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truth while standing at some distance from the subjectivism of modernity.” Guarino is of 
the mind that this move towards adaequatio has failed to pay proper respect to the sub-
jective dimension of knowing which is indicative of this age. He is concerned that this 
concept of understanding distances itself from modernity. In summary he asserts that “the 
inability of the encyclical to come to grips with serious philosophical issues raised by 
modernity, such as the role of subjectivity and historicity in knowing, represents an un-
necessary hesitation in the Church’s attempt to enrich its intellectual and spiritual heri-
tage with all that is true and human.” He seeks to strengthen his argument by noting that 
when the document fails to mention either Blondel or Maréchal, it is an indication of 
John Paul’s disinterest in the subjective dimensions of knowing. He counters the previ-
ously mentioned argument by Henrici (that Blondel was not mentioned by John Paul in 
order not to canonize his thought) as “entirely too benign an interpretation.” Guarino is 
instead of the mind that this move was purposive, and indicates a preference for objective 
knowing.128 
 His third criticism is the most pertinent to this dissertation. John Paul pitted nihil-
ism, which he saw as the culmination of faulty philosophies, against metaphysics. 
Guarino asks whether there might be another alternative to these two options. He notes 
that “many contemporary philosophers and theologians are seeking to overcome both 
relativism and anarchic irrationalism. But they wish to do so without metaphysics, with-
out even a renewed metaphysics, which they deem philosophically untenable.” These 
thinkers seek to place more emphasis upon historicity and linguistics which typifies the 
work being done in modern circles of scholarship. Guarino cautions that he and others are 
not calling for a system of relativism, but for an exploration of the possibility of a non-
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metaphysical means of expression. He thinks that despite its favorable aspects, the encyc-
lical does not adequately deal with postmodern concerns that are tied to considerations of 
culture and history. He thinks that Fides et Ratio, on this point, diminishes the philoso-
phical progress by unnecessarily calling for a return to metaphysics rather than calling for 
a means of thought that would not be relativistic, and yet would answer the questions and 
concerns posed by modernity. 
Guarino’s final criticism concerns the promulgation of the Church’s form/content or con-
text/content distinction in light of the sustained role it has played since Vatican II. He 
writes “the intention of this distinction is to allow a fundamental content, the depositum 
fidei, to be expressed through a variety of perspectives and terminologies. This is the dis-
tinction invoked by John XXIII in his opening address, Gaudet mater ecclesia, and, in 
different places and in various ways, by the conciliar documents themselves (Gaudium et 
spes no. 62, Unitatis redintegratio nos. 6, 17).” In essence, Guarino is concerned that the 
document focuses too much on the content and not enough on the form and context. He 
continues that “this expected emphasis on the identity and perpetuity of the doctrine’s 
truth is not balanced with earlier ecclesial accents on the possible variety of conceptual 
formulation.” 
 He concludes with a few possible reasons for the above omission. He wonders 
whether since a significant portion of the document focuses upon allowing a plurality of 
philosophies that perhaps John Paul thought there needed to be a counterbalance focused 
upon the preservation of the traditional terminology. In addition he wonders whether the 
Church was lending a note of caution by reminding readers that a philosophical system 
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must be “tried” and found able to stand the test of time. In any case, Guarino thinks this a 
missed opportunity.129 
Section 8: Conclusion 
 In presenting concluding remarks on the works of John Paul in general and Fides 
et Ratio in particular it is helpful to keep a few things in mind. First, the context in which 
he writes and the forms in which he expresses himself are both thoroughly Christian. This 
important distinction aids in the evaluation of the legacy of John Paul. Did the Pope ac-
complish the goals that he set out to achieve as a bearer of the faith? Did his work help to 
illuminate the mystery of existence from a philosophical perspective? Was he able to give 
voice to the insights discovered from a phenomenological perspective, and how did his 
faith influence his approach? All of these questions are rightly addressed in light of the 
Pope’s faith perspective. 
 The substantial contribution to the Christian community is helpful to both Catho-
lics and non-Catholics alike. In Fides et Ratio, John Paul is clear that the Word of God is 
supremely authoritative, and that all subsequent elaborations upon truth, whether phi-
losophical or theological are thus bound to it. “It is not the wisdom of words, but the 
Word of Wisdom which Saint Paul offers as the criterion of both truth and salvation.” (§ 
23) And likewise he writes that: 
Underlying all the Church's thinking is the awareness that she is the bearer 
of a message which has its origin in God himself (cf. 2 Cor 4:1-2). The 
knowledge which the Church offers to man has its origin not in any specu-
lation of her own, however sublime, but in the word of God which she has 
received in faith (cf. 1 Th 2:13). (§ 7) 
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With the word of God at its center the Church is then bound, as the document has noted 
many times, to employ a philosophy which is congruent with this revelation. Selman put 
it thus: “Theology cannot render intelligible to us the mystery revealed in the Bible unless 
it employs philosophy suited and open to certain features of Scripture.”130 Freddoso fur-
ther notes that “what it implies for philosophy is that the mysteries of the Christian Faith 
must appear as first principles in any successful attempt to articulate the full truth about 
God, the world, and ourselves.”131 Tresmontant has said as much and more about the 
need for our first principles (metaphysics) to be biblically founded, or at least biblically 
congruent. 
 The next point builds upon the first. In the process of receiving and then passing 
down the content of revelation a type of consistency in required. Guarino addresses this 
need in discussing what Catholic theology refers to as continuity in the development of 
dogma. He later draws from Lonergan and Rahner, both of whom admit of a core content 
that is able to be expressed in different forms.132 In being faithful to this core content one 
need ask if metaphysics necessarily must be present. If so, in what way and to what ex-
tent is it needed? If not, what foundational system must be in place? 
 Wolfgang Pannenberg considered this question and answered thus: “in theol-
ogy… the rejection of metaphysics cannot be successful over the long haul.”133 Selman 
echoes his thought and considers the consequences of the loss of metaphysics. His con-
clusion is that we have witnessed the following in the elimination of metaphysics: 
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1. To confine the mind to the imagination (all our ideas are derived from 
impressions, there is nothing real of which we do not have an image or 
picture). 
2. To cut off the mind from the senses, which is a dualism of mind and 
body, if we can bypass the senses for our knowledge (Plato, Descartes’ 
‘mental inspection’).134 
Guarino is not as convinced that metaphysics proper is what is required, but is 
convinced that some form of foundationalism is essential. He concludes in his treatment 
of foundational thought that theology can not invest itself in any system which is non-
foundationalist or anti-metaphysical. To do so would result in an unintelligible faith or a 
loss of material unity and the continuity of faith.135  Whereas thinkers such as Gerard 
Loughlin want to assert that theological discourse is itself foundational, and that from it 
all other ideas, concepts and theological conclusions should be derived, Barrett in con-
trast notes that Loughlin fails to take into account the needed metaphysical foundation, 
without which religious experience found in theological discourse would be reduced to a 
form of fideism.136  
 While maintaining the primacy of place afforded to theology, reason must not be 
dismissed. To insist that theology, if rational, must be grounded in an understandable sys-
tem is not to do damage to the deposit of faith, but on the contrary, to fortify it. Guarino 
puts it thus: 
One may say, then, that the kind of “foundationalism” defended by Fides 
et ratio is quite specific and always elaborated within the house of faith. 
Attempts to establish a prima philosophia are demanded by revelation, 
never done apart from it, and are ultimately subject to theological criteria. 
The type of foundationalism sanctioned by the document, then, should al-
ways be understood as the “second moment” within the auditus fidei, in-
tellectus fidei synthesis.137 
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Once again, Tresmontant would fit in well with the reflection just offered. Revelation re-
quires that reason give solid and consistent expression to the timeless truth offered by 
God’s Word as conveyed in revelation. Metaphysics is postulated by John Paul as the 
means to meet this task. 
 On another level, those not of a faith conviction can ask if his work as a philoso-
pher has anything to offer the non-believer in the philosophical quest? Those not of the 
Christian persuasion have positively commented upon the merits of Fides et Ratio. Rich-
ard J. Bernstein, who has much criticism to offer, writes that “what is striking about this 
letter is its ecumenical and cosmopolitan spirit. It clearly recognizes that there are sources 
of wisdom that go far beyond the Catholic Church. Christians and non-Christians, East 
and West, pagans and believers have all contributed to the journey for true knowledge.” 
He adds that “the encyclical letter places the greatest emphasis on philosophical inquiry 
rather than on philosophical systems. The very language of the latter stresses the ‘search,’ 
‘journey,’ ‘path,’ and ‘struggle’ to attain the truth.”138 Non-Christians do have a friendly 
partner to dialogue with in John Paul. The record of his papacy speaks loudly of a “reach-
ing out.” His pontificate was marked by ecumenical and inter-religious efforts to achieve 
greater understanding and greater respect. Fides et Ratio as well as the other works of 
John Paul have much to offer if one sees him, as Bernstein does, as fellow traveler on the 
journey to truth. 
 I would like to include a few remarks concerning the Protestant Christian recep-
tion of the encyclical. By and large the forging of “Christian Philosophy” has been a 
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Catholic undertaking. Reformation theology tended to find the damaged intellect result-
ing from the Fall so disabled and wounded as to render reason’s achievement suspicious 
at best. Certainly scholastic theology was mostly viewed as a complex man-made system, 
and an unnecessary one at that. The Word was and is the definitive statement and our 
subsequent development is a watering-down. Why add to what has been definitively spo-
ken? The Catholic response has been to show that the reception of the Word involves a 
process of thought that explicates and draws out the depth, height and breadth of the full-
ness of faith in a necessary way. For the individual, it is required for a correct personal 
understanding. For evangelical purposes, philosophy is needed to understand a secular 
world in order to carry out “The Great Commission”. Many Christians in universities see 
relativism as one of the greatest obstacles to be overcome in order to clear a path for the 
Gospel. 
 In more recent times there is much more of a joint effort. Many Protestant theolo-
gians are seeing the usefulness of the philosophical approach of Aquinas. Norman Geisler 
is a prime example. In all things philosophical he sees Thomas as his closest ally, and has 
called on fellow Evangelicals to look to Thomas in the same way.139 Thomas’s metaphys-
ics is especially appreciated by Geisler. He notes that he is not alone in his admiration for 
the Angelic Doctor and mentions other fellow Evangelicals who also find in Thomas  a 
worldview faithful to the Gospel and yet philosophically rigorous enough in purely secu-
lar circles. J. Daryl Charles also weighs in on the thought of John Paul in Fides et Ratio. 
He finds that the contemporary climate is predominantly post-modern and suffers from a 
rupture between thought and being. Although he thinks the Pope overly optimistic given 
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depravity and the ability of the human intellect after the Fall,140 he praises the Pope for 
his strong stance on the need for a foundation in the encyclical. He notes that in the midst 
of this current climate John Paul is “unabashedly anti-anti-foundationalist.”  Nicholas 
Wolterstorff is wholly enthusiastic in his praise of John Paul. He writes that he is of the 
Reformed tradition, and not withstanding having a few problems with the Pope on some 
peripheral issues (such as the consensus of philosophers historically considered, the role 
of tradition and of Mary), he notes with surprise how this document can be a point of 
unity for Christians. He asks in light of past controversies: “Could it be that those dis-
putes are on the way to disappearing? For I find myself in almost complete agreement 
with what the pope says about the relation of faith and reason.”141 He does not find that 
John Paul has overlooked the weakened state of the intellect after the Fall if one uses the 
proper hermeneutical key to reading it.  He writes: 
I suggest that if one is to understand what the pope is saying, one must 
constantly keep in mind the distinction between properly functioning hu-
man reason, and human reason as it actually functions in its fallen state. 
When the pope is speaking of the former, he can sound exceedingly confi-
dent and optimistic concerning the powers of reason; when he is speaking 
of the latter, he can sound eminently realistic and, on occasion, even 
judgmental.142 
Wolterstorff finds that the document strikes a fine balance which is amenable to 
those in the Catholic and Reformed traditions. This balance is crucial to dispel some of 
the suspicions present since the time of the split. Faith and reason provide the framework 
needed to continue building alliances. Wolterstorff even goes so far as to praise the Pope 
for diagnosing the theological illness of our age. He writes: “to my mind there can be no 
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doubt whatsoever that the pope has put his finger on the fundamental ill from which the-
ology has been suffering in recent years. All too often in recent years theology has been 
in headlong flight from metaphysics- that is, from a willingness to speak about God in 
particular and reality in general.”143 That Christian philosophers from a variety of de-
nominations are able to see in the lack of metaphysics a common formidable problem 
should prove intriguing at the least. Can metaphysics provide a common framework for 
all Christians? Does an ecumenically pleasing metaphysics require major revision? Does 
the biblically focused metaphysics of Tresmontant offer any promise towards this end? 
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 For, after Marion, every route to thinking God via Being or Be-
coming must be thought again – and thought excessively to see if God can 
be thus understood in terms of Being without being radically misunder-
stood as somehow constricted by Being, as somehow less than God. Is 
Platonic “goodness,” or Christian “agape,” or postmodern “excess” appro-
priately understood through any notion of Being – whether Scholastic 
“common being,” Thomistic esse, or even Heideggerian Sein? The dis-
turbing question – disturbing to so many forms of philosophical theology 
in our period – will come to haunt any serious theological reader of God 
without Being.1 
-David Tracy 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE TO METAPHYSICS 
 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 This chapter in no way endeavors to provide a comprehensive treatment of post-
modern thought and its relation to metaphysics. It is rather intended to focus upon two 
postmodern thinkers, both of whom are sufficiently representative of postmodern phi-
losophical theology, and how and why they attempt a refutation of metaphysics. The past 
two chapters have offered a more in-depth look at two individuals who consider meta-
physics essential for Christian philosophical thought. The first chapter presented Tres-
montant’s assertion that metaphysics is a necessary outgrowth of a thoughtful commit-
ment to a Judeo-Christian biblical perspective. The second chapter explored the thought 
of John Paul who advocated metaphysics as a way to ground both the contributions of 
phenomenology and Christian ethics, as well as being a precondition for achieving ra-
tionally grounded thought. 
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 This chapter will present the postmodern challenge to a continued metaphysics 
within Christian philosophical theology. The arguments of both Jean-Luc Marion and 
Gianni Vattimo seek to explicate the perspectives of thinkers of the postmodern philoso-
phical tradition. Philosophers such as Kant, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Husserl and others 
have contributed to forming a new starting point for philosophical theology. This new 
starting point is one devoid of metaphysics, or so they assert, and seeks to eliminate 
foundationalism in all its forms. Although both Marion and Vattimo will be considered, 
the Marion section will be more extensive. The shorter Vattimo section will share much 
of the postmodern proclivities found in the Marion segment, but with a focus on his 
unique contribution. 
 As concerns both of these thinkers, I will concentrate specifically on the bearing 
their thought has upon metaphysics. As opposed to John Paul, these thinkers do not advo-
cate a metaphysical retrieval. They would agree with the Pontiff that metaphysics has lost 
ground in recent years, but find this welcome news. They would consequently disagree 
with John Paul that any sort of metaphysical retrieval is necessary. In fact they would 
find this project retrogressive. I shall give voice to their reasoning, provide some voices 
in opposition to their perspective, and then conclude by proposing a direction for future 
questions. In the following chapter I will consider how one might reconcile these two op-
posed schools of thought, if indeed that is possible. 
Section 2: Jean-Luc Marion 
 Jean-Luc Marion is a French Philosopher who was born in 1946. His studies lead-
ing up to his professorship culminated at the prestigious Sorbonne. He was influenced by 
a diverse array of philosophers and theologians. Included in this group were the likes of 
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Gillis Deleuze and Jacques Derrida as well as the theologians Louis Bouyer, Jean Danié-
lou, Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Presently he teaches at the University 
of Chicago and is a coveted speaker worldwide.2 Marion is primarily concerned with rid-
ding philosophy and theology of metaphysical categories, most especially that of “being.” 
He finds these categories ultimately destructive and believes that they inevitably lead to 
the Nietzschean death of God. He prefers the via negativa approach of Pseudo-Dionysius 
which avoids positive categorical assertions of God. He favors thematic exposés of topics 
such as the icon and idol, the gift, the face and love (agape).3 
 In attempting to clearly describe and contextualize the postmodern worldview, 
Stanley J. Grenz contrasts the modern perspective born of the Enlightenment with the 
postmodern outlook. He describes the modern view as optimistic concerning the ability 
of the human mind to achieve truth on all levels. “The moderns” he writes “believed that 
they were able to see the world as it really is. Postmodernism says that this was an illu-
sion.” Postmodern thought further asserted that advances in cultural anthropology re-
vealed that many of the deep assumptions found in any society (their myths) were cultur-
ally derived and lacked the universal significance that had been traditionally attributed to 
them. These meta-narratives, as they call them, no longer possess the authority to form 
foundational principles able to universally govern thought and ethics. “The demise of the 
grand narrative means that we no longer search for the one system of myths that can unite 
human beings into one people or the globe into one ‘world.’”4 
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The Problem of Language 
 Following upon this line of thought is the postmodern problem with the nature of 
language. Two notable contributors to the postmodern view of language, worthy of men-
tion as their work bears considerable influence, are Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty. 
Derrida is opposed to what can be called a realist view of language. Grenz states that 
“Derrida denies that language has a fixed meaning connected to a fixed reality or that it 
unveils definitive truth. He wants to divest us of this modern concept and open us up to 
the ‘hermeneutical’ possibilities of the written word, the possibilities that arise as we en-
gage in an ongoing conversation with the texts.”5 Grenz goes on to explain how Derrida 
then rebukes the tradition of western philosophy when it claims to have the ability to 
convey a fixed meaning through language. This western disposition to believe in the 
power of language as able to convey meaning is called “logocentrism” according to Der-
rida, and is an untenable position. “Logocentrism is connected to what Derrida calls the 
‘metaphysics of presence.’ Western philosophers assume that there is at the foundation of 
our language a ‘presence’ of being or an essence that we can come to know. And they are 
convinced that language (the system of linguistic ‘signs’) is able to ‘signify’ or represent 
this given reality in its essential nature. Consequently, they search for some ultimate 
‘word,’ presence, essence, truth, or reality to serve as the foundation for our thought, lan-
guage, and experience (the ‘transcendental signified’). … But if such a transcendental 
signifier did exist, Derrida points out, it would have to lie beyond the linguistic system. It 
could not be tainted by the play of linguistic differences or in any way be entangled in the 
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language it is supposed to anchor.”6 This is quite an assertion, and will be challenged as 
we see how this thought is employed in any way by Marion or Vattimo. 
 Another notable thinker who exerted substantial influence within postmodern 
thought is Richard Rorty. He shares with Derrida the conviction that a realist view of lan-
guage is patently false. Rorty’s approach is a bit different in that he comes to this conclu-
sion from the perspective of a pragmatist thinker. In addition to being a non-realist, Rorty 
is also a nonessentialist as well as a nonrepresentationalist. As a nonessentialist he denies 
the knowability as well as the reality that a thing would possess in and of itself. Instead 
the focus is placed upon the meaning or significance a thing has in relation to other 
things. The nonrepresentational aspect has direct bearing upon a portion of what has been 
treated thus far as it stands in contradiction to the correspondence theory of knowledge 
called for by Pope John Paul and traditionally held in Catholic circles. Nonrepresenta-
tionalists object to those who believe that language is able to represent the world as it ac-
tually is. They prefer to think of language more loosely as cohering in some way with the 
world.7 No pretense is made that there is an actual conveyance of reality through lan-
guage, only to a “working relationship” between language and the world. 
 What is crucial at this point is to note the impasse that results from the construc-
tion of such linguistic systems when put in dialogue with any realist system that asserts a 
greater optimism in regard to the ability of language. The conversation seems ended be-
fore it can begin, and perhaps we will have to settle for something less at this point, 
namely, a comparison and perhaps more optimistically a mutual exchange on related 
points. This in some ways is the case as we look to bring Marion and Vattimo to the table 
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with Tresmontant and John Paul. Although both of our postmodern representatives have 
strong disagreements with the views of Tresmontant and John Paul, it is necessary to 
draw out their distinctive approaches aimed at thinking from non-foundationalist perspec-
tives. 
The Elimination of Metaphysics 
 Marion initiates his attack upon metaphysics from the perspective of a defender of 
the sovereignty of God against those who would confine God to human finite categories 
thus actually worshipping in an idolatrous fashion rather than approaching the true God 
who is beyond any categories. Antonio Calcagno provides a concise overview of 
Marion’s perspective as he comments upon God Without Being. He writes: 
In his masterful work, God Without Being, Jean-Luc Marion launches a 
profound challenge to the tradition of metaphysics in general, and more 
specifically, to the related field of metaphysical theology. Marion claims 
that God must no longer be thought of in terms of the traditional category 
“Being,” for that reduces God to an all too human concept which he calls 
“Dieu.” In a sense, a violence is done to God and our understanding of 
God, for we seriously delimit that which by nature is indeterminable. 
Drawing upon a Heideggerian-inspired notion of the phenomenological 
Destruktion, Marion maintains that God must be thought outside the onto-
logical difference and outside the very question of Being itself. In so do-
ing, we free ourselves from an idolatry wherein we reduce God to our own 
all too narrow conceptual schemes.8 
 
 
 At the outset it must be noted that Marion presents quite a challenge to his unini-
tiated readers. The difficulty of the material is further complicated by his writing style. 
Robyn Horner, whose work we shall use for outlining much of this section, notes that 
“Marion’s style is particularly taxing. It is very classical, a feature that is difficult to re-
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move in translation while attempting to remain faithful to his text, and tends to progress 
in spiral rather than linear fashion, which means that it is sometimes initially difficult to 
distinguish between his exposition of others’ ideas and his own, frequently contrasting 
views.”9 To enter into the world of Marion one must first learn the esoteric speech that he 
employs while elaborating his themes. In some respects this new language is appropriate 
given his aim of moving beyond metaphysics. A good deal of the classical language is so 
replete with metaphysically charged language, such as essence, nature, substance, person 
etc., that in order to complete his task Marion must create a new way of speaking. At 
times this language more closely resembles poetry than prose, a point that I shall return to 
later in this chapter. 
 In commenting upon Marion’s desire to eliminate metaphysics, Guarino reminds 
us that at least some part of Marion’s fascination with the via negativa is deeply rooted in 
the Catholic tradition. He mentions the statement of Aquinas that “we do not know what 
God is, only that he is and how he is related to us” (SCGI, 30). He further quotes Gregory 
Nazianzen who observes that “what God is in nature and essence no man ever yet has 
discovered or can discover” (Orations 28, 17). Guarino further explains: 
Theology, by the very nature of its formal object, the triune God, is 
largely, though not entirely, an apophatic discipline, one that only cau-
tiously intermingles presence and absence; the great theological tradition 
of Christianity has recognized this unreservedly.  Marion, like Derrida, 
Caputo, and others, is interested in nonappearance, in the absence from 
which presence comes to light.  From a theological point of view, one cer-
tainly cannot argue with this marked accent on unknowing or even nonap-
pearance, for theology harbors intense elements of the apophatic, the 
apocalyptic, and the eschatological at the heart of its own self-
understanding.10 
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God Without Being 
 Undoubtedly Marion addresses a legitimate concern by weighing in on the side 
of the otherness of God, of the unknowability concerning his essence. He provides a 
healthy reminder that our theology is always an attempt on some level to grasp the in-
tangible, to conceive One beyond our most noble intellectual effort. While attempting 
to accomplish such a feat, Marion has chosen a provocative name for his work, God 
Without Being. At first hearing this may give the impression that he is asserting the 
non-existence of God. Marion assures his reader that this is not the case in the preface 
to this work. To clarify his belief in God he writes that “God is, exists, and that is the 
least of things. At issue here is not the possibility of God’s attaining Being, but, quite 
the opposite, the possibility of Being’s attaining to God.”11 Statements like this may 
help even those critical of Marion’s work to admire his apophatic aims. The question 
is, does he go so far in this pursuit as to skew the reality he wishes to protect?   
 The project that Marion attempts in order to pursue his aim of freeing God 
from all “Being” language and thought is what puts him at odds with the vast majority 
of theologians throughout history who have attempted to use categories which they 
have received from the Fathers as well as the Scholastics. As Horner describes it, the 
postmodern project, of which Marion is certainly a part, has two primary aims. The 
first is overcoming metaphysics, and the second is “thinking of difference.”12 These 
are the goals that directly bear upon our focus upon both Tresmontant and John Paul, 
both of whom insist upon the necessity of metaphysics. 
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 Since the elimination of metaphysics is high on the postmodern agenda, typi-
cally ontology is off limits. The “being” questions that were entertained by previous 
generations of philosophers and theologians have been largely abandoned or rendered 
pointless and/or unachievable. This turning away from ontology is felt on many levels 
as a part of the modern academic milieu. Within the scientific community a similar 
avoidance of ontology has at times caused the contemporary person to relinquish his 
or her unique status in the cosmos. As Richard Barrett puts it, “the idea that a frail bio-
logical being on one planet in one star system, is the centre of the metaphysical uni-
verse, seems ridiculous to many of our contemporaries.”13 We have what Christos 
Yannaras has described as an ontological embarrassment. “The rejection is quite easily 
explained. Ontology is associated with intellectual arrogance and dogmatic inflexibil-
ity grounded in medieval thought.”14 It may also be referred to as an ontological fa-
tigue. In light of this postmodern perspective we can see why Marion has shunned a 
good deal of the classical and traditional language. It is much too imbued with onto-
logical baggage. He seeks to distance himself from this in order to rethink questions of 
God and Being. 
 Tracy notes that within modernity there are two main strategies. The first seeks 
a correlation between “the claims of reason and the disclosures of revelation. The 
other strategy believes that reason functions best in theology by developing rigorous 
concepts and categories to clarify theology’s sole foundation in revelation.”15 Marion 
is decidedly on the side of the second strategy. He, like many postmodern thinkers, 
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finds correlation unachievable. This is the result of the postmodern focus upon the par-
ticular, which always sees the difference and disallows the universal. Those opposing 
this postmodern perspective may object that correlation is unachievable only inasmuch 
as one uses as a starting point modernity and its fluctuating points of focus rather than 
looking towards what is universally graspable through the use of reason. 
 Marion’s position is that revelation is the only legitimate starting point for under-
taking Christian theology. This develops into a number of meditations upon themes 
which are both theologically and phenomenologically derivable. In the end Marion hopes 
to move us to think of God in terms of goodness over being, a goodness rooted in agapeic 
love.  
 Before exploring the themes investigated by Marion which make up the heart of 
his philosophical and theological opus, one more brief excursus is needed. As Marion is 
the postmodern descendent of notable philosophers before him it is appropriate that we 
consider how some of these thinkers have influenced him. 
Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger 
 Like both Tresmontant and John Paul, Marion had to encounter and assess the 
thought of Kant. Marion’s reading of Kant was perhaps not as dramatic as that of John 
Paul or others. He was convinced of the ability of the phenomenological method, and was 
not troubled by dismissing notable thinkers whom he found misdirected. This resulted in 
his dismissal of Kant. Guarino notes how in seeking a phenomenology without horizons, 
“Marion unleashes against the transcendentalism of modernity because phenomenology, 
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unlike Kantianism, ‘no longer limits itself to sensible intuition, but admits all intuition 
that is primarily donative.’”16 
 Marion’s invective against metaphysics follows in the line of thought of 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche sides heavily against metaphysics as a false construct that has been 
heavily built upon and wrongly invested in for centuries in the West. The framework, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, is unable to withstand modern scrutiny. In the face of an indifferent 
universe all that is left is the Will to Power.17 This collapse of metaphysics and its struc-
tural proclivities results in the death of God according to Nietzsche.  Bruce Ellis Benson 
writes that “Marion affirms Nietzsche’s famed account of the death of God, but takes it in 
the opposite direction of the death of God movement of the 1960s. For Marion, that death 
is not the death of a living ‘god’ but the death of the ‘god of the philosophers.’  Such a 
death signifies the end of any theology or philosophy (or, more technically, metaphysics) 
that attempts to make positive determinations of God. Like Nietzsche, Marion sees both 
philosophers and theologians as often ‘idolatrous’ in the sense of creating God in their 
own image and postulating God as the highest ‘being.’”18  Horner notes that Heidegger 
will take this anti-metaphysical ambition even further. Inasmuch as Nietzsche sought to 
overcome metaphysics, "Heidegger will, in fact, judge Nietzsche to be the culminating 
figure of a certain type of metaphysics, since even Nietzsche espouses a value, that of the 
Will to Power."19 For many, the thought of Heidegger put the final nail in the coffin for 
metaphysics. However, this end brought about a new beginning as far as Marion was 
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concerned. Bloechl writes, “for Marion, the end of philosophy recognized by Heidegger 
is simultaneously the (re)emergence of the current nature of certain phenomena that have 
never been submitted themselves to onto-theology - above all, the divine word...the star-
tling conclusion must be that the end of philosophy would be a new beginning for theol-
ogy."20 Ignace Verhack, in light of this Heideggerian perspective, asks a question that 
logically comes to mind. If one buys into Heidegger’s system, is it possible to even have 
“God” as a theme for philosophical discussion?21 
Marion and Phenomenology 
 Marion is a phenomenologist. He is convinced, like Husserl, that a naturalist ap-
proach to the world is insufficient, as it tends to focus on objects within reality, and lacks 
a sufficiently subjective focus.  This type of approach neglects a consideration of con-
sciousness, which is undeniably a part of the whole.  In asserting this point Horner quotes 
Husserl who states "only a radical inquiry back into subjectivity-and specifically the sub-
jectivity which ultimately brings about all world-validity, with its content and in all its 
prescientific and scientific modes, and into the 'what' and the 'how' of the rational accom-
plishments-can make objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic 
meaning of the world."22 It seems that Husserl’s phenomenology is insufficient for 
Marion on a couple of fronts. It is lacking in its ability to deal with the lofty subject mat-
ter contemplated by Marion.  As John D. Caputo has noted, "for Marion, Husserl’s phe-
nomenology has allowed itself to be preoccupied with what Marion calls ‘poor’ or com-
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monplace phenomena in which the intention exceeds or outreaches the givenness, 
whereas Marion analyzes the possibility of a phenomenon that is impossible on Husserl’s 
terms, where the givenness exceeds the intention, swamps and saturates it with givenness 
and leaves it groping for words (meanings, significations)."23 Benson further explains the 
dissatisfaction that Marion has with Husserl’s approach to phenomenology. 
But Marion-ever the radical-contends that even Husserl didn't go far 
enough.  For Husserl still thinks that there is a kind of "horizon" (i,e., a 
background) against which all phenomena appear.  In other words, when I 
see a person or object, I always see that person or object in relation to a 
background (and this includes a cultural and even historical background). 
 
Not only does Marion want to do away with that background (or at least 
suspend it), he also claims that the phenomenon of the Logos (not to men-
tion other phenomena) appears to us as a "saturated phenomenon."  In 
other words, they're so much that we can never get our puny little minds 
around it.  The Logos simply defies our categories and ways of making 
sense of things.24 
 
 
 What Marion thought deficient in previous attempts at philosophy and then in 
phenomenology he believes he has at last achieved to some extent. He writes that “What 
was lacking was a non-metaphysical method of philosophy- phenomenology… It took 
twenty years for me to hope to succeed, at least in part. And in fact, Etant donné, with the 
inventory of saturated phenomena, completes, in the particular case of the phenomenon 
of Revelation, a sketch of what Dieu sans l’être bluntly intended through direct recourse 
to theology.”25 Marion’s aim is to take phenomenology to a new level by employing new 
terms arrived at by key insights into phenomena. Horner concisely presents five funda-
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mental arguments offered by Marion pertaining to phenomenology. They are here pre-
sented in a slightly modified form: 
1. The phenomenology of Husserl at various points opens onto the possibility of 
exceeding metaphysics. 
2. The proper horizon of the phenomenological reduction is neither presence 
(Husserl’s reduction), nor being (Heidegger's existential reduction), but 
givenness (Marion's reduction). 
3. Givenness implies an emphasis on the self givenness of phenomena, and the 
consequent recognition that the subject is not first a constituting I but a screen 
upon which phenomena become visible. 
4. Some phenomena offer so much to intuition that they cannot be definitively 
constituted; these phenomena are saturated by intuition (hence, "saturated 
phenomenon").  They include events, idols, flesh, and icons, but potentially 
also phenomena of r/Revelation. 
5. Phenomenology is a kind of philosophical prolegomenon. It opens onto theol-
ogy as it can provide a non-theological context for the consideration of phe-
nomena that are given in excess of our ability to constitute them, which might 
include revelatory phenomena.26 
 
 Marion’s conviction is that phenomenology is not a way of approaching philoso-
phy, but the way of engaging the world of experience. Since the philosophy of the past is 
an exercise in metaphysical reflection, lacking the sufficient phenomenological insight, it 
should for the most part be laid aside. Horner explains the three ways in which Marion 
believes metaphysics has been overcome. First, it displays an inability to adequately deal 
with the infinite as evidenced by the work of Descartes. Second, the works of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Derrida have shown metaphysics to be a meaningless pursuit. Finally, 
Metaphysics has been overtaken by phenomenology which surpasses it in its ability give 
an account of the world.27 In each of these three ways Marion is convinced that meta-
physics has been overcome, but it is the third way which provides a context out of which 
to properly and fully contemplate love. 
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Marion and Aquinas 
 Given the above perspective, Marion's encounter with Thomism is apt to be con-
frontational. For many, Thomas represents the height of metaphysical ambition. This was 
certainly, at first, the case for Marion. The 1982 edition of Dieu sans l’être blamed Tho-
mas for advancing the idolatry of onto-theology. Guarino notes that within this work 
“Marion argues there that the notion of being purveyed by the scholastic tradition ex-
changes the iconic representation of God, eminently displayed by the Pseudo-Dionysian 
trajectory of love and unknowing, for the more objectified, calculative, and idolic trajec-
tory of Ipsum Esse Subsistens. … seeing being as a category encircling both God crea-
tures and, therefore, as representative of the ‘idolic imagination.’”28 Brian J. Shanley pre-
sents a similar argument in his fine article which attempts to disentangle the conflict that 
Marion had/has with Aquinas. He also recounts Marion’s initial complaint against Tho-
mas from God Without Being: 
There Marion had argued that by reversing the Pseudo-Dionysian priority 
of the good over being in his doctrine of divine names, Aquinas had 
moved fatally away from the God of Revelation and faith, who is funda-
mentally Love, towards the construction of the metaphysical idol of “God” 
who would come to dominate modern thought.  Marion’s original verdict 
on Aquinas was that he was not significantly different from Avicenna and 
John Duns Scotus insofar as he accorded primacy to a human concept of 
being (allegedly tainted with the representational limitations of the imagi-
nation) as the horizon that dominates and determines the way in which 
God can appear; moreover, this conceptual priority could only be univocal 
and so the alleged Thomistic analogy of being collapses.  God is thus ob-
jectified and subordinated to human conceptualization, the beginning of 
the development that would flower into modern onto-theology.”29 
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The remainder of the article goes on to explain Marion's recantation of his earlier assess-
ment of Aquinas and his subsequent rehabilitation of Thomistic thought.  As Shanley 
writes, "In the 1991 ‘Preface to the English Edition’ of God without Being, Marion held 
out the possibility that Thomistic esse may not be the being from which God needs to be 
liberated, identifying the latter instead with both the conceptual and univocal being of 
modern metaphysics and Heidegger’s Ereignis.30 Marion suggested that Thomas does not 
chain God to metaphysics because the esse divine maintains a transcendent distance from 
the composed (esse-essentia) order of beings that is the subject matter of metaphysics 
(ens commune).”31 Marion is able to offer this retractatio inasmuch as his further reading 
of Thomas has led him to conclude that Aquinas did in fact avoid the pitfalls of onto-
theology.  Shanley succinctly presents Marion's argument as to how Thomas avoided 
these fatal mistakes. Marion begins by pointing out the flaws in Heidegger's indictment 
of metaphysics as ontotheology.  First, God must be conceived as falling within the sub-
ject matter of metaphysics, as a Being among beings falling under a univocal concept. 
Second, “God must be efficient causal foundation of beings and is their sufficient rea-
son.” And thirdly, “God as ground must be causa sui, supremely grounding precisely be-
cause self-grounded.”32 
 Marion contends that Aquinas is innocent on all three counts. He asserts that 
Thomas does not include God within his metaphysical system.  Thomas’ metaphysics is 
concerned with ens commune, and God is related only as the principle of ens commune.  
A developed understanding of Thomas’ analogy of being has allowed him to ascertain 
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how Aquinas avoided onto-theology. Although Aquinas escapes fault in this area, Marion 
nonetheless blames the misunderstanding on those developers of Thomas who came after 
him and distorted his original intent.  As concerns the second requirement, Marion makes 
the claim that Aquinas’ teaching on causality is more nuanced and is best understood 
within the framework of creation.  This causality of God must not be strictly tied to effi-
cient causality.  Shanley further explains Marion's position when he writes that "creation 
implies a unique and transcendent kind of origination that is not locatable within some 
larger conceptual framework provided by all-encompassing univocal notions of being or 
causality as in subsequent onto-theological schemas.”33 And finally, Thomas avoids any 
notion of God as causa sui. This fact Marion believes is evidenced in the deep belief of 
Thomas that the self causation of esse is incoherent. Further, Marion makes known that in 
the arguments for the existence of God, God himself is exempt from the principles of 
causality. 
 After Marion's rehabilitation of Aquinas it may be asked if Thomas is adequately 
reflected in Marion's portrayal. This treatment by Marion may indeed establish that 
Aquinas escapes many of the earlier indictments leveled at him under the three meta-
physical problems mentioned by Heidegger, but does this new portrayal of Thomas accu-
rately reflect his thoughts as regards the possibility of metaphysics?  An Aquinas without 
metaphysics is indeed a stretch.  One can recognize that Marion has grown in his under-
standing of the thought of Aquinas, but deciding that all future Thomistic studies should 
be viewed through the lens of Marion and postmodern thinkers would certainly draw a 
negative response from many Thomists. 
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 Although Marion has seen his way clear to exonerate Thomas in this one respect 
he has not gone so far as to see the merits of metaphysics as it concerns all reality other 
than God. He is set on moving past metaphysics on all fronts. Additionally, having cor-
rected his original reading of Thomas he nonetheless remains skeptical of Thomism.  As 
Guarino mentions, “while Marion’s thought continues to undergo modifications, his 
original suspicions about the use of ‘being-language’ when speaking about God still in-
form a good deal of his work.”34 I believe Guarino’s concluding remarks adequately re-
flect a respect for the work of Marion, yet point out how Thomas not only engaged in a 
discussion of God by way of the via negativa, but positively asserted that concepts may 
aid in our understanding of God.  Marion may choose to focus upon God as gift, but 
Aquinas would “insist that even this transcendent and sovereign Gift truly ‘is’ and so ex-
ists-and is intelligible-even if ultimately beyond our understanding.”35 
But while denying that concepts can offer comprehensive knowledge of 
God, Aquinas insists that they have some role in designating him.  There 
is a limited intelligibility afforded by the “pure” perfections such as good-
ness, wisdom, and love.  Such intelligibility is demanded by the very be-
lief in God's manifestation to us, by the faith of the Church in the mediat-
ing role of creedal and doctrinal statements.  Such statements must have 
intelligible content if Christian doctrine is to be anything more than a mere 
cipher of God's existence.  Aquinas engages analogy, then, precisely as a 
"form" to aid in the intelligibility of the impossible gift of revelation.  It is 
not a totalizing form; it clearly respects the balance between presence and 
absence that is essential to Scripture, the creeds, and Christian doctrine.  It 
need not even be the only or exclusive form, but it is perhaps the best form 
for intelligently explaining in the dyad of manifestation and hiddenness 
inherent in Revelation itself.36 
 
 
 At times it seems that Marion's desire to avoid traditional thought leads him to 
new difficulties.  For example, while trying to liberate phenomena and allowing it to fully 
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reveal itself, while removing all constraints, Marion will go so far as to rebuff logic. He 
states that, “as we know, theology contradicts logic."37 Now this brief utterance in the 
midst of a larger treatise on the openness required of phenomena deserves greater atten-
tion than can be given here, but it does indicate a willingness to take his thought in what-
ever direction he sees fit regardless of how it relates to the well established rules of 
thought which are part of the heritage of the Christian faith. It is not only logic, but also 
the legitimacy given to the principle of non-contradiction that Marion takes issue with.38 I 
mention these two points as they stand in notable contrast with John Paul and Fides et 
Ratio. Logic, Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Non-Contradiction are asserted by 
the Pontiff as indispensable to philosophy. Although Marion does not provide an expla-
nation for his understanding of the principle of sufficient reason, he obviously sees it as a 
confining principle.  At times it seems as if Marion views metaphysics, including govern-
ing principles, as an unnecessary imposition upon reality rather than an explanation of the 
working of things. Even in undertaking a study of the divine, certain principles may be 
applied to God not as a constraint, but as an explanation of His very being. Asserting the 
intelligibility of the world can be a tribute to God as an indication of the positive outpour-
ing of Truth that follows upon creation. Once one takes the necessary precautions, as 
Thomas has done, conceptual thinking may arguably be the most fruitful path for intellec-
tual achievement. Marion, on the other hand in seeking to reformulate our thought may 
be calling for what is “unnatural” to the human person. Certainly the model offered in 
Christian revelation, most especially the Gospels, does not refrain from using concepts in 
the process of trying to understand God. In other words, as Marion is very clear about the 
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primacy of revelation does he in fact take seriously enough a biblically based model 
which does not forgo the use of concepts? 
 Thomas wisely couples negative and positive theology in a manner respectful of 
the sovereignty of God and respectful of the intellect of human persons. As Shanley 
notes: 
[Marion has an] exclusive emphasis on the via negativa  at the expense of 
the via causalitatis and the via eminentiae. While Marion is right to argue 
that the apophatic side of Aquinas needs to be retrieved in light of the 
Heideggerian critique, he ultimately pushes that interpratation interpreta-
tion too far.  Marion's reading simply cannot be reconciled with Aquinas's 
position that certain terms can be predicated of God positively and sub-
stantially (though non-quidditatively) through analogy.  At the risk of 
oversimplification, it seems that once again analogy is at the root of 
Marion's misunderstanding of Aquinas. For all of his progress on analogy, 
Marion still seemed somewhat under the spell of Scotus in so far as he 
continues to construe analogy as an account of how formal concepts can 
apply to God rather than as an account of the lived use of language in reli-
gious affirmations.39 
 
 
It is worth noting, that the apophatic tradition, while maintaining an esteemed place 
within Christian theology, has never stood alone, but has been coupled with positive the-
ology. This is in line with much Catholic theology, which considers the bringing into play 
of a both/and type of an approach as opposed to an either/or as most fruitful. 
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The Idol and the Icon40 
 Only by reading Marion’s sustained reflections may one be brought more closely 
to an understanding of his philosophical and theological perspective. Although no intro-
duction is sufficient to get to the heart of Marion’s thought I will offer one author’s at-
tempt that may provide a framework for the topic. Calcagno offers as clear an account of 
Marion’s Idol and Icon comparison that one can find. He writes:  
Both idols and icons are not beings, but they indicate a “manner of being 
of beings.” An idol, as the Greek root (eidô- I see) suggests, has to do with 
vision and the visible.  Idols, like the great statue of Athena overlooking 
the Piraeus of an ancient Athens, were designed to be looked at, they are 
the objects on which we fix our gaze.  Their splendor and brilliance com-
mand our attention. The idol tries to capture what is unique about a deity.  
What makes the idol visible, however, is not the idol itself, but our gaze 
upon it. “Le regard fait l’idole, non l’idole le regard.” It is our intentional 
act of viewing the idol that empowers the idol itself. The divine is anthro-
pomorphized by our gaze upon the idol, for it is we who decide what to 
see as unique (das Einzige) to the idol. In other words, we create the divin-
ity. God becomes trapped in our gaze. God becomes a concept in that 
He/She is seized (capere) by and confined to our own understanding.  In 
so far as God is reduced to our own conceptual categories and understand-
ings, God no longer has Her/His own identity, it is superimposed.  Our 
concepts of God become idolatrous and that they limit an essentially inde-
terminable being to our own understanding. God is made a concept, a 
“Dieu”.41    
 
 
To avoid idolatry Marion sets within his sights what he considers the "first idolatry."  
"The first idolatry can be established rigorously starting from metaphysics to the extent 
that its essence depends on ontological difference, though ‘unthought as such’ (Heideg-
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ger).”42 Marion believes that the concepts employed by metaphysics take the place of the 
One who is beyond categorization. Subsequently, our attempt to think God or worship 
God from within these categories results in an idolatrous act, one that is an encounter 
with a god of our own making.  
 The icon, in contrast to the idol, “refers not to the viewer, but beyond itself; the 
icon is a visible reference to the invisible. Nevertheless, Marion argues that in making 
this reference, the icon does not thereby contain it.…What is clear is that the image is not 
intended to reduce the original to its own dimensions, but allows us to move through its 
contemplation to the worship of the invisible God”43 It is hard not to see the beauty and 
reverence of such a reflection. It stands as a stark reminder that the God of Judeo-
Christian belief is beyond us, beyond our categories. And yet, as we have pointed out St. 
Thomas’ theology offers a view of analogy which frees him of this charge of idolatry.  
 At the root of Marion’s wish to dismantle metaphysics stands the challenge of 
some (like Heidegger and Nietzsche) who feel they have dismantled the “God of meta-
physics.” Marion is then coming to the rescue and is hoping to put in place of this “god of 
metaphysics” the God of revelation. This God is so far beyond concepts that he is ren-
dered “undismantable.” Much of the crux of this debate is centered on whether one thinks 
that traditional metaphysics in general, and Thomism specifically, is able to escape the 
accusations leveled against them by Marion and some other postmodern thinkers. Cer-
tainly Thomists like Norris Clarke hold that a modified Thomism is sufficient to meet the 
challenge. Clarke is convinced that Heidegger’s lack of familiarity with existential Thom-
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ism was problematic.44 Had Heidegger encountered the “remembrance of being” present 
there, the state of modern philosophy might have been quite different. 
 And yet, if metaphysics were reinstated and the arguments of its detractors were 
overcome, would the work of Marion have any merit? I think yes. Its apophatic perspec-
tive is a welcome counterpart to positive theology. The contribution of Pseudo Dionysius 
and the via negativa continue as necessary within the heritage of Christian theology. 
 The reflection upon the idol and icon bears fruit. One can worship a god of one’s 
own creation. In this meditation Marion places the emphasis upon the other. “For Marion, 
the icon also functions as a locus for a significant reversal. What is made visible in the 
icon is the gaze of the invisible other, who looks at my gaze, or whose look crosses my 
gaze.”45 Instead of gazing upon the idol as an act of ego, gazing upon the icon is a tran-
scendent exercise which focuses upon the other and empties the ego. Horner mentions 
that here we find Marion displaying the influence of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Balthasar’s 
theological perspective includes a belief that what is important is not “our experience of 
God, but God’s experience of us.” 
 As Marion has progressed in his understanding of Thomism, and has admitted as 
much, the next question is whether or not Marion can concede one of his most central 
convictions, the absolute need to eradicate from the language of theology all concepts 
referring to God? This in fact is central. He writes: 
But as the idol can exercise its measure of the divine by concept, since the 
gaze as well can invisibly reflect its own aim and in it dismiss the invisi-
ble, the icon also can proceed conceptually, provided at least that the con-
cept renounce comprehending the incomprehensible, to attempt to con-
ceive it, hence also to receive it, in its own excessiveness. But precisely, 
can such concepts be conceived? The only concept that can serve as an in-
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telligible medium for the icon is one that lets itself be measured by the ex-
cessiveness of the invisible that enters into visibility through infinite 
depth, hence that itself speaks or promises to speak this infinite depth, 
where the visible and invisible become acquainted.46 
 
 
Although ambiguous, this statement seems to indicate that Marion is willing to allow for 
concepts only in a manner in which concepts are devoid of positive meaning. When a 
concept tends towards establishing an affirmative attribute of God, especially as this re-
lates to being, it must be dismissed as idolatrous. Any thinking in which being appears is 
overly confining and is inappropriate for God. As Verhack writes, “Even more than Hei-
degger, Marion emphasizes the functional character of the ‘metaphysical’ conception of 
God. According to Marion, not only is a grounded being the highest, but the highest, by 
virtue of its function as final ground, is itself grounded by the being-or, more specifically, 
by and from the being in its need of a ground. This logical-functional character of the 
metaphysical conception of God would be the reason why the metaphysical conception of 
God must be abandoned, in order to prepare the way for ‘a more divine god.’”47  
 This total stripping of affirmative meaning from concepts is in the end counter-
productive. Continuing with the image provided by Marion, the icon is distinguished 
from the idol, and appears to be different as a consequence of the intention present in the 
gaze. It is nonetheless a medium with positive content. Although the icon is spoken of as 
a window to the transcendent, it is not clear glass, but contains substance. Icons in their 
own way require and follow rules or patterns of conceptual construction. The color, form 
and symbol employed are not haphazardly concocted. This point could be further drawn 
out. Perhaps the emphasis lies on the intention of the one gazing. If this is so I think it fair 
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to ask if an intentional acknowledgement of the limitations of conceptual thought on the 
part of those engaged in conceptual positive theology is enough to keep them from idola-
try? 
 Marion’s desire to leave the realm of ontology leads him to another consideration. 
As Oliver Davies puts it, “Marion finds his difference which is ‘indifferent to ontological 
difference’ in an ontology of creation. It is this creative principle which ensures that ‘be-
ing and non-being can be divided according to something other than Being’, thus ‘out-
witting’ or deflecting beings away from Being, and towards the ‘gift.’48 
The Gift 
 In order to escape the confines of metaphysical thought once again, Marion at-
tempts a reflection upon gift. These brief presentations of Marion’s major motifs admit-
tedly do not do justice to the beauty and nuance contained within them. These presenta-
tions are instead aimed at giving voice to Marion so as to provide a minimally adequate a 
grasp of his reasoning for launching an attack upon metaphysics. 
 Davies defines Marion’s gift “as a non-metaphysical principle, which is expres-
sive of free, divine donation that resists all manipulation, appropriation and contamina-
tion by gaze- or human-centered perspectivalism.”49  Note once again that Marion’s de-
sire is to protect the divine from violence by way of human action or belief which would 
go beyond the apophatic approach. Horner provides three significant insights into 
Marion’s treatment of Gift which further elucidates this point. First, “the gift of God is 
only given within withdrawal; there is a relationship, in other words, between gift and 
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abandonment (the two movements of one distance).” God’s absence is indicative of the 
process which takes place in the interaction of giver, gift and receiver. This dwelling 
upon distance “enables Marion to imagine a giving (of God) that would not be an appro-
priation.”50  Second, “Marion explains that the gift traverses distance only in order that, 
in withdrawing, the giver can be ‘read on the gift.’”51  
 This distance once again is stressed by Marion as a necessary portion of an inter-
action with God that does not allow for our laying hold of him. Third, “the gift is itself 
no-thing, that is, no thing other than the capacity to give: ‘to receive the gift amounts to 
receiving the giving act, for God gives nothing except the movement of the infinite ken-
osis of charity….’”52 With this notion of gift one thing is certain: it does not sound like 
fun at the Marion house at Christmas! A question that may be asked of Marion in relation 
to this explanation of giving and the gift is, does God in fact deliver?  
 On the other hand, Horner notes that John D. Caputo’s reading of Marion asserts 
“that Marion’s commitment to the givenness of God also implies a commitment to God’s 
ultimate, if not conceptual presence.”53 What distinguishes Marion from Derrida is a 
givenness that is present in Marion which is lacking in Derrida. Verhack is helpful in tak-
ing this reflection upon gift to its next level. He writes the “the gift, says Marion, liber-
ates by its indifference with respect to being/beings.  Ultimately, the gift also liberates 
itself from being; it liberates itself as it were from its own engagement in the delivery of 
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being. How can it do this? By exercising itself as gift in the name of what comes after it 
and is greater than it. According to Marion, this is ‘charity itself.’”54  
 Guarino also draws out the distinctions between Derrida and Marion as they relate 
to the gift. As both believe that we must maintain an openness to the “totally other,” the 
“impossible” who can shatter what we think as possible, “for Derrida, the impossible 
never comes; it never has an actual presence.” It is here that these two thinkers part ways. 
“For Marion, on the contrary, the impossible is not that which structurally can never 
come.  It is, rather, excess and saturation; it is the gift par excellence, the gift which over-
flows every attempt to "comprehend" its givenness, to be fully understood.55 Examples of 
these saturated phenomena are birth, death, love, etc., those experiences which leave us 
speechless and grasping for concepts and words. This ultimately leads Horner to describe 
what Marion is attempting to achieve as an experience which “defies the capacity of the 
recipient to present it as any thing.”56 Once again one may ask whether this renders con-
cepts useless or just limited? 
Love 
 Marion’s motifs conclude in a reflection upon love, and it is precisely here where 
one finds the culmination of his thought. Horner begins her presentation of Marion’s 
view of love by quoting from his 1970 work, Amour de Dieu, amour des hommes, where 
he states “Love alone is worthy of our faith. The revelation that Christ brings, that ‘God 
is love’ (1 John 4:18) shows us not only what we can know… but, moreover, how we can 
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know… Love constitutes the content as well as the advancement of faith.”57  She further 
points out that “God’s first name is love (not being), love is the content of revelation, and 
revelation is only to be known by loving; this is essentially Marion’s complete theologi-
cal manifesto.”58  She then asks of Marion key questions which are also pertinent to other 
motifs which he employs. How is one to know? What is it that one knows? Marion places 
himself in a precarious position by stripping from his system any connection to concepts. 
One way that he attempts to answer such questions is to make the distinction that is found 
in French as well as other romance languages, of  the two words used for knowing (con-
naître and savoir). The knowledge that Marion proposes that we have of God is non-
conceptual, not thought, but rather received.59 It is more an act of the will than of the in-
tellect. What Horner goes on to explain is that for Marion the choosing for or against God 
is a choice that is non-rational in that it transcends the ability of intellect. Here love pos-
sesses its own logic in the act of love. Marion even goes so far as to call it an “insane” 
choice for or against God. 
 For many this pushes one to the limit. The very pertinent question remains, who is 
the God to whom you offer love and worship? Given the pluralism that is now familiar to 
all, this is a just question. Knowledge of history and of world religions clearly establishes 
that all are not worshipping the same God. The demands of Yahweh are not the demands 
of Moloch or Baal. Does this abandonment to an “unknown God” extend to Christians 
alone?  If it is extended to all, do creedal differences in fact matter? Stripped of concep-
tual distinctions one is left in obscurity. For Marion, this obscurity may in fact be a wel-
come “cloud of unknowing,” but without the counterbalance of a positive conceptual the-
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ology there is only confusion. With this in mind one may sympathize with the conceptu-
ally replete work of Frank Sheed in his Theology and Sanity. There he states that “it 
would be a strange God Who could be loved better by being known less.”60 
 Although Marion takes his name for God from scripture, he seems to forget that 
Christ himself speaks of “God” in conceptual terms. This term seems undeniably concep-
tually charged and yet is employed by Christ himself. Even the metaphysically charged 
term most avoided by Marion, that of “I AM,” is used by Jesus as he hints of his own 
identity.61 It may again be asked if by choosing one name, that of love, Marion does 
damage to a larger portrait of God which is able to include all the scripturally and di-
vinely revealed names for God. Once again the either/or approach impoverishes the theo-
logical heritage. Marion is unable to allow the metaphysician the legitimate breadth of 
treatment that he or she may actually have. From his In Excess he writes, “The theolo-
gian’s job is to silence the Name and in this way let it give us one- while the metaphysi-
cian is obsessed with reducing the Name to presence, and so defeating the Name.”62 Cal-
cagno interjects that Marion is able to level such accusations since he has never justified 
his reading of the metaphysical tradition, but instead has claimed his reading of meta-
physics as axiomatic.63  
 Even as Marion finds the “I AM” the weakest of names, not all find it so. Pope 
Benedict XVI sees in this name a revelation that in the end stands against idolatry as an 
expression of the one name in contrast to the many. He writes: 
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The mysterious name of God, revealed from the burning bush, a name 
which separates this God from all other divinities with their many names 
and simply asserts being, “I am,” already presents a challenge to the no-
tion of myth, to which Socrates’ attempt to vanquish and transcend myth 
stand in close analogy. Within the Old testament, the process which 
started at the burning bush came to new maturity at the time of the Exile, 
when the God of Israel, an Israel now deprived of its land and worship, 
was proclaimed as the God of heaven and earth and described in simple 
formula which echoes the words uttered at the burning bush: “I am.” This 
new understanding of God is accompanied by a kind of enlightenment, 
which finds stark expression in the mockery of the gods who are merely 
the work of human hands (cf. Ps 115). 
 
 
 Bill Riordan points out that the names of Being and Love do not have to stand in 
contradiction, but in fact in the mind of Pope Paul VI were thought to express the very 
same reality. Paul VI writes: 
We believe that this only God is as absolutely one in his infinitely holy es-
sence as in his other perfections: in his almighty power, his infinite 
knowledge, his providence, his will, his love. He is “He who is” as he re-
vealed to Moses… “He is Love,” as the apostle John has taught us… so 
that these two names, Being and Love, express ineffably the same divine 
essence of him who, “dwelling in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6:16), is 
in himself above every name and every created thing and every created in-
tellect.64 
 
 
The Positive Contribution 
 Guarino advances a number of reasons why Marion as well as other postmodern 
thinkers make a worthy contribution to the philosophical and theological project. He first 
notes that Marion, Levinas and others should be applauded for their determined attempt 
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to help make theology digestible to postmodern thinkers who might otherwise reject a 
discussion of God dismissively.65 Next, he commends postmodern thought in general for 
in that it “demands that theology maintain a sense of openness toward the unfamiliar and 
the ‘other,’ awakening us in the process to the ‘otherness’ of God, thereby rescuing us 
from latent rationalism, from theological Cartesianism, and from the ‘naturalism’ en-
demic to human experience. Postmodernism helps us live with contingencies and differ-
ences, correcting a provincial monism and warning us against a lapse into a univocity of 
thought or language.”66 As concerns Marion specifically, Guarino offers two reasons why 
he believes that there is hope that Marion’s work can be incorporated into the greater 
theological tradition. First, he notes that Marion’s reevaluation of Aquinas gives evidence 
for some move towards opening to some type of first philosophy. This he believes in 
spite of the heavily apophatic reading of Thomas’ work.  Second, He quotes Marion from 
his 1997 “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Summary for Theologians,” in The Post-
modern God, where he states that “phenomenology need not have recourse, at least in the 
first instance, to the notion of being or Being.”67 Here Guarino places great emphasis 
upon the clause which states “at least in the first instance” to assert that Marion may be 
open to some foundation, as mentioned in Fides et Ratio, where John Paul calls for phe-
nomenology to become grounded. And on a final note, Guarino points out what others 
have also said about Marion’s approach to theology. It reads at times more like poetry 
than prose. Poetry has its advantages, especially as it is employed towards the end that 
Marion has in mind. It is most useful in expressing the non-conceptual, and yet packs a 
punch. Marion, as has been noted before, seeks a new means of expression. Guarino 
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thinks this new expression is “curiously approximating the nonreligious aesthetic and po-
etic mysticism of Adorno and the later Heidegger.68 Once again I would ask if it is neces-
sary for the poet to call for the elimination of prose? Could not Marion allow his work to 
be seen as a powerful reflection upon certain needed themes? Could he not stand as the 
apophatic poet of our times without having to be the voice that eliminates all others? 
Challenges to Marion 
 To begin with, not everyone who is engaged in truth-seeking in the modern age 
has accepted postmodernism and its axiomatic principles of thought. What Marion is at-
tempting to do is so rooted in postmodern thought that it may be forgotten that there are 
other philosophers who attempt to meet the challenges posed by contemporary thought in 
other ways. They may not find it necessary to entertain the solutions posed by Marion. 
Postmodern thinkers tell us that we should rejoice in varied unconnected voices, but not 
everyone is satisfied with this approach. Horner mentions the criticism offered by David 
Harvey who states that, “obsessed with deconstruction and delegitimating every form of 
argument they encounter, they can end only in condemning their own validity claims to 
the point where nothing remains of any basis for reasoned action. Postmodernism has us 
accepting the reifications and partitionings, actually celebrating the activity of masking 
and cover-up, all the fetishisms of locality, place, or social grouping, while denying that 
kind of meta-theory which can grasp the political-economic processes … that are becom-
ing ever more universalizing in their depth, intensity, reach and power over daily life.”69 
Horner offers an alternative and more sympathetic assessment of postmodernism. She 
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states, that “on the other hand, if it were to be recognized, not that there is no meaning, 
and not that there is every meaning, but that making meaning involves judgments, 
choices, and decisions, then deconstruction could bring us to the point of discerning the 
ethical and appreciating the nature of faith.”70 Though this may speak to postmodernism 
in general, what of Marion? He is unapologetically in favor of not only doing away with 
metaphysics but with our very thought as it has been traditionally conceived. As previ-
ously noted, Marion  advocates distance in relation to God which does not permit of a 
correspondence of concepts with reality.71 Guarino, who gives a fair hearing to Marion, 
also offers a cautionary note: 
The danger with Marion is that one suspects his condemnation of meta-
physics and his concomitant interest in Dionysian thought, in agapic and 
mystical theology, leads to an assertion of Christian truth shorn of an intel-
ligible structure. Theology is about “unknowing” and about “gift,” but any 
attempt to secure this logically, even a posteriori, as an exercise in the fi-
des quaerens intellectum,  seems nothing more than an unwarranted ra-
tionalism that ultimately obscures and occludes the mystery of the given 
(divine) phenomena.72 
 
 
In addition, Guarino makes mention of the position of Fides et Ratio concerning a 
call for foundation. Marion stands squarely in opposition to the encyclical.73 Barring the 
argument from authority, Guarino asks some penetrating questions. “Does Marion allow 
the truth of Christian doctrine, and the classical characteristics predicated of it, to be theo-
retically sustained? Is it enough to say that it “appears” to men and women of all ages and 
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cultures without asking about the very nature of human beings and their ability to grasp 
abiding meanings and enduring truth within cultural and conceptual change?”74 
 A few others pose questions to Marion. Bruce Benson thinks the attempt to 
change the entire direction of our thinking and to eliminate all concepts is dangerous and 
inadvisable. “What’s much more worrisome is whether there is something inherently 
problematic with the project itself. Does Marion’s reduction to pure givenness obliterate 
the very conditions that make it possible to understand and appreciate that which is 
given? Put in a theological context, does the revealed Logos break through as a “pure 
phenomenon” without any horizon? Or does that Logos depend upon the context of, say, 
Old Testament prophesies for its very identity (at least for us)?”75 
 Calcagno thinks that Marion fails in a number of key areas. I will mention two of 
them here. The first concerns whether he addresses causality properly. “Even though 
Marion reads history very narrowly by pointing to God as causa sui, he never carries out 
the implications of cause and effect in relation to our own being in the world. … We 
know by experience that we are not the cause of our own being. Traditionally, metaphy-
sicians view this as signifying that the being of creatures must have been ultimately 
caused by a first cause or creator. … We are analogously related to God existentially. 
God transcends us, but is also immanent. This is articulated in the analogia entis.” Sec-
ondly, Calcagno thinks that Marion ignores the various ways Christians have traditionally 
spoken of knowing God. He points out how Edith Stein wrote of three ways in her small 
essay, Ways to know God. She includes “natural knowledge, Revelation and personal ex-
periences of or encounters with God.” Natural knowledge would of course be limited. 
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This is indicated in the distinction drawn between philosophy and theology. He writes 
that “for Thomas and the Mediaevals, there was an hierarchy of knowing, especially as 
related to God. One cannot help but wonder if Marion has created an apparent, artificial 
lacuna in the metaphysical tradition where one need not exist in the first place, for love 
and being are compatible, but to be thought within the framework of different levels of 
knowing.”76  
 From a quite different angle Davies asks of Marion whether his placement of 
Goodness over Being is indeed sustainable? He writes, “it is only through implicit self-
possession that we can ground the possibility of kenotic goodness. If a virtuous act is to 
put ourselves at risk for the sake of another, then some degree of self-possession as self-
awareness is intrinsic to that act.”77 In other words he is asking if goodness, at least as 
pertains to us requires the primacy of being over goodness. How would such a reflection 
apply to God? 
 A few more questions come to mind. How are we to understand the course of 
Christian history and tradition in light of Marion’s analysis? Traditionally the Church has 
seen in the encounter with Greco-Roman thought the providence of God. Are we to be-
lieve that from Pseudo-Dionysius until Marion we have been engaged in idolatry? Cer-
tainly the philosophical and theological work that has taken place since that time would 
represent a wrong turn for Marion. Next, I have been struck all through Marion’s work 
with the questions that are not addressed. These are the philosophical questions that fall 
within the tradition of metaphysics and can not be answered without recourse to this sci-
ence. For instance, in In Excess Marion treats the topic of flesh. Horner states that for 
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Marion, “flesh gives the ego to itself; there is no experience of I that is not given as flesh. 
It is also the sole means by which the world is phenomenalised.”78 In other words there is 
a treatment of the “one and the many” in some form. Can one call for an end to meta-
physics and then fall back upon its questions and proposed categories? In addition, upon 
reading Marion it is fair to ask if both the esoteric language and non-conceptual thought 
end up in a form of Gnosticism. That is, does he claim to know what it is that limits God? 
His thought seems a far cry from the parables offered by Jesus himself which were un-
derstandable even to the Galilean fishermen. His “pure” apophaticism seems unrelated to 
the enfleshment of God in history. 
 There is one final point of interest brought out by Edith Stein by way of Calcagno 
concerning God’s revelation in the “I Am” of Exodus. Stein thinks this reflection upon 
being (God’s Being) is insightful. She states that the Mediaevals saw in such a revelation 
by God not an indication that God was a “being” or that he existed, but that “this pro-
nouncement on the part of God is to be interpreted as God saying that God fully is and 
admits no non-being (Nichtsein). God is a positivity, a plentitude (Fülle).” And second, 
the “I Am” is “actually God identifying Himself/Herself as ‘Sein in Person,’ Being in 
person.”79 
 So the purely negative, apophatic emphasis, apart from a cataphatic focus, like 
that of Stein, leads to a God of the abyss, not to a God of plentitude. The negative may be 
necessary, but it is always appropriately linked to the fullness of God. One may experi-
ence the dark night, but the splendor of the beatific vision has the last word, not the dark-
ness. In addition, no one lives in total darkness. Reflections of the good, the true, the 
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beautiful and unified are unavoidable. A focus upon a God of plentitude of being can al-
low one to find glimpses of the divine in such things. 
Section 3: Gianni Vattimo 
 Gianni Vattimo was born in Turin on January 4, 1936. He studied philosophy at 
the University of Turin, continued his academic pursuits, and was influenced by the work 
of two notable professors, Karl Löwith and Hans-Georg Gadamer. He was first named 
assistant professor at Turin in 1964 and professor of Aesthetics in 1969. He later became 
Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in Turin in 1982 and since that time has become a 
noted speaker and activist. 
 I intend in this section to present another anti-metaphysical thinker whose per-
spective can be considered alongside Tresmontant, John Paul and Marion. Vattimo’s 
thoroughly postmodern philosophical approach has much in common with Marion. He 
too advocates a non-foundationalist, non-conceptual perspective. With Marion, he calls 
for the elimination of metaphysics. He likewise finds the current hermeneutical concerns 
offered by many postmodern thinkers indicting enough to warrant the end of the meta-
physical thought of the past. His thinking, more so than Marion’s, has been heavily influ-
enced by Nietzsche, and how this influence is born out in his philosophy and theology 
will be explored. 
 Even though Vattimo and Marion swim in the same pond they are notably differ-
ent fish in important ways. They both draw from the same postmodern vision of the 
world and suggest a similar path for the future, however, their methods and emphases are 
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different. Both clearly envision a similar world for Catholic thought in the future, and 
both claim at root to be non-foundationalist.80  
Vattimo and Postmodernism 
 Vattimo characterizes the current climate within religious life, after its contact 
with postmodern philosophy, as profoundly tentative. He tells of how this has played out 
in his own life, how he moved from a boyish adherence to Church belief and practice to a 
more liberated and postmodern perspective. He pursued his university education with the 
goal of developing a new Christian humanism. After encountering the works of Jacques 
Maritain and the neo-Thomistic movement, he wrote on Aristotle for his doctoral thesis. 
He later encountered Nietzsche and Heidegger, both of whom exerted a considerable af-
fect upon his thinking.81 This study eventually culminated in the construction of a post-
modern philosophy uniquely his own. It is based on the conviction that: 
It may be possible to say that the epoch in which we live today, which is 
rightly called postmodern, is the epoch in which reality can no longer be 
conceived of as a structure solidly tied to a sole foundation that philosophy 
would have the task of knowing, or perhaps that religion would have the 
task of adoring. The pluralistic world in which we live can not be inter-
preted by an ideology that wants to unify it at all costs in the name of a 
sole truth, which some academic disciplines would have the task and ca-
pacity of knowing.82 
 
 
Concerning a metaphysical starting point he states that “for much of the twentieth-
century it is no longer possible to think of Being as foundation….” Vattimo attributes this 
loss of foundation to a number of causes, both related to historical developments in the 
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modern era. The first is the recognition of a kinship between foundational thought and 
totalitarianism, the dangers of which are only too apparent at this point in history. The 
second reason is found in our discovery and contact with other cultures, an encounter 
which leads to the third factor, the abolition of a unilinear history.  As we gain an under-
standing of these newly found peoples and their historical narratives, we confront the 
need to overcome a linear, Eurocentric understanding of the world.83 
Vattimo and Metaphysics 
 Paul J. Griffiths points out that Vattimo is the Italian counterpart of the American 
Richard Rorty. Although of differing philosophical and religious traditions, they agree 
substantially upon the place of metaphysics within modernity. Griffiths writes concerning 
the elements upon which they agree: 
The first element in the story is that metaphysical thought-also called 
"onto-theology," “realism,” “objectivism," and so on--has been decisively 
abandoned by the West.  The abandonment of metaphysics, as Vattimo 
puts it, is the form of thought that corresponds to our epoch. Next comes 
the claim that this now-abandoned metaphysical thought is incompatible 
with democracy and the exercise of civic responsibility and virtue.  And 
finally there's the claim that religion, though slow to achieve this, is mov-
ing inexorably in the same post-metaphysical direction: away from being a 
contributor to the ordering of the public sphere, and toward being a private 
comfort that may foster civic virtue.84 
 
 
In agreement with Marion, Vattimo sees the abandoning of metaphysics as the logical 
outcome of our coming to grips with philosophical progress in the West. Vattimo finds 
that the author who most clearly explains this movement within the history of philosophy 
is Wilhelm Dilthey.  "Dilthey retraces two stages within the history of European meta-
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physics: the ancients and that of the moderns.  The latter was destined to end with the dis-
solution of metaphysics accomplished by the Kantian critique and its developments up to 
Dilthey’s historicism.”85 Vattimo continues, "Dilthey writes that whereas metaphysics as 
a science has become impossible, ‘the metaphysical [sic] element of our life as personal 
experience, that is, as moral-religious truth, remains...but experiences of a person's will 
are exempt from a universally valid presentation, which would be coercive and obligatory 
for every other intellect."86 It does not take much deducing to see that the concept of truth 
here proposed is more fluid than has been traditionally presented. This concept of truth 
will be fleshed out a bit further in another section. 
 Griffiths explains how Vattimo characterizes our overcoming of the metaphysical 
captivity of the past in light of the logic of the incarnation.  "In Vattimo's view it is some-
thing intrinsic and proper to Christianity: God's self emptying incarnation began a proc-
ess that gradually emptied Christianity of metaphysical lusts, with the result that at least 
for right-thinking  quasi-Catholics  like himself, Christianity can now be understood ex-
haustively as a ‘call to practice.’”87 Vattimo explains the presence of metaphysics within 
Christianity as attributable in part to the neo-Platonism of Augustine. "But the endurance 
of metaphysics in Augustine, as in all Church fathers and medieval thinkers, may be un-
derstood above all in light of the social and political responsibility the Church had to take 
over after the fall of the Roman Empire. … Furthermore, the Church developed into a 
rigid structure, which was unavoidably grounded on an objectivist metaphysics and on 
scientific knowledge’s claims about the natural world-as Galileo's case shows.”88 
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 Vattimo does not believe, however, that the Church cultivated its metaphysical 
position, especially as concerns its naturalist ethics, in an attempt to retain control over 
temporal matters. Instead, he argues that these positions are the outgrowth of a hierarchi-
cal, authoritarian system. Once one is encouraged to free philosophical inquiry, which he 
believes is advocated in Fides et Ratio, metaphysics will slowly be abandoned. He con-
cludes: 
To return to the main argument, violence found its way into Christianity 
when Christianity made an alliance with metaphysics as the “science of 
Being as being,” that is, as the knowledge of first principles.  The reasons 
for this alliance and the circumstances behind it are many, beginning with 
the responsibilities the Church inherited from the dissolution of the Roman 
Empire, as the only remaining temporal power.  Another reason is the 
classical identification of Christian existence with the philosophical exis-
tence: the human being can realize humanity fully by rising to the knowl-
edge of the first principle (following the model of Plato and Plotinus), to 
be taken up into it.89 
 
 
Vattimo claims as his goal the dissolution of metaphysics. He defines it as "the dismissal 
of all doctrines, which claimed absolute and definitive values as the true description of 
Being's structures.”90 He takes as his model in this postmodern period, Joachim of Fiori, a 
controversial charismatic figure of the 1200’s.  Joachim saw the unfolding of history as 
taking place in three stages.  These three stages were, law, grace, and a more perfected 
state of grace.  Vattimo sees in the end of metaphysics both a sign and goal which is now 
taking place within the third stage.  This final stage would be characterized by an empha-
sis upon "not the letter but the spirit of Revelation."91 This end of metaphysics results in a 
new exposure to culture and pluralism which calls for interpretation rather than objective 
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accounts of reality.92 Vattimo asserts that the overcoming of metaphysics does not entail 
a better truth superseding previous truth, since that would amount to another type of 
metaphysics.  Rather, "metaphysics and metanarratives end because they are no longer 
necessary or credible, like the moral God who, in Nietzsche, dies because the faithful 
themselves recognize that he is a superfluous lie.”93 
Vattimo and Weak Thought 
 What Vattimo proposes in place of metaphysics is what he calls “weak thought.” 
Weak thought (pensiero debole) is what Vattimo describes as the simple recognition that 
in light of the postmodern condition of the world (mentioned above) we are no longer 
able to speak as if we had certain knowledge as was done in the past. This weakening is 
called for in response to the insights of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, who believed that 
“the metaphysical tradition is the tradition of ‘violent’ thinking.”94A hermeneutical stress 
on meaning derived from interpretation in conjunction with a broad exposure to culture 
and histories sustains this conviction. “What I intend to argue is that the West is essen-
tially Christian to the extent that the meaning of its own history appears as the “twilight 
Being,” that is, the diminishment of reality’s solidity through all the procedures of disso-
lution of objectivity brought about by modernity.”95 This movement has a positive result, 
according to Vattimo. "The dissolution of metaphysics generates an openness to religious 
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experience in the philosophical thought, culture, and collective mentality of our soci-
ety."96 
Vattimo and Nietzsche 
 Since much of Vattimo's thought is rooted in Nietzsche97, a brief excursus into the 
thought of Nietzsche (inasmuch as it affects Vattimo's view of metaphysics) is in order.  
Vattimo was first influenced by Nietzsche as he encountered his famous announcement 
that "God is dead."98  This pronouncement, explains Vattimo, is not an atheistic claim.  
To make such a claim would indicate one's ability to access absolute truth.  Nietzsche 
makes no such claim.  Instead, the God who is dead is the moral, metaphysical god.  In 
other words, God (at least the god who has been proclaimed and known up till this point) 
is superfluous.99 Nietzsche's contribution is then a welcome one.  As the concept of God 
that Vattimo struggled with was eradicated, he was then free to consider alternative un-
derstandings of God.  Vattimo certainly acknowledges the validity of religious experi-
ence, and was heartened by Nietzsche’s writings. 
My argument is that, if philosophy recognizes that it can no longer be 
atheistic because the collapse of the metanarratives of metaphysics, it can 
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find in this awareness the basis for a critical position on that turn to relig-
ion and its dangerous fundamentalist features....To sum up: since philoso-
phy no longer has reasons for justifying atheism, it must grant some le-
gitimacy to religious experience, though only in so far as it recognizes the 
end of metaphysics.100 
 
 
In light of the above, I think it fair to say that Vattimo is an extremely ardent proponent 
of the end of metaphysics.  For this reason, both he and Marion stand in stark contrast to 
the thought and work of both Tresmontant and John Paul. 
 To further explain how the nihilism of Nietzsche is reconciled with Vattimo's be-
lief system which extols the religious experience I turn to Ashley Woodward. According 
to Woodward, Vattimo "is one of the few theorists to develop a detailed account of the 
connection between nihilism and the postmodern. Vattimo's Nietzsche therefore stands as 
a useful figure of thought for determining the connection between nihilism and the post-
modern."101  Nietzsche himself defined nihilism as "the radical repudiation of value, 
meaning and desirability."102 In part, the nihilism of the postmodern age is related to the 
concept of history that was previously mentioned.  In light of the plurality of histories, 
Woodward explains three reasons why Vattimo believes that unilinear history has ended.  
First, history represents a selective perspective. Secondly, the old systems which con-
trolled the mandated perspective have been overcome, giving voice to those previously 
silent. Third, in contrast to initial fears that the spreading of media world-wide would re-
sult in a monolithic voice, the opposite has in fact occurred.  The explosion of the media 
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has resulted in a fragmented view of reality as a result of the plethora of voices which 
embody it.103  It is this entire process which has culminated in the postmodern worldview. 
  Woodward’s conclusion explains why Vattimo embraces the nihilism of 
Nietzsche, and how the overcoming of unilinear history and foundational thought can be 
positively viewed. Woodward exposes the nihilistic features that Vattimo finds positively 
appealing. 
These features are, firstly, that nihilism cannot be thought as a unilinear 
history, and secondly that the simple overcoming of nihilism, thought as a 
new era or a new foundation, cannot be an adequate response.  Nihilism in 
its postmodern manifestation is complete nihilism. The way to "overcom-
ing" the negative aspects of nihilism is not to overcome nihilism itself- 
thought as foundationlessness-  but to change one's attitude towards it.  
Postmodernity can be seen as a nihilistic society on Vattimo's analysis be-
cause history has ended; the West has lost its grounds for historical mean-
ing. The pluralistic proliferation of alternative knowledges, beliefs and 
values coincides with the breakdown of any shared meanings and values 
to act as common social ground.  Postmodern society, too, is founda-
tionless. Postmodernists such as Vattimo embrace nihilism, however, 
rather than seeing it as a challenge to the validity of their theories and val-
ues, because they embrace foundationlessness, seeing the tissue of erring 
as the essence of reality.  Rather than searching for a new foundation, 
postmodern nihilists are content to continue ‘living the errant in the light 
of a fundamentally different attitude.’104 
 
 
 With a dismantled ontology, where does Vattimo go from here? He moves from 
ontology to event.  Vattimo claims that the rediscovery of event is the rightful reclaiming 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition. For Vattimo, event is a continuing process, and "the his-
tory of salvation takes place through the events of modernity, and possibly of its cri-
sis...."105 He stands in contrast to the approach of Karl Barth and Emmanuel Lévinas who 
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seek to answer the questions arising at the end of historicist modernity by proposing a 
God who is "wholly other.” He opposes this approach because he believes it relies too 
heavily on a metaphysical understanding of Being, as well as failing to take seriously the 
dogma of the incarnation. Instead he writes, "the way out of modernity cannot be found 
by retrieving the concept of Being as stable and eternal-suprahistorical structure-but 
rather by thinking, more radically, of Being as event.”106  This in some ways bears re-
semblance to Marion’s elaboration upon God as givenness, but presents problems once 
again as we are asked to conceive of God in a manner foreign to most Christians. Vat-
timo’s “God/Event” seems quite different from the Judeo-Christian God as traditionally 
conceived.  
Vattimo’s Biblical Understanding107 
 Far from dismissing the biblical contribution to this discussion, Vattimo asserts 
that it is postmodernism that has allowed a rediscovery of the Scriptures in the spirit they 
were meant to be received. The new “God” of postmodern thought is admittedly not the 
God once referred to, but is more authentic. He writes that “true, it is not the God of 
metaphysics or of medieval scholasticism. But that is not the God of the Bible, of the 
book that was dissolved and dismissed by modern rationalism and absolutist metaphysics. 
… we become aware that once we discover that the vision of Being as eternal structure of 
objectivist metaphysics is untenable, we are left with the biblical notion of creation, 
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namely with the contingency and historicity of our existence.”108 Vattimo does not do 
much to establish this point other than make this assertion. Certainly one would have to 
give answer to the argument of Tresmontant, that in fact there is a biblically derived 
Christian metaphysics. And secondly, the metaphysics of Aquinas, though not always 
offering a proof text for each portion of his works, is rooted in a deep knowledge of Sa-
cred Scripture and was developed in strict accordance with this vision. 
 Vattimo comes to his biblical understanding after developing a theory of biblical 
interpretation. This is the locus of all the various readings that can be extracted from 
those pages throughout history. Vattimo begins by condemning the reading traditionally 
understood by the Church, which he considers a literal interpretation. Instead he presents 
his case for a reading of Scripture which is in accord with the postmodern age. “My ar-
gument is that our epoch must be treated as the age of the spiritual interpretation of the 
biblical message. The active presence of the Christian heritage is recognizable only if the 
literal, and authoritarian, interpretation of the Bible is abandoned.”109 What Vattimo un-
derstands as the “spiritual interpretation” is forthcoming, but his reference to the Chris-
tian heritage is problematic. Certainly an historical overview of scriptural interpretation 
would not show evidence of the type of interpretation advocated by Vattimo, at least until 
somewhat recently. Where might this heritage be found if one chooses to dismiss authori-
tative teaching? Perhaps the heritage might best be found among the Church’s saints. 
This may be conceded by some who may even deny any legitimate exercise of authority 
of the Church to pronounce upon scripture. Yet even a “survey of saints” would scarcely 
produce the type of interpretation advocated by Vattimo. 
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 For Vattimo, the history of interpretation is in process. As Vattimo has stated, 
“the history of salvation and the history of interpretation are much more closely tied to 
each other than Catholic orthodoxy concedes.”110 Even granting the one time event of 
salvation in the coming of Christ, Vattimo calls for an evolving interpretation of scrip-
ture. “The history of salvation continues as the history of interpretation in the strong 
sense in which Jesus himself was the living, incarnate interpretation of Scripture.”111 In 
other words, the Church has been given the Scriptures, they are to be continually reinter-
preted by the Church, and the Church above all is the community of believers.112 This 
results in an ongoing process of continual interpretation. In the end, the truth that is 
sought in scripture as well as in philosophy and theology is to be found through a process 
of consensus. 
 Vattimo acknowledges that not every interpretation if of course valid, but what is 
needed is a community of interpreters.113 Lacking a foundational view of truth, “universal 
validity of an assertion can be constructed by building consensus in dialogue.”114 This 
consensus is only possible in light of the dissolution of metaphysics and the allowing of a 
plurality of voices, both sacred and secular. Although Vattimo is quite adamant regarding 
gaining the truth by communal consensus, it can be asked, “what of the Church through 
time as the community that has called for and conceded to foundational truth?” Vattimo’s 
view relies on a particular reading of history, and selects the voiced he allows to be heard. 
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Section 4: Conclusion 
 At the heart of much of the cultivation of “weak thought” is a desire to counter 
what is perceived as the violence that has marked our history. Vattimo displays a concern 
that the violence he perceives is derived from Metaphysical convictions. One has only to 
read his chapter heading, “Violence, Metaphysics, and Christianity” to have an idea of 
the role metaphysics play in this equation. He links the violence with the “desire to reach 
and be taken up into the first principles.”115 As Vattimo sees it, all identification between 
law and nature results in metaphysical violence. This describes in his view the vast his-
tory of the Church as related to matters of morality, especially sexual morality. Meta-
physics is here blamed inasmuch as it is the foundation of absolutes. This type of thinking 
must be abolished in order to arrive at true freedom.116 
 In chapter Five I intend to respond to some of the larger issues surrounding the 
clash between foundational thinking and postmodern thought. Included in that treatment 
will be  more pointed remarks concerning Vattimo, and I will address in particular an is-
sue he raises concerning ecumenism. It is especially interesting as it is a topic of much 
concern to the past two Popes.  As part of Vattimo’s call for a weakening of thought he 
cites ecumenical progress. He writes that “charity has replaced the traditional conception 
of what truth means.”117  
 Both the late John Paul in Ut Unum Sint and the present Pope, Benedict XVI have 
been strong proponents of ecumenism, and yet have called for dismissal of a “soft ecu-
menism” that glosses over true differences. Instead they both called for true dialogue 
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(even on the toughest issues), a dialogue based in love, but uncompromising on the truth. 
Logic requires, at least for those who adhere to its force, that the work involved with 
seeking the truth means holding to certain positions and the abandonment of others. 
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Here I am reminded of something Socrates said to Phaedo. In their earlier 
conversations, many false philosophical opinions had been raised, and so 
Socrates says: “It would be easily understandable if someone became so 
annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised 
and mocked all talk about being – but in this way he would be deprived of 
the truth of existence and would suffer great loss.” The West has long 
been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its ra-
tionality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage 
the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur – this is the 
programme with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into 
the debates of our time. 
-Pope Benedict XVI1 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 In this chapter I have the challenge and task of bringing together divergent voices.  
No longer is it possible in our current climate to hold an all-inclusive conversation in a 
single academic language. Postmodern thinkers are quick to point this out, much to their 
credit. Instead, we are faced with the challenge of speaking to one another in the hopes of 
sharing one common element, reality. Even this, or most especially this, poses difficul-
ties. And yet, our very attempt to share reality as we understand it with each other is a 
testament that we do indeed think this task a worthy one. 
 In the fist chapter I presented some preliminary definitions and explanations of 
metaphysics. I believe if nothing else, I have pointed out the crucial work which meta-
physical study endeavors to accomplish. Those in favor of it, such as Tresmontant and 
John Paul, advocate for it as an essential component of philosophy in the Catholic tradi-
tion. Those we have chosen as representatives opposed to it, Marion and Vattimo, do so 
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with equal conviction and force. They see its pursuit as detraction. Certainly, what is at 
stake here is central. I will not attempt a solution that all might find agreeable.  Instead I 
will offer a few modest reflections in light of the previous chapters. Perhaps the merit of 
such a project is in having to consider these divergent voices in close proximity. 
 In this final chapter I will place these divergent voices in dialogue in the follow-
ing manner: to offer general reflections on the questions posed in the first chapter in light 
of encountering Tresmontant, John Paul, Marion and Vattimo, and to then focus on each 
thinker – with a mind to emphasize their contributions and problematic elements. Finally, 
I will offer some possible directions for further progress in metaphysics. Each of the ven-
ues proposed is offered not in a definitive way, but as a means to facilitate further consid-
eration and dialogue as well as, I would hope, a movement towards a greater grasp of 
truth. 
Section 2: Some Reflections 
 As was mentioned in the first chapter when referring to the possible division of 
metaphysics, there is no single partitioning agreed upon by all parties. In order to make a 
needed point here I will refer to the division used in Dulles’ text. When metaphysics is 
broken down into ontology, cosmology, natural theology, anthropology and first princi-
ples, one thing is certain – more precise use of the word is needed when either promoting 
or debunking “metaphysics.” This is most especially true as concerns the writings of the 
postmodern thinkers who call for its end. Even this very desire on their part is to call for 
one specifically definable goal as opposed to another. In order to do that, or at least to 
realize its completion, non-contradiction and sufficient reason must remain intact. This 
also comes into play when debunking natural theology. Even if you think concepts inap-
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propriate to defining God, to even engage in any philosophical investigation requires the 
use of language including concepts (even if you intend to transcend them). This is true if 
we are to say anything at all of “being.” To dissemble the language of metaphysics re-
quires the language of metaphysics (even if corrected and expanded). Among postmodern 
thinkers who intend to protest logic or the foundational principles of thought, one finds 
them needing these very tools to make their case. There are parameters of thought as 
there are limits to all facets of human life. To play within the boundaries does not unnec-
essarily limit, but is constitutive of the game. 
 As previously noted, it is not easy to place these thinkers in dialogue given the 
vastly different natures of their projects. To attempt to briefly convey what each thinker 
means by the term metaphysics may be of some use. I will try to condense the focus of 
each thinker towards this end. For Tresmontant, metaphysics refers to the foundational 
philosophical structure which underlies all worldviews. For John Paul, it is the founda-
tional thought needed to anchor philosophy, theology and ethics. Although differing in 
some respects, metaphysics for both Marion and Vattimo may be thought of as an inher-
ited, overly limiting systematic pursuit whose over-conceptualizations result in a pre-
sumptive understanding of the world.  As concerns God, they would find such language a 
conceptual system which confines God through a lessening of the infinite by way of con-
cepts.  Admittedly, these are only sketches of their thoughts, but it does give one some 
introductory idea of how they differ even in their foundational understanding of what the 
science entails. If anything can be said of all four thinkers, it may be that they all intend 
to address the question of the absolute.  Worthy of note is the fact that although John Paul 
and Tresmontant both stand as strong proponents of the metaphysical pursuit, each re-
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gards and engages in metaphysics in a distinct way.  Whereas Tresmontant sees meta-
physics as the expression of a pre-existing structure present within Judeo-Christian 
thought, John Paul views metaphysics as the needed foundational underpinnings which 
will secure ethics and phenomenology.  It is against this Thomistically based metaphys-
ics, like that of John Paul, that we find Marion and Vattimo. Tresmontant may prove a 
more accommodating dialogue partner as he is not a representative of the school to which 
they are directly opposed. Tresmontant does not so much endeavor to construct a meta-
physics as he extracts the characteristics of the Judeo-Christian worldview which he finds 
already present in revelation and offers a coherent portrait based on his findings. Coming 
from the side of the postmodern thinkers, Marion might be more accommodating dia-
logue partner for Tresmontant than Vattimo. Vattimo’s proposed view of reading scrip-
ture may call into question the traditional reading from which Tresmontant draws. 
 In the first chapter I posed the question of whether, which and why certain meta-
physical concepts should be retained in light of modern challenges.  I believe on particu-
lar issues these thinkers stand at an impasse.  Both Marion and Vattimo unequivocally 
call for the end of metaphysics.  Although some concession may be made, most espe-
cially on the part of Marion, by and large I do not see the more committed postmodern 
philosophers and theologians embracing any pursuit of metaphysics whatsoever, at least 
consciously.  I likewise see Tresmontant standing his ground.  His project is in some 
ways unique, and therefore is not in direct line of the scrutiny posed by our two represen-
tatives of postmodern thought. John Paul, on the other hand, in his desire to bring to-
gether both the insights offered by phenomenology with the foundation found in meta-
physics may indeed offer hope.  The key would seem to be found in coming to grips with 
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the non-negotiable insights proffered by each thinker. Any good theologian will not, and 
rightly so, part with the gems of truth that they have gleaned in the course of their studies. 
Section 3: Tresmontant Revisited 
 I believe the strength of Tresmontant's work is to be found in his unique approach 
which applies logic to biblical revelation and contrasts it with other philosophical sys-
tems.  His ability to draw our attention to the unique contribution of Israel helps us to see 
it apart as a singular phenomenon.  His insistence that not every metaphysical system is 
compatible with every theological system is well presented.  The Biblical metaphysics 
posited by Tresmontant, one of universal comprehensibility, stands in stark contrast to the 
metaphysical alternatives offered by postmodern theology, more specifically, as encoun-
tered in this dissertation, that of Marion.  It is worth asking whether the God of revela-
tion, who came among us in the person of Jesus Christ speaking in parables, would be 
better represented by the thought of Tresmontant or Marion? 
 Tresmontant also rightly points out that even to speak of the world as other than 
the absolute requires metaphysics.  In line with his methodology, Tresmontant draws at-
tention to the fact that the first Vatican Council engages in cataphatic thought when it 
pronounces upon the divine attributes, in which a positive proclamation is made in light 
of God's revelation of himself within the Old and New Testaments.  Also worthy of note, 
is the fact that Tresmontant, though certain of metaphysics, is not strictly speaking as part 
of the Thomistic tradition.  He provides an alternative metaphysical route, one that may 
prove more accommodating to postmodern thinkers. 
 In his elaboration upon creation metaphysics, Tresmontant highlights particular 
oddities which must be accounted for.  In line with his thoughts on continual creation is 
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his consideration of the continuing coming to be of persons.  Tresmontant asks, “How 
can this be explained?”  This question is an excellent springboard for future considera-
tions, whether it be from the phenomenological or more traditional metaphysical perspec-
tive.  Continuing in this vein is his awareness of the organization and origin of the com-
ing to be of persons.  His insight that organisms grow from a germ which is a unity may 
bring about new ways to consider the body-soul composite, which is the human person.  
The final insight concerning his focus upon creation involves his invocation of informa-
tion theory.  His conviction that creation communicates a message may spur on some 
level of dialogue between theology and the sciences. 
 Tresmontant points out that both an understanding of the problem of evil and the 
ability to grasp the concept of time require metaphysical thought.  Certainly the tradi-
tional understanding of evil as a privation of the good of the created order, as received 
from Augustine, is hardly able to be cut loose from a metaphysical thought that centers 
on being.  To move in another direction would require an entirely whole-scale rethinking 
of what we mean by evil.  Time, according to Tresmontant, as the progressive coming to 
be of things is closely associated with this thought in the area of creation.  He explains 
that time is the affirmation of continual coming to be of beings as opposed to a singular 
instance in which all that was to be all at once appeared.  All of this thought is aptly con-
sidered to be properly within the realm of metaphysical thought. 
 Tresmontant, like Marion, elaborated upon the themes of both idolatry and gift, 
but in a very different manner.  For Tresmontant, idolatry is not the applying of some-
thing human to God, but the taking of that which is divine and attributing or applying it to 
that which is created. Marion approaches it from the other side; he sees idolatry as our 
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applying to God something human, a concept, and worshipping this god of our own mak-
ing. In either case, a continued exploration of the theme from both perspectives would 
prove worthwhile.  The theme of being as gift, according to Tresmontant, is arrived at as 
a result of juxtaposing a free creating on the part of a wholly self-sufficient, wholly con-
tent God with that of beings coming to be as the necessary result of a cosmic play.  Once 
again, side by side thematic interplay would prove interesting.  Marion’s highly compli-
cated notion of gift has us contemplating gift as an experience of God in withdrawal.  
God has us recognize him in the gift, but not so as to be grasped by us.  Tresmontant pre-
sents a more concrete vision as he presents creation as gift.  The reader is to recognize the 
generosity of God as they grow in understanding of what it means that God chose to 
bring into existence that which can add nothing to his greatness. 
 The metaphysics of Tresmontant is a creation metaphysics. It is biblical and pro-
vides many advantages over other points of departure. It is, however, worth considering 
how a biblical metaphysics would develop if it were begun from a New Testament point 
of departure. From the Christian perspective the impact of the Incarnation was not and is 
not an isolated past event. Its impact has pervaded every fiber of creation. How would the 
Incarnation as a biblical starting point for metaphysics shape the work of Tresmontant? 
Perhaps his creation metaphysics needs only to be expanded to place emphasis upon the 
New Creation in Christ? 
 As another point of interest we may note that the historical approach of Tresmon-
tant might cause it to be more appealing to a postmodern philosopher. Because Tresmon-
tant’s approach is rooted in scripture, it pays considerable attention to history. Future 
studies could do much to draw out the advantages of a metaphysics which is neither as 
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abstract nor as ahistorical as those which disturb many postmodern philosophers. This, as 
I have previously mentioned, is why I think it plausible that Tresmontant could help 
bridge the gap between metaphysical and non-metaphysical thinkers. 
 Tresmontant's metaphysical contribution provides much as it is unique, practically 
unexplored, Biblically derived and logically extended. Perhaps Tresmontant arrived on 
the scene at an inopportune moment in philosophical history, one in which many voices 
were vying to be heard.  His, unfortunately, was not the loudest, for reasons which it may 
be beyond knowing. Perhaps the metaphysical fatigue which previously mentioned was 
beginning to set in and resulted in a setting aside of metaphysical study, not matter how 
persuasive its case. It was my hope that by reviewing his thought as pertains to metaphys-
ics that I could come to recognize the value of his scholarly contribution. Admittedly, his 
work would have greatly benefited from critical review and scholarly challenges.  As his 
work is predominantly unchallenged it stands worthy of further consideration.  Those 
who encounter his work are often pleased and enthused by it. They may be struck by its 
clarity, simplicity and his logical exposé.  Perhaps a reconsideration (or a primary con-
sideration) of the contribution of Tresmontant is in order. 
Section 4: John Paul II Revisited 
 As this dissertation seeks to take seriously the present phenomenological insights 
as well as the vast metaphysical tradition of Christianity, begun in the patristic period and 
continuing until today, John Paul rightly stands at the center of this work. Regardless of 
whether one finds his project successful, his desire to take seriously the phenomenologi-
cal contribution while remaining a metaphysical realist is indeed praiseworthy.  It is this 
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ability to find value in both pursuits that marks him as a significant intellectual in our 
times. 
 In the introductory section of Chapter Three it was noted that John Paul was con-
cerned with the mystical element of theology. Although it was not dealt with in much de-
tail, I think its significance is undeniably important. It may be this factor which allowed 
him to see a need for integration among what might at times seem incompatible phenom-
ena, or the need to bring together phenomena and system. A systematic approach, like 
that found in scholasticism, may be criticized for being seemingly unrelated to experi-
ence, yet it is often underemphasized that systems are at least in part the result of experi-
ence. The experience brought to bear in systems is often the result of a vast array of ex-
periences of people over a lengthy period of time. John Paul’s desire to integrate all truth 
is commendable, and is an indication of a metaphysical mind, one concerned with the 
“universus.” As briefly mentioned in the chapter, the mystical experience of Thomas did 
indeed have a great effect upon Thomas, however, its influence did not deter him from 
continuing to engage in the project of theological reflection. As compared to what is 
really “Real” our attempts may indeed seem as straw, yet in a confused and relativistic 
age, the straw may prove a great place to lay one’s head. The Pope finds value in all of 
reality, the phenomenological, the metaphysical, as well as the mystical dimensions. 
 The personalism of John Paul is also noteworthy. He stands in marked contradic-
tion to those systematic thinkers who are most concerned with system at the expense of 
the person. His emphasis upon the subjective marks him as a contemporary man. This is 
important at a time when the Church is in danger of becoming irrelevant to many sectors 
of society. However, his focus upon the person as locus of all truth refers to the person as 
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discoverer of truth, not creator of it. Once again he brings to bear a balance between the 
objective and subjective dimensions of truth. The focus upon the person is not only found 
in the phenomenology of our time, according to John Paul, but was also present in part 
even in the thought of Aquinas. John Paul cites Gilson, who saw in Thomas a theologian 
whose perspective considered the entire person, mind, will and heart.2 
 One area that marks a sharp distinction in differing camps of modern thought is 
found in the evaluation of nihilism given by John Paul in opposition to that of both 
Marion and Vattimo. For the Pope, nihilism is the culmination of a number of ideologies 
which he considers incompatible with Christianity, such as idealism, atheistic humanism, 
scientific positivism, pragmatism and eclecticism. For the Pope nihilism stands as a most 
detestable philosophical position. In contrast, both Marion and Vattimo speak of it as a 
most welcome position, one which provides a springboard for new and improved theol-
ogy, devoid of metaphysics.  The despair born of nihilism is the result of faulty thinking 
according to John Paul.  In §46 of Fides et Ratio, John Paul calls to mind the aforemen-
tioned philosophies born of the Enlightenment, and believes that the affect that they have 
brought about has resulted in a confusion which has culminated in a philosophy of de-
spair. In the mind of the pontiff, these misguided philosophies form a caravan. They have 
circled the wagons thus forming a moving circle instead of venturing forth towards truth.  
In other words, the advance of metaphysical thought has been corralled, not further ex-
plored in recent memory. 
 In §49, John Paul issues the much discussed statement that "the Church has no 
philosophy of its own," which is a predominant theme within this dissertation. Chapter 
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Three attempted to make clear that I thought John Paul adopted Thomism as his personal 
philosophy of choice, as well as the affect it had upon Fides et Ratio. However it is im-
portant to keep in mind the larger point, which is, despite the leanings of John Paul or any 
successive pontiff, the Church is first and foremost committed to the truth of revelation.  
In as much as this is its task, all philosophies will be judged against this criterion of truth.  
As Chapter Three attempted to indicate, the Church only considers philosophies insofar 
as they explain reality in a way which coincides with divine revelation.  So, the openness 
of the Church to new philosophical systems is limited by their ability to function as 
proper mediators of revealed truth. 
 In §39 and §72 we find John Paul's assessment of the Christian encounter with 
Greek thought and saw that it was predominantly in line with the thought of Tresmontant.  
He unequivocally states that when a philosophy is in contradiction to the content of reve-
lation it is philosophy which must bend while retaining those elements of thought that are 
in harmony with revelation. As important as §39 is to the document, I believe §72 is most 
in need of serious reflection.  In this section, what is asserted regarding God’s providen-
tial plan in history has been shown far too little attention. Of the many reflections and 
criticism offered of Fides et Ratio, I have not come across one which focuses primarily 
on the role of providence in theological history. John Paul writes in relation to our Greco 
Roman heritage, "to reject this heritage would be to deny the providential plan of God 
who guides his church down the paths of time in history."  It is in this regard that I find 
the reflections of Marion and Vattimo wanting.  To deny God’s providential hand as it 
has been intimately involved in the Church through the past two millennia exhibits a lack 
of appreciation for the real and concrete ways that God has been active among his people.  
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Both Marion and Vattimo are properly concerned with Scripture, but not in the way in 
which the truths inherent in Scripture have been enhanced by the encounter of the Church 
with Greco-Roman thought.  John Paul further asserts that this providential encounter 
continues on in our own day, and is thus not merely anchored in the past, but living in the 
present. The various systems of thought which the Church encounters today can be of 
benefit to the Church and aid in its understanding of revelation. This is true whether or 
not the content is congruent with revelation. It may help by providing a contrast which 
illuminates by contradiction. John Paul’s phenomenological proclivities attest to his be-
lief that the Church is to investigate ways of thinking unknown to previous philosophers 
and theologians. 
 Our present pontiff, Benedict XVI, has extended the thought of John Paul as con-
cerns our providential encounter with Greco-Roman thought.  In his Regensburg Ad-
dress, he stated that the benefits derived from our encounter with Greek thought are per-
ennially valid.  He additionally posed a possible future course of thought for theology in 
light of Greek thought.  He suggests that L/logos may be the appropriate point of conver-
gence between biblical faith and Greek inquiry.3 One benefit garnered by this encounter 
provided the church with the language and understanding it needed while it delicately 
worked out defining matters of Christology and Trinitarian thought.  Its terminology was 
considered adequate for use in previous conciliar teaching and theological expression.  It 
also culminated in having a profound affect upon the language and thought of numerous 
saints and doctors throughout the history of the Catholic faith. If this metaphysically re-
plete system of thought were inherently flawed, a charge which has been leveled against 
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it, I hardly think it would have gone unnoticed for so long and by so many, especially by 
those saintly men and women whose wisdom surpassed the knowledge of their own time. 
 This further leads to another related topic.  In §55, §65 and §66, John Paul, in line 
with Pope Pius XII, warns us of the danger involved in abandoning the traditional termi-
nology of the Church.  This seems to some very practical advice.  Since a good portion of 
the terminology that is used in conciliar documents, official church teachings, the writ-
ings of revered theologians and doctors as well as the recently distributed Universal 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, may be considered scholastic in influence, what would 
it entail practically to entirely abandon this language or system of metaphysical thought? 
Additionally, how are theologians of the future to take on the task of adequately convey-
ing a faith that is congruent with the past, without having had exposure to this terminol-
ogy?  Contained within our understanding of the faith are terms which carry with them 
very precise meanings that have, in some cases, been deeply thought over by previous 
councils or theologians.  Take for example the teaching of the real presence of Christ in 
the Eucharist, which has for centuries been taught explained and understood using the 
term transubstantiation.  A proper and adequate understanding of the term substance is a 
prerequisite for considering this teaching.  It may be countered that new and better ways 
of explaining real presence should be pursued. Allowing for this, if one is to be sure of 
conveying accurately the truth which was defined by transubstantiation in new ways, a 
knowledge of the scholastic linguistic system is in order.  And so, practically speaking, it 
is a legitimate question to ask if the church is expected to continually modify its linguistic 
base as it approaches philosophies of the future.  The metaphysical language amassed by 
the Church to date is quite substantial.  Though neither Pius XII nor John Paul require the 
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continued use of traditional terminology, they nonetheless call for the theologian to be 
familiar with it. Even if the Church of the future chooses to discard this scholastically 
based language, must the Church deny the efficacy of the language as it was previously 
employed? It appears that some postmodern thinkers would be happy with nothing less 
than the wholesale removal of all terms which are derived from metaphysical thinking. 
To my mind this seems unreasonable and unnecessary. 
 Some ecumenical considerations may be appropriate to consider here. How is the 
Catholic Church to make ecumenical progress if it is tied to a scholastically based lan-
guage which is not used by either the Orthodox or Reformed traditions? This question 
must be addressed as it has been reiterated numerous times in official Church teaching 
that the Church is unreservedly committed to ecumenical progress. This was the clear 
teaching of the Second Vatican Council, Ut Unum Sint and various other teachings of 
both John Paul and Benedict XVI. The future direction of the Church entails a linguistic 
challenge which cannot be ignored. There is no doubt that the language which each inter-
locutor brings to the table will be mutually enriched by continual dialogue and willing-
ness to engage the other in their totality, including specific language, conceptual ideas 
and theological histories. This is best accomplished as each group contributes its insights 
to the wisdom of the other. This itself would prove very enlightening and beneficial for 
future ecumenical discussions. 
 As my concentration is specifically upon metaphysics we might here refine our 
focus. The Reformed tradition has not been as involved in the questions of metaphysics 
as has their Catholic counterparts who inherited the tradition of scholastic thought. 
Thinkers like Norman Geisler, an Evangelical philosopher, finds that Thomas is a wel-
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come companion when dealing with philosophical questions. He makes what many be-
lieve to be a strong case for the Evangelical need for a Thomistic contribution.4 As for the 
Orthodox, perhaps the only solution would be to maintain parallel systems that while util-
izing different language maintain a clear understanding of common meaning and history. 
This in fact might prove to be a beneficial way to keep from being so overly invested in a 
single system that it overshadows the truth which the system is meant to convey. It would 
also allow the unique beauty of each heritage, East and West, to continue to develop 
without being subsumed into the other. It is also worth mentioning, that their tie to the 
classical Greek thinkers also allows for much common ground. 
 As concerns John Paul’s final assessment of the place of metaphysics for today 
and the future, I think it impossible to deny his unequivocal commitment to its continua-
tion within the Church’s philosophy and theology. Although he did not mandate a return 
to Thomistic metaphysics, he did call for a restoration of some form of metaphysics. This 
is certainly not the agenda of most postmodern thinkers. His insistence upon both meta-
physical realism, as expressed in his correspondence  theory of truth (adaequatio), and 
his emphasis upon a philosophy of being both unequivocally establish his position. 
 I ended the third chapter with some notes of admiration as well as challenges to 
the thought of John Paul. In conclusion, I find John Paul to be a formidable thinker and a 
man who set himself the task of thinking with the Church (in line with the sentir con la 
iglesia of St. Ignatius Loyola). He strove to be faithful to truth, especially as it is present 
in revelation, and as it was discoverable by the human mind. His philosophy was broad 
enough to embrace both phenomenology and metaphysical realism. It is too soon to draw 
any definitive conclusions pertaining to his comprehensive contribution to philosophical 
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and theological thought. As scholars critically grapple with his work we will most likely 
gain a growing, positive evaluation. For now his presence still looms large within the 
Church. 
Section 5: Marion and Vattimo 
 Although the esoteric language of Marion may be off-putting upon first reading, 
once one comes to understand more deeply his project and the reasons for his unique way 
of speaking there is much to be gained by reading Marion. Upon contemplating the 
themes offered by Marion, I was struck by how each provided great insight into the mys-
tery of God while adequately conveying his sense of “divine distance.” For example, the 
reflection upon the idol and icon was a stark reminder that theologians should be mindful 
of their use of language when attempting to illuminate divine mysteries. We must be 
careful in how we think about God, never allowing our concepts to confine the One who 
transcends all thought. We may too easily create a god of our own making, and idolize it 
through our gaze, thus replacing the God of revelation with a “fashioned” god. The apo-
phatic way may have been too much forgotten at times, and Marion provides a good re-
minder of its benefits. Yet, I am perplexed by his desire to have the apophatic way as the 
only voice for theology. Thomas acknowledged the via negativa, yet was also was a pro-
ponent of cataphatic thought. To implement Marion’s vision of theology would entail a 
removal of a considerable portion of the theological heritage that makes up the larger por-
tion of our history, including a bulk of the biblical witness. There have been 1500 years 
(since Pseudo-Dionysius) of theological contributions that can not, and should not, be 
cast aside because they are not apophatic in nature. In addition, as Roger Duncan states, 
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much of the work of phenomenology bears a striking resemblance to poetry.5 Is it possi-
ble for postmodern thinkers like Marion and Vattimo to see their work fitting in as a con-
tribution to the larger whole instead of being the solution? Can we not benefit from both 
poetry and prose? Is there no room for a Gilson or Maritain within their vision of the 
Church? Perhaps Marion’s move towards a phenomenology that thinks more positively 
of the idol, as was noted in the previous chapter, provides a future direction.  
 I believe a serious consideration should be given to conceptual language. This in-
vestigation may be able to produce a middle ground where it is admitted that as limited as 
language may be it still proves useful. It would seem that the goal of dismissing all con-
cepts would be counterproductive as well as impossible. Further, Marion’s attempt at re-
buffing logic and sufficient reason is counterproductive even towards his goal, as was 
previously mentioned.  A realization of the limits of language when applied to God is a 
must, but as I will elaborate further on, I think it can be done in ways other than that pro-
posed by Marion and Vattimo.  To do this I briefly present the solution of W. Norris 
Clarke and his thought concerning analogous language.   
 A further, separate point is that both Marion and Vattimo assert that revelation is 
the pinnacle and that all thought should flow from this source. Scholastic thought is then 
viewed as an unnecessary elaboration. But the question then remains, Why then do we 
need any elaboration whatsoever? Why not just read and be content to encounter the bib-
lical texts directly? Vattimo may respond that revelation is encountered as a lived reality 
and therefore needs to be expressed anew each and every time one reads the scriptures 
and a consensus arrived at. This too presents problems as it provides no stability of inter-
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pretation and leaves the faithful in a state of perpetual flux and discontinuity with the 
past. Thus he holds that we are better off with a hearing of the text without further elabo-
ration, in effect, liturgy without theology. 
 Marion’s treatment of the various themes culminates in love. It is certainly hard to 
argue with a theology of love. However, stated simply, the love of which he speaks on 
one front lacks the necessary and supporting content, and where it does have content it 
runs the risk of falling into the idol that he is trying to avoid. Marion can not himself 
wholly avoid the possible idolatry of concepts from which he so ardently tries to distance 
himself even in his theology of love, a conceptual term, I might add, in its own right. 
 Both Marion and Vattimo are concerned with the dangers that may result from 
metaphysics on any number of fronts. They are concerned with how it will do damage to 
any thinking in relation to God. They are also concerned that a solidly constructed meta-
physics will lead to a dangerous intolerance. A strong ontology leads to violence, or so 
they claim. That ideas can be dangerous or even deadly is beyond rational denial as the 
communist and socialist movements of the last century clearly indicate (a point which 
John Paul repeatedly made during his pontificate). Consider also the present day prob-
lems of the human slave trade and religious fundamentalism and the violence they perpe-
trate to see how belief systems can continue to manifest violence. George Weigel notes 
that the Lublin professors, John Paul included, were well aware the ideas had conse-
quences as evidenced by the corpses they saw strewn across Europe in the wake of Nazi 
Germany and Communist Russia.6 That a particular metaphysics may incline one towards 
immoral and barbaric action is hard to deny. In fact it is the opinion of both Tresmontant 
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and John Paul, in advocating for the necessity of a metaphysics, that not just any meta-
physics will do. However, one could not find in a rightly understood Thomas a single 
phylum of teaching that would lead to such barbarism.  
 The importance of the choice of philosophical systems can not be overestimated. 
This in fact is what Tresmontant strove so diligently to establish. Certain philosophies 
contain within themselves a metaphysical structure whether or not one wishes it to be so 
or not. Why is it then that Marion and Vattimo choose to buy into the thought of 
Nietzsche and other thinkers who stand in fundamental opposition to their Christian 
faith? One may counter that Aquinas did much the same in drawing from both Plato and 
Aristotle, both of whom were outside of the Judeo-Christian tradition. This is a larger 
question than can be addressed here, but suffice it to say that each system must be evalu-
ated on its own merits and trajectory. In addition, Aquinas and others were willing, and in 
fact did, make significant changes to the Greek thought they received. It may be asked if 
much of postmodern thought has bought into philosophical systems that are questionable 
as to their compatibility with Christian theology instead of following the trend of accept-
ing what is helpful and jettisoning what is in opposition to Christian faith. 
 I have mentioned how Marion and Vattimo are in agreement that the metaphysical 
project should come to a halt, but I have not drawn sufficient attention to a significant 
point of difference. Marion’s thought resonates more effectively in an Old Testament 
context. He is ever-waiting, living in hope for the coming of the Messiah. 1 John 1 would 
be a passage that would not fit well within his thought. For Marion, it would display too 
much touching, grasping and seeing. In contrast, Vattimo is just the opposite. He so much 
emphasizes the incarnational that God seems to have squeezed every last bit of transcen-
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dence out of himself in becoming human (a form of Hegelianism). In this way the old 
adage in media stat virtu (or in this case in media stat veritas) may hold quite true. It 
seems as if Christian orthodoxy stands between either extreme. 
 As for a positive contribution coming from Vattimo we may look to some further 
development of his emphasis on consensus. There may be room here for some type of 
merging of his thought with that of the sensus fidelium. In an optimistic light we might be 
able to see how in dialogue and participation we may be led towards agreement. The area 
of contention may be found in agreeing upon who qualifies as the fidelium. 
 The most pressing question that I have for both Marion and Vattimo is fundamen-
tal and yet has gone unanswered, namely, have they sufficiently established that meta-
physics is unneeded? Have they sufficiently argued that what they provide has super-
seded the metaphysical tradition of the past? Do they adequately explore questions of be-
ing, or questions that attempt to illuminate “the one and the many”? How do they  at-
tempt to explain the problem of change? These timeless metaphysical questions are not 
entertained but are rather set aside. As Paul Griffiths has stated in response to the pro-
jected thesis of Vattimo, 
the first element in this theoretical gloss is the idea of the simple refusal.  
A whole vocabulary - that of truth, reality, objectivity, universality - is 
identified and refused.  It is not argued against, not shown to be incoher-
ent, not opposed by its mirror image, but simply refused.  In rejecting real-
ism, Rorty and Vattimo do not espouse or argue for anti-realism; and in re-
jecting metaphysics they don't argue (or even suggest, at least when 
they're being careful) that metaphysics is impossible.  They are "post-
metaphysical" rather than "anti-metaphysical": they aren't against meta-
physics; they're simply after it, subsequent to it.  They left it behind.  Re-
fusal is not denial.  It is, instead, the abandonment of one lexicon and the 
deployment of another.  Someone who turns from philosophy to jazz im-
provisation has not refused or rebutted philosophy, but merely refused or 
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abandoned it.  To refute or rebut would still be to practice philosophy, and 
this Rorty and Vattimo do not wish to do.7 
 
 
 He states that instead of posing actual philosophical challenges to metaphysics, to 
which other philosophers may choose to give answers, they choose to narrate. 
“Post-metaphysical historicists win, when they do, not by out-arguing their opponents, 
but by out-narrating them, by telling the story with sufficient verve and inventiveness that 
others also want to tell versions of it, and in doing so to abandon their older stories-in this 
case, the stories about truth and realism....A carefully consistent post-metaphysical his-
toricism of this sort is not easy to refute, since it does not use a vocabulary in which refu-
tation is even a recognizable item.”8 
 He goes on to attempt two answers to the postmodern challenge: 
How, then, to respond?  One perfectly proper response is to make one's 
own refusal.  If something is offered, without argument, as an object of 
seductive charm, the offer can be refused without embarrassment or justi-
fication...the enterprise of post-metaphysical historicism requires for its 
own success that people listen, adopt, and imitate.  Not doing this, there-
fore, serves as a refusal Rorty and Vattimo can recognize...but there is an-
other kind of response that may sometimes be useful.  It, too, is an inter-
vention rather than an argument.  Rorty and Vattimo can themselves be 
pegged, and it's easy enough for Christians to do this with our own techni-
cal lexicon.  We can explain to ourselves what kind of performance Rorty 
and Vattimo offer.  We can diagnose their performance as a bad case of li-
bido dominandi, in which their own egos have been written so large that 
they must depict history as a story of progress culminating in their own 
genius.  We can counter close to this unrestricted superbia the Christian 
virtue of humility. And we can narrate the emergence of post-
metaphysical historicism as the last, dying gasp of a story the West has 
told itself about its own supremacy.9 
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 Griffiths’ criticism is sharp. He does not indicate any sense of having benefited by 
contact with the works of postmodern thinkers such as Marion and Vattimo.  Having no 
sense of appreciation for any of the contributions of postmodernism may not help Grif-
fiths to win a hearing in certain circles.  However, the criticism offered by Griffiths 
should not go unnoticed.  It is easy to forget when being absorbed in the reading of post-
modern thought that the dismantling of metaphysics and its defeat as proposed by post-
modern literature has not been sufficiently established. Griffiths draws our attention to 
this fact. He asks us think about the method employed by postmodern thinkers, that of 
using persuasive and attractive rhetoric in place of logic and classical philosophical rea-
soning. He has us ask if the challenge of sophism has appeared once again in an updated 
form? 
Section 6: Proposed Future Ways to Proceed 
 What I intend to do at this point is to offer some possibly promising directions for 
theology in light of the previous discussion which both take seriously the offerings of 
postmodern thought and explicate the merits of continuing the metaphysical tradition. 
This summary will offer proposed beginnings in light of the previous four chapters but 
should not be considered a holistic or complete evaluation of the question thus far exam-
ined. There are starting points in contemporary theology, which if rigorously maintained, 
offer no concession and allow no room for dialogue. Those who believe that anything 
less than a strict Thomism (in the tradition of the manuals) is a betrayal of the tradition, 
will end up doing their philosophizing in a such a provincial way as to give no hearing to 
postmodernism’s positive offerings. Those postmodern thinkers who wish to eliminate all 
the cataphatic theology that has taken place between Pseudo-Dionysius and today will 
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also be sorely disappointed. They will miss out on authentically encountering the theo-
logical experience of men and women who have found the metaphysically replete theol-
ogy of their day enlightening as well as amenable to growth in holiness and love of God. 
The added difficulty that we come upon through differing philosophical languages and 
systems admittedly poses a challenge, but it conversely offers an engaging opportunity. 
Section 7: Analogous Language and God 
 At the heart of much of the argument offered by postmodern thinkers is a view of 
language which seeks to undermine its ability to convey meaning. For a vast majority of 
Catholic thinkers throughout history, the ability of language to adequately convey mean-
ing has not been problematic. To remember that there have been similar challenges one 
has only to recall the nominalist controversy. As this pertains to the exercise of theology, 
we are crippled if we are not permitted the linguistic tools needed for investigation and 
expression. This linguistic doubt is more pronounced when referring to God. It is the 
conviction of postmodern theologians, like Marion, that we must rethink our use of lan-
guage when speaking of God. 
In the past the difficulty was recognized and was dealt with in a different manner.  
Early on, theologians realized that the terms employed when applied to human beings are 
radically different when applied to God.  They found the solution to this problem in the 
use of analogous language.  W. Norris Clarke has nicely laid out an explanation of how 
Thomas and others have handled this problem in his The Philosophical Approach to God.  
I will briefly recap his argument. 
 The solution posed by Thomas began as he and other medieval thinkers contem-
plated the names of God. The problem faced by Thomas, and still pertinent to theologians 
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today, is that, "all meaningful language about the real-world is drawn from a matrix of 
human experience, and that to use such language to talk about a being beyond our experi-
ence and not testable in experience is in principle impossible because it is empty of any 
content we can understand when applied to such a being."10  
 Clarke admits that there have previously been many so-called Thomistic explana-
tions of analogy which were inadequately representative of Thomas. He notes that one 
attempt coming from the school of Cajetan was based on an earlier work of Thomas, 
which he later abandoned.  Thomas then replaced it with a "more metaphysically 
grounded ‘analogy of causal participation,’ as it is now called.”11  Clark makes note that 
in his presentation he must only be interested in those analogous terms:  
which express literally and properly, not metaphorically or by extrinsic 
denomination, some real intrinsic similarity found diversely but propor-
tionately in all the analogates. Such analogies are called ‘analogies of 
proper proportionality’ in traditional Thomistic terminology and are the 
only ones which are really useful in metaphysics, especially in speaking 
about God. … These objective real similarities are not in the order of 
forms or essences, strictly speaking, precisely because they range over 
many different forms and essences. … Thus power can be exercised by an 
atom, a plant, and muscle, a mind, or a will; the modes of exercising it can 
be radically different in each case, yet we notice a genuine similarity, 
which we wish to express by the unified analogous term ‘power.’12 
 
 
These terms as they are used in reference to a wide number of divergent objects are pur-
posely and systematically vague terms, according to Clarke.  Any attempt to too narrowly 
define or pin down analogous language proves self-defeating for the purpose of using 
analogy.  Such concepts must be flexible; it is what Clarke prefers to call a stretch con-
cept.  Clarke believes the mind capable of such a feat but cautions that an application of 
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 W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The Philosophical Approach to God, rev. ed. (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2007) 70. 
11
 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 72. 
12
 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 72-73. 
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logic which seeks to too narrowly define terms to be used analogously can also be coun-
terproductive.  Analogy most properly functions within the lived use of language. 
 With this flexible use of concepts in place, Clark moves forward to ask how we 
can extend an analogous term beyond our present experience. His contention is that as the 
mind encounters realities beyond its experience, its inner dynamism propels it to an ex-
pansion beyond the horizon of consciousness to which the mind is implicitly disposed. 
From the beginning of our intellectual life there is a necessary mutual co-
involvement of being, intelligibility, and analogy.  But as soon as we have 
found it either necessary or fruitful to expand the application of a particu-
lar attribute analogously to some new dimension of reality, we must im-
mediately in the same act purify the meaning-content of this analogous 
term, rendering it less determinate and precise so that its possible range of 
applications will no longer be restricted by its presently experienced range 
of application.  If the term we first pick is resistant to such inner stretching 
of meaning, we seek for another, broader one which will allow it.13 
 
 
 Clark then takes his thinking a bit further.  He extends his analogous use of lan-
guage to include God.  He believes that Thomas points out the way in which we can 
bridge the gap between God and his creatures, giving us a meaningful way of speaking 
about him.  This belief is found in causal participation, or efficient causality.  Clarke 
writes, 
It is the fundamental property of all efficient causality – a doctrine implicit 
in Plato but first laid down by Aristotle, echoed with some reservations by 
the neo-Platonic tradition, and systematically exploited by St. Thomas in 
his participation metaphysics-that every effect must in some way resemble 
its cause.  Since all that the effect has comes from its cause and is the gift 
of the cause, and since the cause cannot give what it does not possess, at 
least in some higher equivalent way, then under pain of intelligibility there 
must be some resemblance between the effect and its cause, at least in the 
most fundamental order of existence and the latter's satellite property, such 
as unity.14 
 
                                                 
13
 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 77. 
14
 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 79. 
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 This leads us once again to a consideration of how to handle apophatic treatments 
of God.  Clarke believes that creation itself forges a bond between God and his creatures. 
This relationship, he holds, should have us think of God as infinitely higher rather than 
totally other.  This strikes at the heart of the proposed ways of thinking about God pre-
sented by many postmodern thinkers.  Clarke posits that a God who is totally other does 
not relate to us in any fashion and in such a way does not allow for an attraction to God 
on our part. He finds the view of our being related to God consistent with Scripture and 
refers to the passage in Genesis where God says "let us make man to our own image and 
likeness." This passage hints at our participation in some of the perfections of God, be it 
ever so far off as the infinite is as compared to the finite.  
 Clarke additionally wishes to highlight one point which he finds indispensable for 
understanding Thomas.  He stresses the "capital importance of the ontological bond of 
similitude deriving from causal participation as the indispensable metaphysical underpin-
ning for giving meaning to language about God in Thomistic (and, I do not hesitate to 
say, I think any viable) philosophical theology....Cut the bond of causal similitude be-
tween God and creature which, outside direct mystical experience, is our only bridge 
across the unfathomable abyss between finite and Infinite, and there is no path left to the 
mystery shrouded peaks of the further shore.”15 
 This brief examination of Clarke, while not a full examination of his thought or 
philosophy, does allow for a fruitful answer to the postmodern question of language and 
God. Marion and Vattimo have chosen to take another path, yet they have not adequately 
shown analogy, as here presented, to be an unachievable way of speaking about God.  It 
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 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 81. 
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may be as Griffiths has stated, that postmodern thinkers have chosen to sidestep meta-
physics altogether. However, that leaves those of us who have not chosen to make such a 
move receptive to a renewed Thomistically inspired way of speaking about God. 
Section 8: The Metaphysical Realism of the IAP 
 A number of years ago the International Academy of Philosophy in Liechtenstein 
undertook the project of pursuing studies in the movement called Phenomenological Re-
alism. The University of Dallas furthered the project when they produced a Journal which 
prompted a number of scholars to join in this course of study. The goal of this journal, 
Aletheia, was indicated by its title which refers both to truth and reality. It attempted to 
pursue a course of philosophical study with an eye to truth in its purest form. Their goal 
was to pursue a philosophy “capable of knowing Being and Truth as they objectively are 
in themselves, as they are independently of human thought.” “The scope of this journal 
should be nothing less than the scope of the ‘philosophia perennis,’ understood as the 
questions and discoveries found among the greatest philosophers of all ages, as some-
thing more universal than any particular ‘school.’”16  
 The goal was to engage all schools of philosophy with a mind to look beyond sys-
tems in search of the truth. It was to seek a “universal philosophy” which was to lead 
thinkers beyond the specializations which they so often pursue in the current state of aca-
demia. As fond as some of the thinkers were of the thought of Thomas, they stated that 
“We are convinced that our resolution to proceed systematically cannot be carried out 
simply by reviving the system of Thomism.”17 
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 Josef Seifert, "Forward," Aletheia [University of Dallas, Irving, Texas], 1 (June 1977) i. 
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 Seifert, "Forward," Aletheia,iii. 
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 They wanted to stress that their pursuit (although recognizing phenomenological 
insights) was not one of pure phenomenology, but of phenomenology coupled with real-
ism. They modeled their thought on that of the early Husserl as found in  Logical Investi-
gations. They were convinced that the contribution of this approach had been vastly un-
der-recognized. “What the public has yet to realize is that the ‘phenomenological realists’ 
discovered again that there are essential structures of being, which, being neither invented 
nor constituted by the human mind, are discovered by it, and which in their timeless va-
lidity precede both the changeable empirical things which they govern, as well as the 
changeable human mind which knows them.”18 
 As previously noted when presenting the offerings of Clarke, no cursory overview 
is adequate to give sufficient answer to the problems faced in this dissertation, especially 
when trying got bring together classical and postmodern theologians. Yet, this has been 
offered as a sign that there are efforts being made which seek to bring together divergent 
voices and seriously consider their perspectives on truth. I have cited the I.A.P. as one 
such group endeavoring to hear all voices with a mind to integrate the truth content pre-
sented. 
Section 9: Conclusion 
 It has been the intention of this dissertation to consider both Claude Tresmontant 
and Pope John Paul II as they have contributed to the role of metaphysics within theol-
ogy. This treatment in no way makes any pretense at being comprehensive, but rather has 
endeavored to explore both perspectives.  It was then thought beneficial to have them en-
ter into dialogue with the anti-metaphysical thought of Jean-Luc Marion and Gianni Vat-
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timo. I hoped to have presented the thoughts of both Tresmontant and John Paul in a way 
which compellingly yet critically showed the strength of their arguments as concerns the 
necessity of metaphysics.  For Tresmontant it was found already present in the biblical 
texts, needing only to be drawn out and presented. For John Paul it was found in the need 
of a continued metaphysics tradition, able to adequately ground ethical thought while re-
maining a consistent witness to revealed truth, which is the task of the Church. 
 As for Jean-Luc Marion and Vattimo, I believe I have been sufficiently sympathetic to 
their projects in as much as they were able to be reconciled with Catholic philosophy and 
theology. I acknowledge the importance of the apophatic way and recognize the efforts 
made to remind us of this approach to knowing God and recognizing the limits inherent 
in conceptual language. I nonetheless feel that they fail when they attempt to elevate apo-
phatic way as the only way, specifically as their proposals neglect metaphysical princi-
ples and thought inherent in the Biblical witness, as attested to by Tresmontant. I likewise 
think their project weak as it attempts to do away with the Christian heritage which has 
come to us through the ages and has been providentially guided.  Continued dialogue is 
certainly needed, but not in a way that leaves the Christian faith devoid of its metaphysi-
cal heritage as John Paul clearly indicated. 
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